El Futuro de la PESC en el debate actual de la UE

La principal obligación de la Unión debe ser la de extender más allá de sus fronteras la estabilidad política y la prosperidad económica de la que han disfrutado los ciudadanos comunitarios en los últimos cincuenta años. Empezando lógicamente por nuestros vecinos más inmediatos. Consiguiendo el viejo sueño de la reunificación de Europa. Logrando conciliar las Instituciones con la historia y la geografía de nuestro continente.

La PESC en el Debate sobre el Futuro de Europa

Este artículo analiza las contribuciones de los representantes de los Gobiernos nacionales en la Convención Europea en materia de Política Exterior y de Seguridad Común. Intenta mostrar de forma gráfica los principales temas de debate abiertos sobre Acción Exterior y como queda plasmado en las discusiones los ejes de fractura pre-existentes en el seno de la familia europea.

Sobre la facticitat de la consideració moral dels animals no humans

Aquest treball s'enquadra en l'àmbit del que s'anomena bioètica animal i es desenvolupa al voltant de la consideració moral dels animals no humans a partir d'un tractament interdisciplinari que implica l'encontre de disciplines tan diverses com filosofia, història, psicologia o estudis de gènere, entre d'altres.

La huella del futuro. El cine y el pensamiento y la imagen y el fantasma

Se tratará en este trabajo, primero, de caracterizar un tipo de imagen capaz deromper con los yugos con los que la contemporaneidad somete la imaginación a partir de la obra de cineastas particularmente sensibles a este problema, como Werner Herzog y Wim Wenders. Una vez hecho esto, analizaremos la fuente de dicha imagen para así poder invocarla, como si de verdaderas hechicerías o chamanismos se tratase, teniendo en cuenta las nuevas tecnologías y atendiendo a algunos de quienes han sabido extraer de ellas sus poderes más ocultos, sobre todo Jean-Luc Godard y David Lynch. Por último, será a través del cine de Claire Denis y de una cierta idea del cuerpo como ahondaremos en el acontecimiento de la nueva imagen capaz de sacar al sistema de sus goznes y relanzar al cine y al pensamiento hacia un futuro incierto; incierto como es todo auténtico futuro.

Los Biocarburantes : ¿una opción de futuro?

Durante los últimos años se ha especulado mucho acerca de la escasez del petróleo, el recurso energético más utilizado desde hace un siglo. Es por este motivo que ha surgido un nuevo sector basado en las energías renovables, las cuales intentan sustituir el petróleo como base energética.El objetivo de este trabajo se inspira en la preocupación por la insuficiencia de este carburante y si puede llegar a ser sustituido por cualquier otra energía renovable. En particular, el proyecto se centra en un tipo de energía renovable: los biocarburantes, los más importantes de los cuales son el bioetanol y el biodiésel.Para poder conseguir los resultados que obtiene esta investigación es preciso responder a una serie de preguntas: ¿es factible la sustitución del petróleo?, ¿Los biocarburantes tienen alguna ventaja respecto al petróleo?, ¿Se alcanzarán algún día los objetivos previstos?, etc. Como el tema de los biocombustibles es muy amplio este proyecto se ha tenido que limitar para hacer un análisis más exhaustivo. Éste se centrará en un solo sector, el industrial, más específicamente en la sustitución del petróleo por biocarburantes en el sector automovilístico. El análisis que se lleva a cabo, el cual está distribuido en tres partes, muestra la comparativa entre el petróleo y estos dos tipos de biocarburantes desde diferentes perspectivas económicas. Estas partes se clasifican en: PARTE I: introducción al mundo de los biocarburantes y sus ventajas e inconvenientes. PARTE II: estudio de la evolución de sus precios, sus costes, su viabilidad actual y sus perspectivas de futuro… Además se analiza su repercusión en España y en los principales países productores de los biocarburantes.PARTE III: conclusión del estudio

Catholic Confession of Sins as Third-Party Moral Enforcement

Catholicism has built up a legalistic religion based on two pillars: salvation by works and 'auricular' confession of sins to a priest with judicial functions. Since the Reformation, many consider auricular confession inferior to less institutional and more individual conceptions of faith. This article analyzes how all these historical solutions trade off specialization advantages against exchange costs to produce moral enforcement. After showing the behavioral foundations of confession and the adaptiveness of its historical evolution, it tests hypotheses on its efficacy, exploitation and opportunity cost. Econometric evidence supports the efficacy but not the exploitative character of Catholic confession. It also explains its secular decline as a consequence of two factors. First, the rise in education, which makes moral self-enforcement less costly. Second, the productivity gap suffered by confession, given its necessarily interpersonal nature.

The role of moral values in the economic analysis of crime: A general equilibrium approach

In this paper, we develop a general equilibrium model of crime and show thatlaw enforcement has different roles depending on the equilibrium characterization and the value of social norms. When an economy has a unique stable equilibrium where a fraction of the population is productive and the remaining predates, the government can choose an optimal law enforcement policy to maximize a welfare function evaluated at the steady state. If such steady state is not unique, law enforcement is still relevant but in a completely different way because the steady state that prevails depends on the initial proportions of productive and predator individuals in the economy. The relative importance of these proportions can be changed through law enforcement policy.

