Endogenous bargaining power

We present a novel approach to N-person bargaining, based on the idea thatthe agreement reached in a negotiation is determined by how the directconflict resulting from disagreement would be resolved. Our basic buildingblock is the disagreement function, which maps each set of feasible outcomesinto a disagreement point. Using this function and a weak axiom basedon individual rationality we reach a unique solution: the agreement inthe shadow of conflict, ASC. This agreement may be construed as the limitof a sequence of partial agreements, each of which is reached as a functionof the parties relative power. We examine the connection between ASC andasymmetric Nash solutions. We show the connection between the power ofthe parties embodied in the ASC solution and the bias in the SWF thatwould select ASC as an asymmetric Nash solution.

Endogenous labor market participation and the business cycle

Existing models of equilibrium unemployment with endogenous labor market participation are complex, generate procyclical unemployment rates and cannot match unemployment variability relative to GDP. We embed endogenous participation in a simple, tractable job market matching model, show analytically how variations in the participation rate are driven by the cross-sectional density of home productivity near the participation threshold, andhow this density translates into an extensive-margin labor supply elasticity. A calibration of the model to macro data not only matches employment and participation variabilities but also generates strongly countercyclical unemployment rates. With some wage rigidity the model also matches unemployment variations well. Furthermore, the labor supply elasticity implied by our calibration is consistent with microeconometric evidence for the US.

Endogenous business cycles and stabilization policies

The paper reports results on the effects of stylized stabilization policies on endogenously created fluctuations. A simple monetary model with intertemporally optimizing agents is considered. Fluctuations in output may occur due to fluctuations in labor supply which are again caused by volatile expectations which are ``self fulfilling'', i.e. correct given the model. It turns out that stabilization policies that are sufficiently countercyclical in the sense that government spending (on transfers or demand) depends sufficiently strongly negatively on GNP-increases can stabilize the economy at a monetary steadystate for an arbitrarily low degree of distortion of that steady state. Such stabilization has unambiguously good welfare effects and can be achieved without features such as positive lump sum taxation or negative income taxation as part of the stabilization policy.

Endogenous information structures

Many models in the economics literature deal with strategic situations withprivately informed agents. In those models the information structure isassumed to be exogenous and common knowledge. We consider whether suchmodels, and the results they produce, are robust with respect theendogenization of the information structure. The results depend on whetherinformation acquisition is secret or private, and on whether the strategicsituation involves simultaneous or sequential moves. In particular we findthat only when information is secretly acquired and moves are simultaneous,the results are fully robust. When information is acquired secretly butmoves are sequential additional equilibria may appear. Instead, privateinformation acquisition may make the equilibrium set smaller.

Unemployment insurance with endogenous search intensity and precautionary saving

A welfare analysis of unemployment insurance (UI) is performed in a generalequilibrium job search model. Finitely-lived, risk-averse workers smooth consumption over time by accumulating assets, choose search effort whenunemployed, and suffer disutility from work. Firms hire workers, purchasecapital, and pay taxes to finance worker benefits; their equity is the assetaccumulated by workers. A matching function relates unemployment, hiringexpenditure, and search effort to the formation of jobs. The model is calibrated to US data; the parameters relating job search effort to the probability of job finding are chosen to match microeconomic studies ofunemployment spells. Under logarithmic utility, numerical simulation shows rather small welfaregains from UI. Even without UI, workers smooth consumption effectivelythrough asset accumulation. Greater risk aversion leads to substantiallylarger welfare gains from UI; however, even in this case much of its welfareimpact is due not to consumption smoothing effects, but rather to decreased work disutility, or to a variety of externalities.

Interiority of the optimal population growth rate with endogenous fertility

This paper analyzes the issue of the interiority of the optimal population growth rate in a two-period overlapping generations model with endogenous fertility. Using Cobb-Douglas utility and production functions, we show that the introduction of a cost of raising children allows for the possibility of the existence of an interior global maximum in the planner¿s problem, contrary to the exogenous fertility case

Union power, minimum wage legislation endogenous labor supplies and production

The objective of this work is to study the impact of the unions' bargaining power on production and wages. We present a model where a competitive final good is produced through two substitutable intermediate goods, one produced by unskilled labor and the other by skilled labor. Potential workers decide at their cost to become skilled or unskilled and, thus, labor supplies are determined endogenously. We find that the reallocation of the labor supplies due to changes in the unskilled (or skilled) unions¿ bargaining power may have a positive impact on the final goods production. At the same time, total labor earnings increase with the unskilled unions¿ bargaining power if the final goods production increases too. We also show that the minimum wage legislation has efects similar to an increase in the bargaining power of the unskilled unions.

