40 resultados para Inequality, redistribution, political economy
Resumo:
We discuss a unified theory of directed technological change and technologyadoption that can shed light on the causes of persistent productivity differencesacross countries. In our model, new technologies are designed in advanced countries and diffuse endogenously to less developed countries. Our framework is richenough to highlight three broad reasons for productivity differences: inappropriatetechnologies, policy-induced barriers to technology adoption, and within-countrymisallocations across sectors due to policy distortions. We also discuss the effectsof two aspects of globalization, trade in goods and migration, on the wealth ofnations through their impact on the direction of technical progress. By doing so,we illustrate some of the equalizing and unequalizing forces of globalization.
Resumo:
In this paper we study the relationship between labor market institutions and monetary policy. We use a simple macroeconomic framework to show how optimal monetary policy rules depend on labor institutions (labor adjustment costs, and nominal and real wage rigitidy) and social preferences regarding inflation, employment, and real wages. We also calibrate our model tocompute how the change in social welfare brought about by giving up monetary policy as a result of joining the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) depends on institutions and preferences. We then use the calibrated model to analyze how EMU affects the incentives for labor market reform, both for reformsthat increase the economy's adjustment potential and for those that affect the long-run unemployment rate.
Resumo:
This paper analyzes the political economy of immigration when the salient electoralissue is the level of immigrants and the relevant immigration policy is the expenditurein immigration control. We consider that immigration affects voters? welfarethrough economic and non economic factors. We model political competition `a laWittman with the ideology of parties endogenously determined at equilibrium. Atequilibrium, parties propose different levels of immigration, located to the left and tothe right of the median voter?s ideal point, and combine skilled and unskilled workersamong their constituencies. Numerical simulations provide the levels of immigrationproposed by the two parties and the composition of parties? constituencies as we varythe efficacy of immigration control and the intensity of immigration aversion.
Resumo:
We develop a theory of news coverage in environments of information abundance. News consumersare time-constrained and browse through news items that are available across competingoutlets, choosing which ones to read or skip. Media firms are aware of consumers' preferences andconstraints, and decide on rankings of news items that maximize their profits. We find that, evenwhen readers and outlets are rational and unbiased and when markets are competitive, readersmay read more than they would like to, and the stories they read may be significantly differentfrom the ones they prefer. Next, we derive implications on diverse aspects of new and traditionalmedia. These include a rationale for tabloid news, a theory of optimal advertisement placementin newscasts, and a justification for readers' migration to online media platforms in order to circumventinefficient rankings found in traditional media. We then analyze methods for restoringreader-efficient standards and discuss the political economy implications of the theory.
Resumo:
La dècada de 1980 va significar un punt i a part per als governs metropolitans. Després de viure una època daurada durant els 60 i 70, la reestructuració del sistema politicoeconòmic va comportar que les estructures de govern metropolità fossin qüestionades i fins i tot suprimides. Quan tot semblava indicar que restarien només com a record, la lògica de competència entre grans ciutats i la necessitat de reinventar-se en base a un desenvolupament sostenible va suposar un inesperat renaixement de la política metropolitana. Si fins aleshores la seva necessitat s'havia justificat bàsicament des d'un punt de vista funcional, seguint pautes tecnòcrates i burocratitzades, la nova metropolítica se centra en la competitivitat i en la sostenibilitat, alhora que posa èmfasi en assajar mètodes de governança. Londres, ciutat que presenta certs paral·lelismes històrics amb Barcelona, ha estat una ciutat pionera i de la seva experiència es pot aprendre per la capital catalana
Resumo:
[spa] El estudio de la presencia de ideas económicas en los debates parlamentarios se ha convertido recientemente en un objeto importante dentro de la investigación sobre el proceso de institucionalización de la economía política en Europa Occidental en la llamada era liberal. En este marco general, este artículo se centra en el análisis de un caso de particular interés: La relevancia del pensamiento económico y el papel jugado por los economistas en los debates parlamentarios que siguieron a la creación de un nuevo impuesto que trataba de captar la renta personal, que fue lanzado por el ministro de Hacienda Laureano Figuerola en 1868. El artículo intenta demostrar, en primer lugar, que las ideas económicas jugaron efectivamente un papel relevante en las discusiones sobre el impuesto sobre la renta y que la presencia e influencia de los economistas en el Legislativo en este tiempo fue notable. En segundo lugar, que este fue un intento serio de modernizar la estructura fiscal española llevado a cabo por el Gobierno Provisional, el cual trató de diseñar un sistema impositivo capaz de fomentar el crecimiento económico del país.
