A note on the coincidence between Stackelberg and Nash equilibria in a differential game between government and firms

[cat] A Navas i Marín Solano es va demostrar la coincidència entre els equilibris de Nash i de Stackelberg per a una versi´o modificada del joc diferencial proposat por Lancaster (1973). Amb l’objectiu d’obtenir una solució interior, es van imposar restriccions importants sobre el valors dels paràmetres del model. En aquest treball estenem aquest resultat, en el límit en que la taxa de descompte és igual a zero, eliminant les restriccions i considerant totes les solucions possibles.

The assignment game: core bounds for mixed-pair coalitions

In the assignment game framework, we try to identify those assignment matrices in which no entry can be increased without changing the coreof the game. These games will be called buyer¿seller exact games and satisfy the condition that each mixed¿pair coalition attains the corresponding matrix entry in the core of the game. For a given assignment game, a unique buyerseller exact assignment game with the same core is proved to exist. In order to identify this matrix and to provide a characterization of those assignment games which are buyer¿seller exact in terms of the assignment matrix, attainable upper and lower core bounds for the mixed¿pair coalitions are found. As a consequence, an open question posed in Quint (1991) regarding a canonical representation of a ¿45o¿lattice¿ by means of the core of an assignment game can now be answered

The extreme core allocations of the assignment game

Although assignment games are hardly ever convex, in this paper a characterization of their set or extreme points of the core is provided, which is also valid for the class of convex games. For each ordering in the player set, a payoff vector is defined where each player receives his marginal contribution to a certain reduced game played by his predecessors. We prove that the whole set of reduced marginal worth vectors, which for convex games coincide with the usual marginal worth vectors, is the set of extreme points of the core of the assignment game

The extreme core allocations of the assignment game

Although assignment games are hardly ever convex, in this paper a characterization of their set or extreme points of the core is provided, which is also valid for the class of convex games. For each ordering in the player set, a payoff vector is defined where each player receives his marginal contribution to a certain reduced game played by his predecessors. We prove that the whole set of reduced marginal worth vectors, which for convex games coincide with the usual marginal worth vectors, is the set of extreme points of the core of the assignment game

On the dimension of the core of the assignment game

The set of optimal matchings in the assignment matrix allows to define a reflexive and symmetric binary relation on each side of the market, the equal-partner binary relation. The number of equivalence classes of the transitive closure of the equal-partner binary relation determines the dimension of the core of the assignment game. This result provides an easy procedure to determine the dimension of the core directly from the entries of the assignment matrix and shows that the dimension of the core is not as much determined by the number of optimal matchings as by their relative position in the assignment matrix.

Single-valued solutions for the Böhm-Bawerk horse market game

Single-valued solutions for the case of two-sided market games without product differentiation, also known as Böhm-Bawerk horse market games, are analyzed. The nucleolus is proved to coincide with the tau-value, and is thus the midpoint of the core. Moreover a characterization of this setof games in terms of the assignment matrix is provided.

An axiomatization of the nucleolus of the assignment game

[cat] En el domini dels jocs bilaterals d’assignació, es presenta una axiomàtica del nucleolus com l´unica solució que compleix les propietats de consistència respecte del joc derivat definit per Owen (1992) i monotonia de les queixes dels sectors respecte de la seva cardinalitat. Com a conseqüència obtenim una caracterització geomètrica del nucleolus mitjançant una propietat de bisecció més forta que la que satisfan els punts del kernel (Maschler et al, 1979).

A note on the coincidence between Stackelberg and Nash equilibria in a differential game between government and firms

[cat] A Navas i Marín Solano es va demostrar la coincidència entre els equilibris de Nash i de Stackelberg per a una versi´o modificada del joc diferencial proposat por Lancaster (1973). Amb l’objectiu d’obtenir una solució interior, es van imposar restriccions importants sobre el valors dels paràmetres del model. En aquest treball estenem aquest resultat, en el límit en que la taxa de descompte és igual a zero, eliminant les restriccions i considerant totes les solucions possibles.

The assignment game: core bounds for mixed-pair coalitions

In the assignment game framework, we try to identify those assignment matrices in which no entry can be increased without changing the coreof the game. These games will be called buyer¿seller exact games and satisfy the condition that each mixed¿pair coalition attains the corresponding matrix entry in the core of the game. For a given assignment game, a unique buyerseller exact assignment game with the same core is proved to exist. In order to identify this matrix and to provide a characterization of those assignment games which are buyer¿seller exact in terms of the assignment matrix, attainable upper and lower core bounds for the mixed¿pair coalitions are found. As a consequence, an open question posed in Quint (1991) regarding a canonical representation of a ¿45o¿lattice¿ by means of the core of an assignment game can now be answered

Observational methodology in football: Development of an instrument to study the offensiva game in football.

