Deducible o no deducible: ésta es la cuestión

El propósito del artículo es facilitar orientaciones útiles, sugerir y sistematizar algunos criterios admisibles en materia de deducción de gastos de difícil tratamiento, pensando en personas que desarrollan actividades profesionales y que han de presentar periódicamente sus declaraciones de IRPF, IS e IVA.

Naturaleza y regimen jurídico del impuesto sobre los sueldos y salarios de los funcionarios de las Coumnidades Europeas

La prevalencia del interés comunitario para salvaguardar la igualdad entre los funcionarios de la Comunidad y la independencia de la Administración comunitaria, movieron al establecimiento de un impuesto comunitario en los Protocolos sobre Privilegios e Inmunidades anejos a los Tratados de Roma, privando a la exención de impuestos nacionales del carácter de privilegio, para configurarla como directa consecuencia de la creación de un impuesto comunitario. La realización del presente estudio nos lleva a plantearnos, en primer lugar, el problema de la naturaleza del recurso objeto del mismo.

Determinación de la base imponible en estimación objetiva

Es tracta d'una pràctica fiscal de determinació de la base imponible en estimació objectiva.

La cláusula de intercambio de información tributaria según el Convenio bilateral Hispano-Brasileño para evitar la doble imposición y prevenir la evasión fiscal en materia de impuestos sobre la renta

El presente artículo tiene por objeto analizar el contenido, alcance, evolución y límites de la cláusula de intercambio de información incorporada en el Convenio Hispano-Brasileño para evitar la doble imposición y prevenir la evasión fiscal en materia de impuestos sobre la renta (1974), fin a cuyo logro se toma como punto de partida el marco jurídico instrumentalizador del intercambio de información tributaria y asistencia mutua entre Estados. Tendrá cabida en estas páginas un análisis en detalle de aspectos tan importantes y poco manidos como los problemas de interpretación de los convenios de doble imposición en materia de intercambio de información tributaria consecuencia de las modificaciones sustanciales tras la aprobación de las sucesivas versiones del Modelo de Convenio de la OCDE y sus Comentarios, interpretación que afecta de manera directa a cuestiones de primer orden como el ámbito subjetivo y objetivo de aplicación, límites y restricciones de la cláusula de intercambio de información sellada y ratificada por el Estado Español y la República Federativa del Brasil en 1974. Igualmente se da noticia de otros significados extremos tales como el destino del intercambio de información tributaria y el deber de confidencialidad de los Estados, con especial alusión al alcance de las restricciones específicas previstas para el intercambio de información tributaria no sólo desde la óptica de la legislación española sino también desde la visión de la normativa reguladora de la materia en Brasil.

La tributación de las rentas de capital en los Estados miembros de la Comunidad Europea

El artículo trata sobre la tributación de las rentas de capital de los estados miembros de la Comunidad Europea en lo referente a intereses y dividendos y en lo que afecta a variaciones patrimoniales.

On the relation between tax rates and evasion in a multi-period economy

We extend the basic tax evasion model to a multi-period economy exhibiting sustained growth. When individuals conceal part of their true income from the tax authority, they face the risk of being audited and hence of paying the corresponding fine. Both taxes and fines determine individual saving and the rate of capital accumulation. In this context we show that the sign of the relation between the level of the tax rate and the amount of evaded income is the same as that obtained in static setups. Moreover, high tax rates on income are typically associated with low growth rates as occurs in standard growth models that disregard the tax evasion phenomenon.

Tax evasion, technology shocks, and the cyclicality of government revenues

This paper analyzes the behavior of the tax revenue to output ratio over the business cycle. In order to replicate the empirical evidence, we develop a simple model combining the standard Ak growth model with the tax evasion phenomenon. When individuals conceal part of their true income from the tax authority, they face the risk of being audited and hence of paying the corresponding fine. Under the empirically plausible assumptions that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution exhibits a sufficiently small value and that productivity shocks are serially correlated, we show that the elasticity of government revenue with respect to output is larger than one, which agrees with the empirical evidence. This result holds even if the tax system displays flat tax rates. We extend the previous setup to generate larger fiscal deficits when the economy experiences a recession.

Do agglomeration economies reduce the sensitivity of firm location to tax differentials?

Low corporate taxes can help attract new firms. This is the main mechanism underpinning the standard 'race-to-the-bottom'view of tax competition. A recent theoretical literature has qualified this view by formalizing the argument that agglomeration forces can reduce firms' sensitivity to tax differentials across locations. We test this proposition using data on firm startups across Swiss municipalities. We find that, on average, high corporate income taxes do deter new firms, but that this relationship is significantly weaker in the most spatially concentrated sectors. Location choices of firms in sectors with an agglomeration intensity at the twentieth percentile of the sample distribution are estimated to be twice as responsive to a given difference in local corporate tax burdens as firms in sectors with an agglomeration intensity at the eightieth percentile. Hence, our analysis confirms the theoretical prediction: agglomeration economies can neutralize the impact of tax differentials on firms' location choices.

