The Effects of government spending on the distribution of consumption

We study the effects of government spending on the distribution of consumption. We find a substantial degree of heterogeneity: consumption increases at the bottom and falls at the top of the distribution, implying a significant temporary reduction of consumption inequality. The effects of the shock display correlations of around -0.7/-0.9 with the percentage of stockholders within the decile. We interpret the results as in line and yielding support to models of limited participation where, while the Ricardian equivalence holds for rich households, for poor household, with no access to capital markets, the Keynesian multiplier is at work.

Fiscal foresight, forecast revisions and the effects of government spending in the open economy

This paper investigates the effects of government spending on the real exchange rate and the trade balance in the US using a new VAR identification procedure based on spending forecast revisions. I find that the real exchange rate appreciates and the trade balance deteriorates after a government spending shock, although the effects are quantitatively small. The findings broadly match the theoretical predictions of the standard Mundell-Fleming model and differ substantially from those existing in literature. Differences are attributable to the fact that, because of fiscal foresight, the government spending is non-fundamental for the variables typically used in open economy VARs. Here, on the contrary, the estimated shock is fundamental.

The Farm, the city, and the emergence of social security

We study the social, demographic and economic origins of social security. The data for the U.S. and for a cross section of countries suggest that urbanization and industrialization are associated with the rise of social insurance. We describe an OLG model in which demographics, technology, and social security are linked together in a political economy equilibrium. In the model economy, there are two locations (sectors), the farm (agricultural) and the city (industrial) and the decision to migrate from rural to urban locations is endogenous and linked to productivity differences between the two locations and survival probabilities. Farmers rely on land inheritance for their old age and do not support a pay-as-you-go social security system. With structural change, people migrate to the city, the land loses its importance and support for social security arises. We show that a calibrated version of this economy, where social security taxes are determined by majority voting, is consistent with the historical transformation in the United States.

El Sistema educatiu als territoris autònoms palestins: estudi interpretatiu

El propòsit d'aquesta investigació és conèixer, descriure i interpretar el sistema educatiu palestí per saber si una situació de conflicte afecta -i en quina mesura- el funcionament, estructura, resultats i comprensió del concepte educatiu en una regió. Per assolir-ho, s'ha cercat informació bibliogràfica en diferents fonts, a més de la observació in situ de la realitat educativa palestina, fent entrevistes a diferents agents de la regió. Cal esmentar que el treball teòric és general però la descripció pràctica és contextualitzada a Nablus, una ciutat de Cisjordània. Els resultats obtinguts en aquesta investigació educativa de la branca de l'Educació Comparada han estat diversos, concretar-se en diferents conclusions: les conseqüències d'una guerra silenciosa que fa més de 60 anys que es perllonga en el temps implica dificultats econòmiques i administratives que afecten directament al sistema educatiu de la regió; objectius del govern palestí encarats a desenvolupar la població amb una aplicació pràctica real que els acompleix; importància de l'imaginari social de la nació per comprendre la importància del concepte d'Educació i les accions i atacs que rep aquest concepte per part de l'Estat d'Israel i on la comunitat internacional no es posiciona; la necessitat de crear un Estat Independent Palestí

El reto del paisaje urbano en China, del Mall Comercial al espacio público

Las categorías del espacio introvertido y extrovertido definen por excelencia la estructura espacial, que ordena el ámbito de lo privado y lo público en la ciudad. La dualidad del espacio abierto y cerrado, vinculado a la estructura espacial de la ciudad clásica China, quedaba ordenado, justificado y vinculado mediante una estructura espacial muy definida. Sin embargo en el modelo de ciudad contemporánea, aflora la cuestión de la integración de estas categorías espaciales y su articulación dentro de una estructura urbana heterogénea y fuertemente alterada. ¿Cuáles serán los factores de cambio de la transición de un espacio comunitario introvertido a un espacio cívico abierto? Este proceso es un proceso que debe discurrir a un doble nivel espacial y político. Debe discurrir en paralelo a la transición de las categorías espaciales que ordenan identitariamente el ámbito urbano y la progresiva transición socio-cultural y política de una sociedad que debe gradualmente identificar y adoptar como propias las instituciones de gobierno local y su escenario, la ciudad.

Government and the distribution of skills

Individuals' life chances in the future will very much depend on how we invest in our children now. An optimal human capital model would combine a high mean with minimal variance of skills. It is well-established that early childhood learning is key to adult success. The impact of social origins on child outcomes remains strong, and the new role of women poses additional challenges to our conventional nurturing approach to child development. This paper focuses on skill development in the early years, examining how we might best combine family inputs and public policy to invest optimally in our future human capital. I emphasize three issues: one, the uneven capacity of parents to invest in children; two, the impact of mothers' employment on child outcomes; and three, the potential benefits of early pre-school programmes. I conclude that mothers' intra-family bargaining power is decisive for family investments and that universal child care is key if our goal is to arrive at a strong mean with minimal variance.

Policy Making in Divided Government. A Pivotal Actors Model with Party Discipline.

This article presents a formal model of policy decision-making in an institutional framework of separation of powers in which the main actors are pivotal political parties with voting discipline. The basic model previously developed from pivotal politics theory for the analysis of the United States lawmaking is here modified to account for policy outcomes and institutional performances in other presidential regimes, especially in Latin America. Legislators' party indiscipline at voting and multi-partism appear as favorable conditions to reduce the size of the equilibrium set containing collectively inefficient outcomes, while a two-party system with strong party discipline is most prone to produce 'gridlock', that is, stability of socially inefficient policies. The article provides a framework for analysis which can induce significant revisions of empirical data, especially regarding the effects of situations of (newly defined) unified and divided government, different decision rules, the number of parties and their discipline. These implications should be testable and may inspire future analytical and empirical work.