The following paper introduces a new approach to the analysis of offensive game in football. Therefore, the main aim of this study was to create an instrument for collecting information for the analysis of offensive action and interactions game. The observation instrument that was used to accomplish the main objective of this work consists of a combination of format fields (FC) and systems of categories (SC). This methodology is a particular strategy of the scientific method that has as an objective to analyse the perceptible behaviour that occurs in habitual contexts, allowing them to be formally recorded and quantified and using an ad hoc instrument in order to obtain a behaviour systematic registration that, since they have been transformed in quantitative data with the necessary reliability and validity determined level, will allow analysis of the relations between these behaviours. The codifications undertaken to date in various games of football have shown that it serves the purposes for which it was developed, allowing more research into the offensive game methods in football.

Some game-theoretic grounds for meeting people half-way

It is well known that, in distributions problems, fairness rarely leads to a single viewpoint (see, for instance, Young (1994)). In this context, this paper provides interesting bases that support the simple and commonly observed behavior of reaching intermediate agreements when two prominent distribution proposals highlight a discrepancy in sharing resources. Specifi cally, we formalize such a conflicting situation by associating it with a `natural' cooperative game, called bifocal distribution game, to show that both the Nucleolus (Schmeidler (1969)) and the Shapley value (Shapley (1953a)) agree on recommending the average of the two focal proposals. Furthermore, we analyze the interpretation of the previous result by means of axiomatic arguments. Keywords: Distribution problems, Cooperative games, Axiomatic analysis, Nucleolus, Shapley value. JEL Classi fication Numbers: C71, D63, D71.

Anàlisi de les diferències en la conducta motriu dels alumnes de l'ESO durant la realització d'un joc col·lectiu

Partint de la base que no tots els alumnes es desenvolupen de la mateixa manera en el marc de les pràctiques esportives col·lectives a l’àrea d’Educació Física, per què no indagar dins el comportament motor de cadascun d’ells i veure’n les diferències? Arran d’aquesta qüestió, el següent estudi pretén evidenciar les diferències més significatives que s’estableixen sobre les conductes motrius dels alumnes de 3r i 4t de l’ESO durant la realització d’un joc esportiu col·lectiu. Així doncs, la mostra va ser seleccionada en funció de si els alumnes realitzaven, o no, algun tipus de modalitat esportiva fora de l’escola (individual i/o col·lectiva). Per tal de poder determinar aquestes diferències, es va utilitzar l’observació indirecta d’imatges enregistrades en vídeo. Amb l’ajuda de fulls d’observació ajustats al joc en concret i d’un instrument d’avaluació, s’havien de registrar de forma pertinent les conductes motrius dels alumnes durant la realització del joc esportiu col·lectiu seleccionat. Els resultats i les conclusions finals s’han extret a partir dels valors representats en la graella d’observació i de la puntuació final obtinguda mitjançant l’instrument d’avaluació emprat.

World Of Wars Android Game

World Of Wars es un videojuego de acción para plataformas Android basándose en los estilos shoot em¿up arcades antiguos pero adaptándolos a los nuevos tiempos y nuevas formas de juego que existen en la actualidad. Se ha utilizado la librería Cocos2D-x, así como el lenguaje de programación C++ para el desarrollo de el.

Diseño e implementación de un serious game para el aprendizaje del material quirúrgico y desarrollo de una operación

En este trabajo se recoge información útil que se debe tener en cuenta para desarrollar un serious game pertinente para el entrenamiento de profesionales de la salud, que aporte destrezas y habilidades necesarias para afrontar las cirugías reales. Se propone un serious game a modo de simulador de diferentes operaciones quirúrgicas traumatológicas, que permite al usuario las etapas preoperatorias, intraoperatorias y postoperatorias de una cirugía, en las que se debe describir qué acciones se llevan a cabo, quiénes la realizan y si es necesario algún material específico.

Cooperation and game theory, free software or the #15m movement: Two examples for universities

Closing talk of the Open Access Week 2011 at the UOC, by Josep Jover. Why do altruistic strategies beat selfish ones in the spheres of both free software and the #15m movement? The #15m movement, like software but unlike tangible goods, cannot be owned. It can be used (by joining it) by an indeterminate number of people without depriving anyone else of the chance to do the same. And that turns everything on its head: how universities manage information and what their mission is in this new society. In the immediate future, universities will be valued not for the information they harbour, which will always be richer and more extensive beyond their walls, but rather for their capacity to create critical masses, whether of knowledge research, skill-building, or networks of peers... universities must implement the new model or risk becoming obsolete.