The labor market effects of payroll taxes in a middle-income country: Evidence from Colombia

We use a panel of manufacturing plants from Colombia to analyze how the risein payroll tax rates over the 1980 s and 1990 s affected the labor market.Our estimates indicate that formal wages fall by between 1.4% and 2.3% as aresult of a 10% rise in payroll taxes. This 'less-than-full-shifting' islikely to be the result of weak linkages between benefits and taxes and thepresence of downward wage rigidities induced by a binding minimum wage inColombia. Because the costs of taxation are only partly shifted fromemployers to employees, employment should also fall. Our results indicatethat a 10% increase in payroll taxes lowered formal employment by between4% and 5%. In addition, we find less shifting and larger disemploymenteffects for production than non-production workers. These results suggestthat policies aimed at boosting the relative demand of low-skill workers byreducing social security taxes on those with low earnings may be effectivein a country like Colombia, especially if tax cuts are targeted to indirectbenefits.

Is there a connection between the tax administration and the political power?

This paper offers empirical evidence from Spain of a connection between the tax administration and the political power. Firstly, the regional tax administration is not immune to the budgetary situation of regional government, and tends to exert a greater (or lesser) effort in tax collection the greater (or lower) the (expected) public deficit. At the same time, the system of unconditional grants from the central layer of government provokes an ¿income effect¿ which disincentivises the efforts of the tax administration. Secondly, these efforts also decrease when the margin to lose a parliamentary seat in an electoral district is cut, although the importance of this disincentive decreases according to the parliamentary strength of the incumbent

Top income shares in Portugal over the twentieth century

[cat] L’objectiu d’aquest article és presentar nova evidència estadística sobre l’evolució de les desigualtats econòmiques a Portugal a llarg termini. L’explotació de les fonts fiscals portugueses ha permès l’estimació annual de les top income shares des de 1936. La construcció d’aquesta nova sèrie s’ha fet seguint la metodologia emprada per Piketty (2001). Aquesta nova sèrie revela una caiguda de les top income shares durant la Segona Guerra Mundial, seguida d’una recuperació fins a principis dels anys cinquanta. Des de mitjans dels cinquanta fins a principis dels anys vuitanta hi ha una caiguda dràstica de les top income shares. Per acabar, durant els anys noranta les top income shares tornen a augmentar. Aquesta pauta és molt similar a la viscuda en altres països: la reducció de les top income shares durant l’època daurada és compartida per tots els països estudiats i el seu increment als anys noranta sembla que alinea Portugal amb la pauta seguida pels països Anglosaxons.

Is there a connection between the tax administration and the political power?

This paper offers empirical evidence from Spain of a connection between the tax administration and the political power. Firstly, the regional tax administration is not immune to the budgetary situation of regional government, and tends to exert a greater (or lesser) effort in tax collection the greater (or lower) the (expected) public deficit. At the same time, the system of unconditional grants from the central layer of government provokes an ¿income effect¿ which disincentivises the efforts of the tax administration. Secondly, these efforts also decrease when the margin to lose a parliamentary seat in an electoral district is cut, although the importance of this disincentive decreases according to the parliamentary strength of the incumbent

Top income shares in Portugal over the twentieth century

[cat] L’objectiu d’aquest article és presentar nova evidència estadística sobre l’evolució de les desigualtats econòmiques a Portugal a llarg termini. L’explotació de les fonts fiscals portugueses ha permès l’estimació annual de les top income shares des de 1936. La construcció d’aquesta nova sèrie s’ha fet seguint la metodologia emprada per Piketty (2001). Aquesta nova sèrie revela una caiguda de les top income shares durant la Segona Guerra Mundial, seguida d’una recuperació fins a principis dels anys cinquanta. Des de mitjans dels cinquanta fins a principis dels anys vuitanta hi ha una caiguda dràstica de les top income shares. Per acabar, durant els anys noranta les top income shares tornen a augmentar. Aquesta pauta és molt similar a la viscuda en altres països: la reducció de les top income shares durant l’època daurada és compartida per tots els països estudiats i el seu increment als anys noranta sembla que alinea Portugal amb la pauta seguida pels països Anglosaxons.

The effect of tax enforcement on tax elasticities: Evidence from charitable contributions in France

Optimal tax formulas expressed in "sufficient statistics" are usually calibrated under the assumptionthat the relevant tax elasticities are unaffected by other available policy instruments.In practice though, tax authorities have many more instruments than the mere tax rates andtax elasticities are functions of all these policy instruments. In this paper we provide evidencethat tax elasticities are extremely sensitive to a particular policy instrument: the level of taxenforcement. We exploit a natural experiment that took place in France in 1983, when the taxadministration tightened the requirements to claim charitable deductions. The reform led to asubstantial drop in the amount of contributions reported to the administration, which can becredibly attributed to overreporting of charitable contributions before the reform, rather thanto a real change in giving behaviours. We show that the reform was also associated with asubstantial decline in the absolute value of the elasticity of reported contributions. This findingallows us to partially identify the elasticity of overreporting contributions, which is shown tobe large and inferior to -2 in the lax enforcement regime. We further show using bunching oftaxpayers at kink-points of the tax schedule that the elasticity of taxable income also experienceda significant decline after the reform. Our results suggest that optimizing the tax rate fora given tax elasticity when other policy instruments are not optimized can lead to misleadingconclusions when tax authorities have another instrument that could set the tax elasticity itselfat its optimal level as in Kopczuk and Slemrod [2002].