Government Spending and Re-election

Does additional government spending improve the electoral chances of incumbent political parties? This paper provides the first quasi-experimental evidence on this question. Our research design exploits discontinuities in federal funding to local governments in Brazil around several population cutoffs over the period 1982-1985. We find that extra fiscal transfers resulted in a 20% increase in local government spending per capita, and an increase of about 10 percentage points in the re-election probability of local incumbent parties. We also find positive effects of the government spending on education outcomes and earnings, which we interpret as indirect evidence of public service improvements. Together, our results provide evidence that electoral rewards encourage incumbents to spend part of additional revenues on public services valued by voters, a finding in line with agency models of electoral accountability.

Fiat Money, Intrinsic Properties, and Government Transaction Policy

Why do people coordinate on the use of valueless pieces of paper as generally accepted money? A possible answer is that these objects have intrinsic properties that make them better candidates to be used as media of exchange. Another answer stresses the fact that unconvertible fiat money will not easily appear unless there is a centralized institution that favors its use. The main objective of the paper is to analyze these questions. In order to do this, we take a model of commodity money in which fiat money does not play any significant role and modify it to examine under which circumstances fiat money might come to circulate as medium of exchange. Some of the results obtained from the model differ in a rather substantial way from previous related literature.

Are rules-based government programs shielded from special-interest politics? Evidence from revenue-sharing transfers in Brazil

Manipulation of government finances for the benefit of narrowly defined groups is usuallythought to be limited to the part of the budget over which politicians exercise discretion inthe short run, such as earmarks. Analyzing a revenue-sharing program between the centraland local governments in Brazil that uses an allocation formula based on local population estimates,I document two main results: first, that the population estimates entering the formulawere manipulated and second, that this manipulation was political in nature. Consistent withswing-voter targeting by the right-wing central government, I find that municipalities withroughly equal right-wing and non-right-wing vote shares benefited relative to opposition orconservative core support municipalities. These findings suggest that the exclusive focus ondiscretionary transfers in the extant empirical literature on special-interest politics may understatethe true scope of tactical redistribution that is going on under programmatic disguise.

Social capital, government expenditures, and growth

Countries with greater social capital have higher economic growth. We show that socialcapital is also highly positively correlated across countries with government expenditureon education. We develop an infinite-horizon model of public spending and endogenousstochastic growth that explains both facts through frictions in political agency whenvoters have imperfect information. In our model, the government provides servicesthat yield immediate utility, and investment that raises future productivity. Voters aremore likely to observe public services, so politicians have electoral incentives to underprovidepublic investment. Social capital increases voters' awareness of all governmentactivity. As a consequence, both politicians' incentives and their selection improve.In the dynamic equilibrium, both the amount and the efficiency of public investmentincrease, permanently raising the growth rate.

Does direct democracy reduce the size of government? New evidence from historical data, 1890-2000

Using historical data for all Swiss cantons from 1890 to 2000, we estimate the causal effect of direct democracy on government spending. The main innovation in this paper is that we use fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity and instrumental variables to address the potential endogeneity of institutions. We find that the budget referendum and lower costs to launch a voter initiative are effective tools in reducing canton level spending. However, we find no evidence that the budget referendum results in more decentralized government or a larger local government. Our instrumental variable estimates suggest that a mandatory budget referendum reduces the size of canton spending between 13 and 19 percent. A 1 percent lower signature requirement for the initiative reduces canton spending by up to 2 percent.

Catalan government popularity. An example of economic effects on sub-national government support

The aim of this essay is to deal with economic voting in contexts ofmultilevel governance and to be a contribution to the debate on attribution of responsibilities in popularity functions literature. We use aggregate and individual data from Catalonia in order to analyse the relation between the state of the economy and the support for a sub-state government. The empirical analysis shows that the responsibility hypothesis works in regional governments without explicit macroeconomic competencies. We have also considered the evaluations of government performance on certain specific policies in order to clarify and determine the factors that drive Catalan government support. The article considers the implications of the findings for future attempts to model party support in a context of the European Union.

Policy making in divided government. A pivotal actors model with party discipline

This article presents a formal model of policy decision-making in an institutional framework of separation of powers in which the main actors are pivotal political parties with voting discipline. The basic model previously developed from pivotal politics theory for the analysis of the United States lawmaking is here modified to account for policy outcomes and institutional performances in other presidential regimes, especially in Latin America. Legislators' party indiscipline at voting and multi-partism appear as favorable conditions to reduce the size of the equilibrium set containing collectively inefficient outcomes, while a two-party system with strong party discipline is most prone to produce 'gridlock', that is, stability of socially inefficient policies. The article provides a framework for analysis which can induce significant revisions of empirical data, especially regarding the effects of situations of (newly defined) unified and divided government, different decision rules, the number of parties and their discipline. These implications should be testable and may inspire future analytical and empirical work.

Fiscal decentralization policies and sub-national government debt in evolving federations

As part of a process of democratization, many countries spanning Europe, Latin Amertica, Africa, and Asia are reorganizing their governments bydevolving fiscal responsibility and authority to newly empowered regionaland local governments. Although decentralization in each country proceedsdifferently, a common element tends to be an initially heavy relianceon central government grants to fund regional spending. We develop atheoretical model of regional borrowing decisions in which the incentivesfor regional borrowing depend crucially on how the regions expect thefederal system of finance to evolve. We examine the implications of themodel using data on Spanish regions for the period 1984-1995 and findevidence that regions may be borrowing inefficiently in response toincentives imbedded in the Spanish system of fiscal decentralization.