Resumo:
[spa] El estudio de la presencia de ideas económicas en los debates parlamentarios se ha convertido recientemente en un objeto importante dentro de la investigación sobre el proceso de institucionalización de la economía política en Europa Occidental en la llamada era liberal. En este marco general, este artículo se centra en el análisis de un caso de particular interés: La relevancia del pensamiento económico y el papel jugado por los economistas en los debates parlamentarios que siguieron a la creación de un nuevo impuesto que trataba de captar la renta personal, que fue lanzado por el ministro de Hacienda Laureano Figuerola en 1868. El artículo intenta demostrar, en primer lugar, que las ideas económicas jugaron efectivamente un papel relevante en las discusiones sobre el impuesto sobre la renta y que la presencia e influencia de los economistas en el Legislativo en este tiempo fue notable. En segundo lugar, que este fue un intento serio de modernizar la estructura fiscal española llevado a cabo por el Gobierno Provisional, el cual trató de diseñar un sistema impositivo capaz de fomentar el crecimiento económico del país.
Resumo:
The recent strides of democracy in Latin America have been associated to conflicting outcomes. The expectation that democracy would bring about peace and prosperity have been only partly satisfied. While political violence has been by and large eradicated from the sub-continent, poverty and social injustice still prevail and hold sway. Our study argues that democracy matters for inequality through the growing strength of center left and left parties and by making political leaders in general more responsive to the underprivileged. Furthermore, although the pension reforms recently enacted in the region generated overall regressive outcomes on income distribution, democratic countries still benefit from their political past: where democratic tradition was stronger, such outcomes have been milder. Democratic tradition and the specific ideological connotations of the parties in power, on the other hand, did not play an equally crucial role in securing lower levels of political violence: during the last wave of democratizations in Latin America, domestic peace was rather an outcome of political and social concessions to those in distress. In sum, together with other factors and especially economic ones, the reason why recent democratizations have provided domestic peace in most cases, but have been unable so far to solve the problem of poverty and inequality, is that democratic traditions in the subcontinent have been relatively weak and, more specifically, that this weakness has undermined the growth of left and progressive parties, acting as an obstacle to redistribution. Such weakness, on the other hand, has not prevented the drastic reduction of domestic political violence, since what mattered in this case was a combination of symbolic or material concessions and political agreements among powerful élites and counter-élites.
Resumo:
Why was England first? And why Europe? We present a probabilistic model that builds on big-push models by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989), combined with hierarchical preferences. The interaction of exogenous demographic factors (in particular the English low-pressure variant of the European marriage pattern)and redistributive institutions such as the old Poor Law combined to make an Industrial Revolution more likely. Essentially, industrialization is the result of having a critical mass of consumers that is rich enough to afford (potentially) mass-produced goods. Our model is then calibrated to match the main characteristics of the English economy in 1750 and the observed transition until 1850.This allows us to address explicitly one of the key features of the British IndustrialRevolution unearthed by economic historians over the last three decades the slowness of productivity and output change. In our calibration, we find that the probability of Britain industrializing is 5 times larger than France s. Contrary to the recent argument by Pomeranz, China in the 18th century had essentially no chance to industrialize at all. This difference is decomposed into a demographic and a policy component, with the former being far more important than the latter.
Resumo:
This paper analyzes the different equilibria in rural-urban migrationsand political redistribution that result from the interaction betweenincreasing political returns, the distribution of land, and creditmarket imperfections. Governments that put a special weight on thewelfare of urban workers when setting agricultural prices generate apolitical externality in the urban sector, giving peasants anincentive to migrate in anticipation of policy determination. Ifcredit markets are imperfect, land ownership confers higherproductivity to peasants, who require large price changes to migrate.In this context, land inequality would lead to large migrations and tolarge policy change, while an egalitarian land distribution would leadto no migration and to a small policy change. This interaction shedslight on the contrasting experience of Latin America and East Asia atthe outset of World War II.