EU “actorness” in International Relations: The Non-Proliferation Policy of the EU in the Southern Mediterranean

El punt de partida d'aquesta investigació és una retòrica molt utilitzada que la UE és un actor global. En vista d'això, la no proliferació de la política comunitària al sud de la Mediterrània s'examina. L'estudi es realitza sobre la base de la conceptualització de la UE "actorness" ia través d'alguns criteris (context extern, l'evolució de l'aparell de política exterior de la UE, la Unió Europea l'auto-presentació i la percepció de tercers, la consistència i la disponibilitat d'instruments de política i accions concretes) que involucren tant factors ideacionals i materials, d'acord amb el "pluralisme metodològic". Aquest marc conceptual va ajudar a avaluar la no proliferació de la política comunitària en aquesta regió en particular on la UE té interessos i bones raons per actuar. Cada un dels criteris de manifest els avantatges i desavantatges de la UE "actorness" en aquest camp seleccionat i la caixa. Aquest document sosté que la no proliferació "actorness" de la UE a la regió del sud de la Mediterrània ha estat limitat a causa d'una varietat de raons.

The Effects of government spending on the distribution of consumption

We study the effects of government spending on the distribution of consumption. We find a substantial degree of heterogeneity: consumption increases at the bottom and falls at the top of the distribution, implying a significant temporary reduction of consumption inequality. The effects of the shock display correlations of around -0.7/-0.9 with the percentage of stockholders within the decile. We interpret the results as in line and yielding support to models of limited participation where, while the Ricardian equivalence holds for rich households, for poor household, with no access to capital markets, the Keynesian multiplier is at work.

Fiscal foresight, forecast revisions and the effects of government spending in the open economy

This paper investigates the effects of government spending on the real exchange rate and the trade balance in the US using a new VAR identification procedure based on spending forecast revisions. I find that the real exchange rate appreciates and the trade balance deteriorates after a government spending shock, although the effects are quantitatively small. The findings broadly match the theoretical predictions of the standard Mundell-Fleming model and differ substantially from those existing in literature. Differences are attributable to the fact that, because of fiscal foresight, the government spending is non-fundamental for the variables typically used in open economy VARs. Here, on the contrary, the estimated shock is fundamental.

Dynamic diagnosis based on interval analytical redundancy relations and signs of the symptoms

A model-based approach for fault diagnosis is proposed, where the fault detection is based on checking the consistencyof the Analytical Redundancy Relations (ARRs) using an interval tool. The tool takes into account the uncertainty in theparameters and the measurements using intervals. Faults are explicitly included in the model, which allows for the exploitation of additional information. This information is obtained from partial derivatives computed from the ARRs. The signs in the residuals are used to prune the candidate space when performing the fault diagnosis task. The method is illustrated using a two-tank example, in which these aspects are shown to have an impact on the diagnosis and fault discrimination, since the proposed method goes beyond the structural methods

Relations among several nuclear and electronic density functional reactivity indexes

A set of connections among several nuclear and electronic indexes of reactivity in the framework of the conceptual Density Functional Theory by using an expansion ofthe energy functional in terms of the total number of electrons and the normal coordinates within a canonical ensemble was derived. The relations obtained provided explicit links between important quantities related to the chemical reactivity of a system. This paper particularly demonstrates that the derivative of the electronic energy with respect to the external potential of a system in its equilibrium geometry was equal to the negative of the nuclear repulsion derivative with respect to the external potential

Union activism in an inclusive model of industrial relations : evidence from an Spanish case

In this article we analyze the reasons, within the context of Spanish industrial relations, for trade union members’ active participation in their regional union. The case of Spain is particularly interesting as the unions’ main activity, collective bargaining, is a public good. The text, based on research involving a representative survey of members of a regional branch of the “Workers” Commissions” (Comisiones Obreras) trade union, provides empirical evidence that the union presence in the workplace has a significant influence on members’ propensity for activism. By contrast, the alternative hypothesis based on instrumental reasons appears of little relevance in the Spanish industrial relations context.

Government and the distribution of skills

Individuals' life chances in the future will very much depend on how we invest in our children now. An optimal human capital model would combine a high mean with minimal variance of skills. It is well-established that early childhood learning is key to adult success. The impact of social origins on child outcomes remains strong, and the new role of women poses additional challenges to our conventional nurturing approach to child development. This paper focuses on skill development in the early years, examining how we might best combine family inputs and public policy to invest optimally in our future human capital. I emphasize three issues: one, the uneven capacity of parents to invest in children; two, the impact of mothers' employment on child outcomes; and three, the potential benefits of early pre-school programmes. I conclude that mothers' intra-family bargaining power is decisive for family investments and that universal child care is key if our goal is to arrive at a strong mean with minimal variance.

Policy Making in Divided Government. A Pivotal Actors Model with Party Discipline.

