Institutional support of the firm: A theory of business registries

Registering originative business contracts allows entrepreneurs and creditors to choose, andcourts to enforce market-friendly contract rules that protect innocent third parties whenadjudicating disputes on subsequent contracts. This reduces information asymmetry for thirdparties, which enhances impersonal trade. It does so without seriously weakening property rights,because it is rightholders who choose or activate the legal rules and can, therefore, minimize thecost of any possible weakening. Registries are essential not only to make the chosen rules publicbut to ensure rightholders commitment and avoid rule-gaming, because independent registriesmake rightholders choices verifiable by courts. The theory is supported by comparative andhistorical analyses.

Endogeneizing know-how flows through the nature of R&D investments

In this paper we carefully link knowledge flows to and from a firm s innovation process with this firm s investment decisions. Three types of investments are considered: investments in applied research, investments in basic research, and investments in intellectual property protection. Only when basic research is performed, can the firm effectively access incoming knowledge flows and these incoming spillovers serve to increase the efficiency of own applied research. The firm can at the same time influence outgoing knowledge flows, improving appropriability of its innovations, by investing in protection. Our results indicate that firms with small budgets for innovation will not invest in basic research. This occurs in the short run, when the budget for know-how creation is restricted, or in the long-run, when market opportunities are low, when legal protection is not very important, or, when the pool of accessible and relevant external know-how is limited. The ratio of basic to applied research is non-decreasing in the size of the pool of accessible external know-how, the size and opportunity of the market, and, the effectiveness of intellectual property rights protection. This indicates the existence of economies of scale in basic research due to external market related factors. Empirical evidence from a sample of innovative manufacturing firms in Belgium confirms the economies of scale in basic research as a consequence of the firm s capacity to access external knowledge flows and to protectintellectual property, as well as the complementarity between legal and strategic investments.

The growth and diffusion of knowlegde and the theory of the firm

We analyze the implications of a market imperfection related to the inability to establish intellectual property rights, that we label {\it unverifiable communication}. Employees are able to collude with external parties selling ``knowledge capital'' of the firm. The firm organizer engages in strategic interaction simultaneously with employees and competitors, as she introduces endogenous transaction costs in the market for information between those agents. Incentive schemes and communication costs are the key strategic variables used by the firm to induce frictions in collusive markets. Unverifiable communication introduces severe allocative distortions, both at internal product development and at intended sale of information (technology transfer). We derive implications of the model for observable decisions like characteristics of the employment relationship (full employment, incompatibility with other jobs), firms' preferences over cluster characteristics for location decisions, optimal size at entry, in--house development vs sale strategies for innovations and industry evolution.

Patentes, regulación de precios e innovación en la industria farmacéutica

The trade-off between property rights/price regulation and innovation depends on countrycharacteristics and drug industry specificities. Access to drugs and innovation can bereconciled by seven ways that, among others, include: public health strengthening in thecountries with the largest access problems (those among the poor with the weakestinstitutions); public and private aid to make attractive R&D on neglected diseases; pricediscrimination with market segmentation; to require patent owners to choose eitherprotection in the rich countries or protection in the poor countries (but not both).Regarding price regulation, after a review of theoretical arguments and empirical evidence,seven strategies to reconcile health and industrial considerations are outlined, including:mitigation of the medical profession dependence on the pharmaceutical industry; considerationof a drug as an input of a production process; split drug authorization from public fundingdecisions; establish an efficiency minimum for all health production inputs; and stop theEuropean R&D hemorrhagia.

The choice of titling system in land

This paper analyzes the choice of the socially optimal titling systemassuming rational individual choices about recording, assurance andregistration decisions. It focuses on the enforcement of propertyrights on land under private titling and the two existing publictitling systems, recording and registration. When the reduction in theexpected costs of eviction compensates the higher cost of initialregistration, it is more efficient to introduce a registration systemrather than a recording system. The development of private "titleassurance" improves the standing of recording as compared toregistration. This improvement depends, however, on the efficiency ofthe assurance technology and, also, on corrective taxation that isneeded to align individual optimization, which disregards the transferelement in eviction, with social objectives.

The law of impersonal transactions

Most economic interactions happen in a context of sequential exchangein which innocent third parties suffer information asymmetry with respect toprevious "originative" contracts. The law reduces transaction costs byprotecting these third parties but preserves some element of consent byproperty rightholders to avoid damaging property enforcement?e.g., it isthey, as principals, who authorize agents in originative contracts. Judicialverifiability of these originative contracts is obtained either as an automaticbyproduct of transactions or, when these would have remained private, byrequiring them to be made public. Protecting third parties produces a legalcommodity which is easy to trade impersonally, improving the allocationand specialization of resources. Historical delay in generalizing this legalcommoditization paradigm is attributed to path dependency?the law firstdeveloped for personal trade?and an unbalance in vested interests, asluddite legal professionals face weak public bureaucracies.

