Property as an economic concept: Reconciling legal and economic conceptions of property rights in a Coasean framework

Adopting a simplistic view of Coase (1960), most economic analyses of property rightsdisregard both the key advantage that legal property rights (that is, in rem rights) provide torightholders in terms of enhanced enforcement, and the difficulties they pose to acquirers interms of information asymmetry about legal title. Consequently, these analyses tend to overstatethe role of "private ordering" and disregard the two key elements of property law: first, theessential conflict between property (that is, in rem) enforcement and transaction costs; and,second, the institutional solutions created to overcome it, mainly contractual registries capable ofmaking truly impersonal (that is, asset-based) trade viable when previous relevant transactionson the same assets are not verifiable by judges. This paper fills this gap by reinterpreting bothelements within the Coasean framework and thus redrawing the institutional foundations of bothproperty and corporate contracting.

New ideas need new space

We develop a setting with weak intellectual property rights, where firms' boundaries, location and knowledge spillovers are endogenous. We have two main results. The first one is that, if communication costs increase with distance, entrepreneurs concerned about information leakage have a benefit from locating away from the industry center: distance is an obstacle to collusive trades between members andnon-members. The second result is that we identify a trade-off for the entrepreneur between owning a facility (controlling all its characteristics) and sharing a facility with a {\it non-member} (an agent not involved in production), therefore losing control over some of its characteristics. We focus on ``location" as the relevant characteristic of the facility, but location can be used as a spatial metaphor for other relevant characteristics of the facility. For theentrepreneur, sharing the facility with non-members implies that the latter, as co-owners, know the location (even if they do not have access to it). Knowledge of the location for the co-owners facilitates collusion with employees, what increases leakage. The model yields a benefit for new plants from spatial dispersion (locating at the periphery of the industry), particularly so for new plants of new firms.We relate this result with recent empirical findings on the dynamics of industry location.

Pre-play communication and credibility: A test of Aumann's conjecture

The effectiveness of pre-play communication in achieving efficientoutcomes has long been a subject of controversy. In some environments,cheap talk may help to achieve coordination. However, Aumannconjectures that, in a variant of the Stag Hunt game, a signal forefficient play is not self-enforcing and concludes that an "agreementto play [the efficient outcome] conveys no information about what theplayers will do." Harsanyi and Selten (1988) cite this example as anillustration of risk-dominance vs. payoff-dominance. Farrell and Rabin(1996) agree with the logic, but suspect that cheap talk willnonetheless achieve efficiency. The conjecture is tested with one-waycommunication. When the sender first chooses a signal and then anaction, there is impressive coordination: a 94% probability for thepotentially efficient (but risky) play, given a signal for efficientplay. Without communication, efforts to achieve efficiency wereunsuccessful, as the proportion of B moves is only 35%. I also test ahypothesis that the order of the action and the signal affects theresults, finding that the decision order is indeed important. WhileAumann s conjecture is behaviorally disconfirmed when the signal isdetermined initially, the signal s credibility seems to be much moresuspect when the sender is known to have first chosen an action, andthe results are not statistically distinguishable from those whenthere is no signal. Some applications and issues in communication andcoordination are discussed.

Communication, coordination and efficiency in evolutionary one-population models

We analyze the role of commitment in pre-play communication for ensuringefficient evolutionarily stable outcomes in coordination games. All players are a priori identical as they are drawn from the same population. In games where efficient outcomes can be reached by players coordinating on the same action we find commitment to be necessary to enforce efficiency. In games where efficienct outcomes only result from play of different actions, communication without commitment is most effective although efficiency can no longer be guaranteed. Only when there are many messages then inefficient outcomes are negligible as their basins of attraction become very small.

Strategy communication and measurement systems

Organizations often face the challenge of communicating their strategiesto local decision makers. The difficulty presents itself in finding away to measure performance wich meaningfully conveys how to implement theorganization's strategy at local levels. I show that organizations solvethis communication problem by combining performance measures in such away that performance gains come closest to mimicking value-added asdefined by the organization's strategy. I further show how organizationsrebalance performance measures in response to changes in their strategies.Applications to the design of performance metrics, gaming, and divisionalperformance evaluation are considered. The paper also suggests severalempirical ways to evaluate the practical importance of the communicationrole of measurement systems.