This article presents a formal model of policy decision-making in an institutional framework of separation of powers in which the main actors are pivotal political parties with voting discipline. The basic model previously developed from pivotal politics theory for the analysis of the United States lawmaking is here modified to account for policy outcomes and institutional performances in other presidential regimes, especially in Latin America. Legislators' party indiscipline at voting and multi-partism appear as favorable conditions to reduce the size of the equilibrium set containing collectively inefficient outcomes, while a two-party system with strong party discipline is most prone to produce 'gridlock', that is, stability of socially inefficient policies. The article provides a framework for analysis which can induce significant revisions of empirical data, especially regarding the effects of situations of (newly defined) unified and divided government, different decision rules, the number of parties and their discipline. These implications should be testable and may inspire future analytical and empirical work.

Government Spending and Re-election

Does additional government spending improve the electoral chances of incumbent political parties? This paper provides the first quasi-experimental evidence on this question. Our research design exploits discontinuities in federal funding to local governments in Brazil around several population cutoffs over the period 1982-1985. We find that extra fiscal transfers resulted in a 20% increase in local government spending per capita, and an increase of about 10 percentage points in the re-election probability of local incumbent parties. We also find positive effects of the government spending on education outcomes and earnings, which we interpret as indirect evidence of public service improvements. Together, our results provide evidence that electoral rewards encourage incumbents to spend part of additional revenues on public services valued by voters, a finding in line with agency models of electoral accountability.

Fiat Money, Intrinsic Properties, and Government Transaction Policy

Why do people coordinate on the use of valueless pieces of paper as generally accepted money? A possible answer is that these objects have intrinsic properties that make them better candidates to be used as media of exchange. Another answer stresses the fact that unconvertible fiat money will not easily appear unless there is a centralized institution that favors its use. The main objective of the paper is to analyze these questions. In order to do this, we take a model of commodity money in which fiat money does not play any significant role and modify it to examine under which circumstances fiat money might come to circulate as medium of exchange. Some of the results obtained from the model differ in a rather substantial way from previous related literature.

Are rules-based government programs shielded from special-interest politics? Evidence from revenue-sharing transfers in Brazil

Manipulation of government finances for the benefit of narrowly defined groups is usuallythought to be limited to the part of the budget over which politicians exercise discretion inthe short run, such as earmarks. Analyzing a revenue-sharing program between the centraland local governments in Brazil that uses an allocation formula based on local population estimates,I document two main results: first, that the population estimates entering the formulawere manipulated and second, that this manipulation was political in nature. Consistent withswing-voter targeting by the right-wing central government, I find that municipalities withroughly equal right-wing and non-right-wing vote shares benefited relative to opposition orconservative core support municipalities. These findings suggest that the exclusive focus ondiscretionary transfers in the extant empirical literature on special-interest politics may understatethe true scope of tactical redistribution that is going on under programmatic disguise.

Social capital, government expenditures, and growth

Countries with greater social capital have higher economic growth. We show that socialcapital is also highly positively correlated across countries with government expenditureon education. We develop an infinite-horizon model of public spending and endogenousstochastic growth that explains both facts through frictions in political agency whenvoters have imperfect information. In our model, the government provides servicesthat yield immediate utility, and investment that raises future productivity. Voters aremore likely to observe public services, so politicians have electoral incentives to underprovidepublic investment. Social capital increases voters' awareness of all governmentactivity. As a consequence, both politicians' incentives and their selection improve.In the dynamic equilibrium, both the amount and the efficiency of public investmentincrease, permanently raising the growth rate.

Asymptotic robustness in multi-sample analysis of multivariate linear relations

Standard methods for the analysis of linear latent variable models oftenrely on the assumption that the vector of observed variables is normallydistributed. This normality assumption (NA) plays a crucial role inassessingoptimality of estimates, in computing standard errors, and in designinganasymptotic chi-square goodness-of-fit test. The asymptotic validity of NAinferences when the data deviates from normality has been calledasymptoticrobustness. In the present paper we extend previous work on asymptoticrobustnessto a general context of multi-sample analysis of linear latent variablemodels,with a latent component of the model allowed to be fixed across(hypothetical)sample replications, and with the asymptotic covariance matrix of thesamplemoments not necessarily finite. We will show that, under certainconditions,the matrix $\Gamma$ of asymptotic variances of the analyzed samplemomentscan be substituted by a matrix $\Omega$ that is a function only of thecross-product moments of the observed variables. The main advantage of thisis thatinferences based on $\Omega$ are readily available in standard softwareforcovariance structure analysis, and do not require to compute samplefourth-order moments. An illustration with simulated data in the context ofregressionwith errors in variables will be presented.

Does direct democracy reduce the size of government? New evidence from historical data, 1890-2000

Using historical data for all Swiss cantons from 1890 to 2000, we estimate the causal effect of direct democracy on government spending. The main innovation in this paper is that we use fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity and instrumental variables to address the potential endogeneity of institutions. We find that the budget referendum and lower costs to launch a voter initiative are effective tools in reducing canton level spending. However, we find no evidence that the budget referendum results in more decentralized government or a larger local government. Our instrumental variable estimates suggest that a mandatory budget referendum reduces the size of canton spending between 13 and 19 percent. A 1 percent lower signature requirement for the initiative reduces canton spending by up to 2 percent.