Ownership, Incentives and Hospitals

This article analyzes hospital privatization by comparing costs and quality between different ownership forms. We put the attention on the distinction between public hospitals and private hospitals with public funding. Using information about Spanish hospitals, we have found that private hospitals provide services at a lower cost at expenses of lower quality. We observe that property rights theory is fulfilled at least for the Spanish hospital market. The way that Heath Authorities finance publicly funded hospitals may be responsible for the differences in incentives between public and private centers. We argue that the trade-off between costs and quality could be minimized by designing financing contracts with fixed and variable components.

Challenges and Opportunities of Online Entertainment. Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Internet, Law & Politics. Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, Barcelona, 9-10 July, 2012.

El VIII Congrés Internacional Internet, Dret i Política (IDP 2012) que s'ha dut a terme a Barcelona els dies 9 i 10 de juliol de 2012 sota el títol genèric de "Reptes i oportunitats de l'entreteniment en línia", ha abordat alguns dels principals reptes als que s'enfronta la societat de la informació des de la perspectiva jurídica i politològica. Concretament, els temes centrals han estat el debat sobre l'entreteniment a la xarxa, així com altres qüestions relacionades amb Internet i els drets de propietat intel·lectual, la privacitat, la seguretat o la llibertat d'expressió.

Technology Catching-up and the Role of Institutions

The aim of the paper is to investigate the role played by differences in Institutional Quality on the process of technology catch-up across countries. Empirical evidence shows how countries endowed with better institutions are those experiencing higher TFP growth rates, faster rates of technology adoption and hence being those more rapidly closing the gap with the frontier. Conversely, countries lacking some minimum institutional level are shown to diverge in the long run and not to catch-up. Some institutions, however, play an ambiguous role in the creation and adoption of technology. We find that the tightening of Intellectual Property Rights reduces the ability of followers to freely imitate technology slowing down their catchup rate. This negative effect is stronger the farther the countriesare found from the frontier. Other institutional categories such as openness to trade, instead, benefit both leaders and followers.

Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences

We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose an alternative from a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. An allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set of its users. Agents have gregarious preferences over allocations: given an allocation, they prefer that the set of users becomes larger. We require that the final allocation be efficient and stable (no agent can be forced to be a user and no agent who wants to be a user can be excluded). We propose a two-stage sequential mechanism whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is an efficient and stable allocation which also satisfies a maximal participation property.

Estudio multidisciplinario del ecosistema manglar en la comunidad tradicional de Curral Velho : Estudio sobre la pesca artesanal y análisis de sus diferencias con la acuicultura del camarón

Curral Velho es una comunitat tradicional, situada al nord-est de Brasil, que manté una relació directa amb els ecosistemes que la envolten. La comunitat depèn del estat de conservació del medi natura, ja que obtenen diferents serveis ecositemics. En aquest territori es desenvolupen dos tipus d’economies amb unes bases molt diferents. Una economia tradicional, desenvolupada per la pròpia comunitat, que es basa en la propietat col·lectiva del territori i en optimitzar a llarg termini els beneficis que s’obtenen del medi; y un altre com la camaronicultura, la base de la qual es la obtenció de beneficis a curt termini i amb un territori de propietat privada. Aquesta superposició de models de producció genera impactes ambientals, i un conflicte socio-ambiental entre la comunitat i els que desenvolupen la camaronicultura. L’objectiu es realitzar un estudi econòmic de la pesca artesanal de Curral Velho caracteritzant manera de viure, creant una base de dades sobre pesca artesanal i elaborant indicador de beneficis econòmics generats per la pesca artesanal. Per contextualitzar els resultats es va fer un anàlisis de les dos economies existents a la comunitat. Els resultats obtinguts en primer lloc són que l’economia d’explotació intensiva aporta més guanys per les persones de la comunitat que tenen un relació directa que les que es dediquen a la pesca artesanal, però es important no aturar-se aquí: s’ha de realitzar un anàlisis més profund. Com a conclusió, la activitat pesquera es més rentable a llarg termini ja que els recursos extrets de manera sostenible i així són il·limitats y accessibles a tota la comunitat. A diferència de la camaronicultura, la pesca artesanal no genera desigualtats socials ni vulneracions dels drets humans. Tot el contrari, genera forts vincles entre els individus de la comunitat basats en el treball en equip i l’aprenentatge vivencial e intergeneracional.