Contractual allocation of decision rights and incentives: The case of automobile distribution

We analyze empirically the allocation of rights and monetary incentives in automobile franchise contracts. These contracts substantially restrict the decision rights of dealers and grant manufacturers extensive contractual completion and enforcement powers, converting the manufacturers, de facto, in a sort of quasi-judiciary instance. Variation in the allocation of decision rights andincentive intensity is explained by the incidence of moral hazard in the relation. In particular, when the cost of dealer moral hazard is higher and the risk of manufactureropportunism is lower, manufacturers enjoy more discretion in determining the performance required from their dealers and in using mechanisms such as monitoring, termination and monetary incentives to ensure such performance is provided. We also explore the existence of interdependencies between the different elements of the system. and find some complementarities between completion and termination rights, and between monitoring rights and the intensity of incentives.

The growth and diffusion of knowlegde and the theory of the firm

We analyze the implications of a market imperfection related to the inability to establish intellectual property rights, that we label {\it unverifiable communication}. Employees are able to collude with external parties selling ``knowledge capital'' of the firm. The firm organizer engages in strategic interaction simultaneously with employees and competitors, as she introduces endogenous transaction costs in the market for information between those agents. Incentive schemes and communication costs are the key strategic variables used by the firm to induce frictions in collusive markets. Unverifiable communication introduces severe allocative distortions, both at internal product development and at intended sale of information (technology transfer). We derive implications of the model for observable decisions like characteristics of the employment relationship (full employment, incompatibility with other jobs), firms' preferences over cluster characteristics for location decisions, optimal size at entry, in--house development vs sale strategies for innovations and industry evolution.

En route to a more democratic European Union – An analysis of the communication strategies of European Citizens’ Initiatives (ECIs)

L’èxit de l’iniciativa ciutadana europea (ICE) com a instrument de democràcia directa a nivell europeu està directament relacionat amb la seva promulgació. Els ciutadans d’arreu Europa han d’estar informats sobre aquest nou mecanisme per tal que es dugui a terme, la qual cosa suposa una dificultat. Aquest estudi qualitatiu ens mostra els recursos i problemes en la divulgació de les ICE. Una anàlisi basat en entrevistes amb diferents organitzadors d’aquestes ICE que ens dona algunes idees sobre les seves estratègies de comunicació, així com l’ús d’eines de comunicació i relacions amb els mitjans de comunicació. A banda de les dificultats lingüístiques i financeres hi ha altres obstacles més específics relacionats amb l’ICE.

Mobile Communication 2012 : Experiències i recerques sobre comunicació mòbil

La comunicació mòbil és un dels temes de més actualitat en diferents fòrums, des de diferents perspectives. Espanya juga un paper important per les dinàmiques i l’evolució del seu mercat. En aquest sentit, el nostre país ofereix un interès específic per l'amplitud del seu parc de dispositius 3G (el segon d'Europa, després d'Itàlia) i per la intensitat del desenvolupament de xarxes socials mòbils, a més de per la creixent implicació d'empreses en la producció i distribució de continguts mòbils. Com va passar amb Internet, es tracta d’un procés d'innovació pel qual els formats de contingut, les pràctiques de consum i els models de negoci característics de la televisió i la xarxa, per exemple, s'adapten, primer, al nou mitjà, per a després desenvolupar formes i models específics que aprofiten les potencialitats de personalització, geolocalització i conectivitat ubiqua.

Electronic journals, scholarly communication and libraries

The recent surge in scientific electronic journals began when libraries began having access to the WWW in the mid-1990s. The shift from paper to digital has affected the traditional alignment and role of the primary "stakeholders" -mainly authors, publishers, universities and libraries. The author offers a brief review of the history of the scholarly journal followed by the evolution of e-journals in during the past two decades. The article then focuses on the implications that these have had on traditional library processes and services such as selection, acquisitions, cataloguing, storage, preservation and user services. In the conclusion the author speculates on the long term effect of Web-based publishing on the format of the traditional scholarly journal as it has existed for over 300 years.

Communication in networks with hierarchical branching

We present a simple model of communication in networks with hierarchical branching. We analyze the behavior of the model from the viewpoint of critical systems under different situations. For certain values of the parameters, a continuous phase transition between a sparse and a congested regime is observed and accurately described by an order parameter and the power spectra. At the critical point the behavior of the model is totally independent of the number of hierarchical levels. Also scaling properties are observed when the size of the system varies. The presence of noise in the communication is shown to break the transition. The analytical results are a useful guide to forecasting the main features of real networks.