The role of unions in an endogenous growth model with human capital

In this paper we study the relationship between unions and growth in a two-sector overlapping generations model with altruism and humancapital. This relationship depends on the interaction between the technology in the sector that produces human capital, the degreeof unionization of the economy and the operativeness of the bequest motive.

Neck pounding during sinus rhythm: a new clinical manifestation of dual atrioventricular nodal pathways

Objective To determine the clinical and electrophysiological characteristics of patients with paroxysmal palpitations and neck pounding during sinus rhythm. Methods Clinical, electrocardiographic, and electrophysiological characteristics of six patients with paroxysmal palpitations and neck pounding during sinus rhythm were studied in basal conditions and when symptomatic. Response to treatment was observed. Results Baseline ECGs were normal (four patients) or had first degree atrioventricular block with intermittent PR shortening. During symptoms, narrow QRS rhythms were seen without visible P waves (three patients) or with P waves partially hidden in the QRS complex (three patients). Dual atrioventricular nodal pathways were found in all five patients who had electrophysiological studies. In these patients the slow pathway conduction time was long enough (mean (SD), 425 (121)¿ms) for ventricular activation after slow pathway conduction during sinus rhythm to coincide with the next atrial depolarisation, causing neck pounding during exercise (four patients) or at rest (two patients). Tachycardia was not induced in any patient. Medical treatment aggravated symptoms in three patients. A pacemaker was successfully used in two. Conclusions Neck pounding during sinus rhythm is a clinical manifestation of dual atrioventricular nodal pathways. Medical treatment may aggravate symptoms but a pacemaker may offer definitive relief.

Interiority of the optimal population growth rate with endogenous fertility

This paper analyzes the issue of the interiority of the optimal population growth rate in a two-period overlapping generations model with endogenous fertility. Using Cobb-Douglas utility and production functions, we show that the introduction of a cost of raising children allows for the possibility of the existence of an interior global maximum in the planner¿s problem, contrary to the exogenous fertility case

Union power, minimum wage legislation endogenous labor supplies and production

The objective of this work is to study the impact of the unions' bargaining power on production and wages. We present a model where a competitive final good is produced through two substitutable intermediate goods, one produced by unskilled labor and the other by skilled labor. Potential workers decide at their cost to become skilled or unskilled and, thus, labor supplies are determined endogenously. We find that the reallocation of the labor supplies due to changes in the unskilled (or skilled) unions¿ bargaining power may have a positive impact on the final goods production. At the same time, total labor earnings increase with the unskilled unions¿ bargaining power if the final goods production increases too. We also show that the minimum wage legislation has efects similar to an increase in the bargaining power of the unskilled unions.

The role of unions in an endogenous growth model with human capital

In this paper we study the relationship between unions and growth in a two-sector overlapping generations model with altruism and humancapital. This relationship depends on the interaction between the technology in the sector that produces human capital, the degreeof unionization of the economy and the operativeness of the bequest motive.

Endogenous depth of reasoning

We introduce a model of strategic thinking in games of initial response. Unlike standard level-k models, in this framework the player's `depth of reasoning' is endogenously determined, andit can be disentangled from his beliefs over his opponent's cognitive bound. In our approach,individuals act as if they follow a cost-benefit analysis. The depth of reasoning is a function ofthe player's cognitive abilities and his payoffs. The costs are exogenous and represent the gametheoretical sophistication of the player; the benefit instead is related to the game payoffs. Behavioris in turn determined by the individual's depth of reasoning and his beliefs about the reasoningprocess of the opponent. Thus, in our framework, payoffs not only affect individual choices inthe traditional sense, but they also shape the cognitive process itself. Our model delivers testableimplications on players' chosen actions as incentives and opponents change. We then test themodel's predictions with an experiment. We administer different treatments that vary beliefs overpayoffs and opponents, as well as beliefs over opponents' beliefs. The results of this experiment,which are not accounted for by current models of reasoning in games, strongly support our theory.Our approach therefore serves as a novel, unifying framework of strategic thinking that allows forpredictions across games.