Rules or consequences? The role of ethical mindsets in moral dynamics

Recent research on the dynamics of moral behavior has documented two contrastingphenomena - moral consistency and moral balancing. Moral balancing refers to thephenomenon whereby behaving (un)ethically decreases the likelihood of doing so againat a later time. Moral consistency describes the opposite pattern - engaging in(un)ethical behavior increases the likelihood of doing so later on. Three studies supportthe hypothesis that individuals' ethical mindset (i.e., outcome-based versus rule-based)moderates the impact of an initial (un)ethical act on the likelihood of behaving ethicallyin a subsequent occasion. More specifically, an outcome-based mindset facilitates moralbalancing and a rule-based mindset facilitates moral consistency.

Specialization and rent-seeking in moral enforcement: The case of confession

Moral codes are produced and enforced by more or less specialized means and are subject to standard economic forces. This paper argues that the intermediary role played by the Catholic Church between God and Christians, a key difference from Protestantism, faces the standard trade-off of specialization benefits and agency costs. It applies this trade-off hypothesis to confession of sins to priests, an institution that epitomizes such intermediation, showing that this hypothesis fits cognitive, historical and econometric evidence better than a simpler rent-seeking story. In particular, Catholics who confess more often are observed to comply more with the moral code; however, no relationship is observed between mass attendance and moral compliance. The data also links the current decline in confession to the rise in education, which makes moral self-enforcement less costly, and to the productivity gap suffered by confession services, given its necessarily interpersonal nature.

La gestión sanitaria: orientaciones a futuro para el cambio organizativo, del control y la financiación

This paper offers a general view of changes in health care management in theSpanish Health System. We focus on the organisational, financing andaccountability aspects of health care provision. We do this by encompassingmanagerial changes and social change and well-grounded in theory health economicsliterature. In this way we try to link applied economics and management issues,as we did in a former paper, ten years ago on the same basis(López-Casasnovas, 2002). We emphasise mistakes and milestones in the wayforward to improve health systems by better understanding the public natureof health policies. Key aspects of this are to achieve a better allocation ofresponsibilities to providers on patients health, to incentive the organisationof medical self-managed health care institutions and to build global budgets onrisk-adjusting capitation and better integrated health care providers on acommunity basis.

A note on the convergence to competitive equilibria in economies with moral hazard

We examine the conditions under which competitive equilibria can beobtained as the limit, when the number of strategic traders getslarge, of Nash equilibria in economies with asymmetric informationon agents' effort and possibly imperfect observability of agents'trades. Convergence always occur when either effort is publiclyobserved (no matter what is the information available tointermediaries on agents' trades); or effort is private informationbut agents' trades are perfectly observed; or no information at allis available on agents' trades. On the other hand, when eachintermediary can observe its trades with an agent, but not theagent's trades with other intermediaries, the (Nash) equilibriawith strategic intermediaries do not converge to any of thecompetitive equilibria, for an open set of economies. The source ofthe difficulties for convergence is the combination of asymmetricinformation and the restrictions on the observability of tradeswhich prevent the formation of exclusive contractual relationshipsand generate barriers to entry in the markets for contracts.

Moral hazard and non-exclusive contracts

This paper studies equilibria for economies characterized by moral hazard(hidden action), in which the set of contracts marketed in equilibrium isdetermined by the interaction of financial intermediaries.The crucial aspect of the environment that we study is thatintermediaries are restricted to trade non-exclusive contracts: theagents' contractual relationships with competing intermediaries cannot bemonitored (or are not contractible upon). We fully characterize equilibrium allocations and contracts. In thisset-up equilibrium allocations are clearly incentive constrainedinefficient. A robust property of equilibria with non-exclusivity isthat the contracts issued in equilibrium do not implement the optimalaction. Moreover we prove that, whenever equilibrium contracts doimplement the optimal action, intermediaries make positive profits andequilibrium allocations are third best inefficient (where the definitionof third best efficiency accounts for constraints which capture thenon-exclusivity of contracts).

Social value orientation as a moral intuition: Decision-making in the dictator game

We studied the decision making process in the Dictator Game and showed that decisions are the result of a two-step process. In a first step, decision makers generate an automatic, intuitive proposal. Given sufficient motivation and cognitive resources, they adjust this in a second, more deliberated phase. In line with the social intuitionist model, we show that one s Social Value Orientation determines intuitive choice tendencies in the first step, and that this effect is mediated by the dictator s perceived interpersonal closeness with the receiver. Self-interested concerns subsequently leadto a reduction of donation size in step 2. Finally, we show that increasing interpersonal closeness can promote pro-social decision-making.

Moral hazard and dynamics of insider ownership stakes

In this paper, I analyze the ownership dynamics of N strategic risk-averse corporate insiders facing a moral hazard problem. A solution for the equilibrium share price and the dynamics of the aggregate insider stake is obtained in two cases: when agents can crediblycommit to an optimal ownership policy and when they cannot commit (time-consistent case). Inthe latter case, the aggregate stake gradually adjusts towards the competitive allocation. The speed of adjustment increases with N when outside investors are risk-averse, and does not depend on it when investors are risk-neutral. Predictions of the model are consistent with recent empirical findings.