Extremal principle of entropy production in the climate system

Paltridge found reasonable values for the most significant climatic variables through maximizing the material transport part of entropy production by using a simple box model. Here, we analyse Paltridge's box model to obtain the energy and the entropy balance equations separately. Derived expressions for global entropy production, which is a function of the radiation field, and even its material transport component, are shown to be different from those used by Paltridge. Plausible climatic states are found at extrema of these parameters. Feasible results are also obtained by minimizing the radiation part of entropy production, in agreement with one of Planck's results, Finally, globally averaged values of the entropy flux of radiation and material entropy production are obtained for two dynamical extreme cases: an earth with uniform temperature, and an earth in radiative equilibrium at each latitudinal point

The effect of atmospheric absorption of sunlight on the runaway greenhouse point

The longwave emission of planetary atmospheres that contain a condensable absorbing gas in the infrared (i.e., longwave), which is in equilibrium with its liquid phase at the surface, may exhibit an upper bound. Here we analyze the effect of the atmospheric absorption of sunlight on this radiation limit. We assume that the atmospheric absorption of infrared radiation is independent of wavelength except within the spectral width of the atmospheric window, where it is zero. The temperature profile in radiative equilibrium is obtained analytically as a function of the longwave optical thickness. For illustrative purposes, numerical values for the infrared atmospheric absorption (i.e., greenhouse effect) and the liquid vapor equilibrium curve of the condensable absorbing gas refer to water. Values for the atmospheric absorption of sunlight (i.e., antigreenhouse effect) take a wide range since our aim is to provide a qualitative view of their effects. We find that atmospheres with a transparent region in the infrared spectrum do not present an absolute upper bound on the infrared emission. This result may be also found in atmospheres opaque at all infrared wavelengths if the fraction of absorbed sunlight in the atmosphere increases with the longwave opacity

Unstable equilibrium: young adult women in family and career formation in Southern Europe

The paper examines the relationship between family formation (i.e., living with a partner and having children) and women’s occupational career in southern Europe (i.e., Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain). The relationship is explored by analysing the impact that different family structures and male [nvolvement in caring activities have on women’s early occupational trajectories (i.e., remaining in the same occupational status, experiencing downward or upward mobility, or withdrawing from paid work). This research shows that male involvement in caring activities does not really push women ahead in their career, but the absolute lack of male support seems to negatively affect women’s permanence in paid work. These results apply to all southern European countries except Portugal, where the absolute absence of the partners’ support in caring activities does not seem to alter women’s determination to remain in paid work. The methodology applied consists of the estimation of multinomial logit regression models and the analysis is based on eight waves (1994-2001) of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP).

The role of moral values in the economic analysis of crime: A general equilibrium approach

In this paper, we develop a general equilibrium model of crime and show thatlaw enforcement has different roles depending on the equilibrium characterization and the value of social norms. When an economy has a unique stable equilibrium where a fraction of the population is productive and the remaining predates, the government can choose an optimal law enforcement policy to maximize a welfare function evaluated at the steady state. If such steady state is not unique, law enforcement is still relevant but in a completely different way because the steady state that prevails depends on the initial proportions of productive and predator individuals in the economy. The relative importance of these proportions can be changed through law enforcement policy.

Equilibrium asset prices and savings of heterogeneous agents in the presence of incomplete markets and portfolio constraints

We study the quantitative properties of a dynamic general equilibrium model in which agents face both idiosyncratic and aggregate income risk, state-dependent borrowing constraints that bind in some but not all periods and markets are incomplete. Optimal individual consumption-savings plans and equilibrium asset prices are computed under various assumptions about income uncertainty. Then we investigate whether our general equilibrium model with incomplete markets replicates two empirical observations: the high correlation between individual consumption and individual income, and the equity premium puzzle. We find that, when the driving processes are calibrated according to the data from wage income in different sectors of the US economy, the results move in the direction of explaining these observations, but the model falls short of explaining the observed correlations quantitatively. If the incomes of agents are assumed independent of each other, the observations can be explained quantitatively.

Credit constraints in general equilibrium: Experimental results

Our work attempts to investigate the influence of credit tightness orexpansion on activity and relative prices in a multimarket set-up. We report on somedouble- auction, two-market experiments where subjects had to satisfy an inequalityinvolving the use of credit. The experiments display two regimes, characterizedby high and low credit availability. The critical value of credit at the commonboundary of the two regimes has a compelling interpretation as the maximal credituse at the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium of the abstract economy naturally associatedto our experimental environment. Our main results are that changes in theavailability of credit: (a): have minor and unsystematic effects on quantitiesand relative prices in the high-credit regime, (b): have substantial effects, bothon quantities and relative prices, in the low-credit regime.

Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium

In this paper we consider dynamic processes, in repeated games, that are subject to the natural informational restriction of uncoupledness. We study the almost sure convergence to Nash equilibria, and present a number of possibility and impossibility results. Basically, we show that if in addition to random moves some recall is introduced, then successful search procedures that are uncoupled can be devised. In particular, to get almost sure convergence to pure Nash equilibria when these exist, it su±ces to recall the last two periods of play.

A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium

We propose a simple adaptive procedure for playing a game. In thisprocedure, players depart from their current play with probabilities thatare proportional to measures of regret for not having used other strategies(these measures are updated every period). It is shown that our adaptiveprocedure guaranties that with probability one, the sample distributionsof play converge to the set of correlated equilibria of the game. Tocompute these regret measures, a player needs to know his payoff functionand the history of play. We also offer a variation where every playerknows only his own realized payoff history (but not his payoff function).

Short-term investment and equilibrium multiplicity

I study the effects of the heterogeneity of traders'horizon in the context of a 2-period NREE model whereall traders are risk averse. Owing to inventory effects,myopic trading behavior generates multiplicity ofequilibria. In particular, two distinct patterns arise.Along the first equilibrium, short term tradersanticipate higher second period price reaction toinformation arrival and, owing to risk aversion,scale back their trading intensity. This, in turn,reduces both risk sharing and information impoundinginto prices enforcing a high returns' volatility-lowprice informativeness equilibrium. In the second one,the opposite happens and a low volatility-high priceinformativeness equilibrium arises.

Testing calibrated general equilibrium models

This paper illustrates the philosophy which forms the basis of calibrationexercises in general equilibrium macroeconomic models and the details of theprocedure, the advantages and the disadvantages of the approach, with particularreference to the issue of testing ``false'' economic models. We provide anoverview of the most recent simulation--based approaches to the testing problemand compare them to standard econometric methods used to test the fit of non--lineardynamic general equilibrium models. We illustrate how simulation--based techniques can be used to formally evaluate the fit of a calibrated modelto the data and obtain ideas on how to improve the model design using a standardproblem in the international real business cycle literature, i.e. whether amodel with complete financial markets and no restrictions to capital mobility is able to reproduce the second order properties of aggregate savingand aggregate investment in an open economy.

Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: An experimental study

We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertaintyabout the payoffs. Our game is closely related to models that have beenused in many macroeconomic and financial applications to solve problemsof equilibrium indeterminacy. In our experiment each subject receives anoisy signal about the true payoffs. This game has a unique strategyprofile that survives the iterative deletion of strictly dominatedstrategies (thus a unique Nash equilibrium). The equilibrium outcomecoincides, on average, with the risk-dominant equilibrium outcome ofthe underlying coordination game. The behavior of the subjects convergesto the theoretical prediction after enough experience has been gained. The data (and the comments) suggest that subjects do not apply through"a priori" reasoning the iterated deletion of dominated strategies.Instead, they adapt to the responses of other players. Thus, the lengthof the learning phase clearly varies for the different signals. We alsotest behavior in a game without uncertainty as a benchmark case. The gamewith uncertainty is inspired by the "global" games of Carlsson and VanDamme (1993).

Equilibrium unemployment insurance

In this paper, we incorporate a positive theory of unemployment insuranceinto a dynamic overlapping generations model with search-matching frictionsand on-the-job learning-by-doing. The model shows that societies populatedby identical rational agents, but differing in the initial distributionof human capital across agents, may choose very different unemploymentinsurance levels in a politico-economic equilibrium. The interactionbetween the political decision about the level of the unemployment insuranceand the optimal search behavior of the unemployed gives rise to aself-reinforcing mechanism whichmay generate multiple steady-stateequilibria. In particular, a European-type steady-state with highunemployment, low employment turnover and high insurance can co-exist withan American-type steady-state with low unemployment, high employment turnoverand low unemployment insurance. A calibrated version of the model featurestwo distinct steady-state equilibria with unemployment levels and durationrates resembling those of the U.S. and Europe, respectively.