La Biblioteca de la UOC : continguts digitals per a una biblioteca virtual

En aquesta comunicació, farem un repàs dels continguts digitals que actualment conformen el fons de la Biblioteca de la UOC. Parlar de continguts digitals a la Biblioteca de la UOC implica necessàriament recordar que la nostra biblioteca es defineix a si mateixa com a virtual, una virtualitat caracteritzada per la possibilitat oferta als nostres usuaris d'accedir remotament a continguts i serveis bibliotecaris, en què es combinen notícies bibliogràfiques, textos electrònics, bancs d'imatges i tota mena d'informacions per mitjà d'una xarxa telemàtica. La relació entre continguts digitals i virtualitat és, evidentment, directa: els serveis que s'ofereixen virtualment es fan sobre la base de documents digitals i, al mateix temps, aquests serveis virtuals també generen documents electrònics.

Study and implementation of some quantitative trading models

Quantitative or algorithmic trading is the automatization of investments decisions obeying a fixed or dynamic sets of rules to determine trading orders. It has increasingly made its way up to 70% of the trading volume of one of the biggest financial markets such as the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). However, there is not a signi cant amount of academic literature devoted to it due to the private nature of investment banks and hedge funds. This projects aims to review the literature and discuss the models available in a subject that publications are scarce and infrequently. We review the basic and fundamental mathematical concepts needed for modeling financial markets such as: stochastic processes, stochastic integration and basic models for prices and spreads dynamics necessary for building quantitative strategies. We also contrast these models with real market data with minutely sampling frequency from the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA). Quantitative strategies try to exploit two types of behavior: trend following or mean reversion. The former is grouped in the so-called technical models and the later in the so-called pairs trading. Technical models have been discarded by financial theoreticians but we show that they can be properly cast into a well defined scientific predictor if the signal generated by them pass the test of being a Markov time. That is, we can tell if the signal has occurred or not by examining the information up to the current time; or more technically, if the event is F_t-measurable. On the other hand the concept of pairs trading or market neutral strategy is fairly simple. However it can be cast in a variety of mathematical models ranging from a method based on a simple euclidean distance, in a co-integration framework or involving stochastic differential equations such as the well-known Ornstein-Uhlenbeck mean reversal ODE and its variations. A model for forecasting any economic or financial magnitude could be properly defined with scientific rigor but it could also lack of any economical value and be considered useless from a practical point of view. This is why this project could not be complete without a backtesting of the mentioned strategies. Conducting a useful and realistic backtesting is by no means a trivial exercise since the \laws" that govern financial markets are constantly evolving in time. This is the reason because we make emphasis in the calibration process of the strategies' parameters to adapt the given market conditions. We find out that the parameters from technical models are more volatile than their counterpart form market neutral strategies and calibration must be done in a high-frequency sampling manner to constantly track the currently market situation. As a whole, the goal of this project is to provide an overview of a quantitative approach to investment reviewing basic strategies and illustrating them by means of a back-testing with real financial market data. The sources of the data used in this project are Bloomberg for intraday time series and Yahoo! for daily prices. All numeric computations and graphics used and shown in this project were implemented in MATLAB^R scratch from scratch as a part of this thesis. No other mathematical or statistical software was used.

Clustering algorithms for anti-money laundering using graph theory and social network analysis

HEMOLIA (a project under European community’s 7th framework programme) is a new generation Anti-Money Laundering (AML) intelligent multi-agent alert and investigation system which in addition to the traditional financial data makes extensive use of modern society’s huge telecom data source, thereby opening up a new dimension of capabilities to all Money Laundering fighters (FIUs, LEAs) and Financial Institutes (Banks, Insurance Companies, etc.). This Master-Thesis project is done at AIA, one of the partners for the HEMOLIA project in Barcelona. The objective of this thesis is to find the clusters in a network drawn by using the financial data. An extensive literature survey has been carried out and several standard algorithms related to networks have been studied and implemented. The clustering problem is a NP-hard problem and several algorithms like K-Means and Hierarchical clustering are being implemented for studying several problems relating to sociology, evolution, anthropology etc. However, these algorithms have certain drawbacks which make them very difficult to implement. The thesis suggests (a) a possible improvement to the K-Means algorithm, (b) a novel approach to the clustering problem using the Genetic Algorithms and (c) a new algorithm for finding the cluster of a node using the Genetic Algorithm.

How does ownership structure invfluence bank risk? Analyzing the role of managerial incentives

This paper analyzes how ownership concentration and managerial incentives influences bank risk for a large sample of US banks over the period 1997-2007. Using 2SLS simultaneous equations models, we show that ownership concentration has a positive total effect on bank risk. This is the result of a positive direct effect, which reflects monitoring and opportunistic behavior, and a negative indirect effect, which works through the design of managerial incentive contracts and reflects shareholder preferences toward risk. Large shareholders reduce bank risk by reducing the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility (Vega) and by increasing the CEO pay-performance sensitivity (Delta). In addition, we show that the direct and indirect effect of ownership concentration on bank risk depends on the type of the largest shareholder (a family, a bank, a corporation or an institutional investor), as well as, on the total shareholding held by each type as a group. Our results suggest that the positive relation between ownership concentration and risk is not the result of preferences towards more risk. Rather, they point at opportunistic behavior of large shareholders.

Generation of induced pluripotent stem cells from human cord blood cells with only two factors:OCT4 and SOX2

Induced pluripotent stem cells (iPSC ) provide an invaluable resource for regenerative medicine as they allow the generationof patient-specific progenitors with potential value for cell therapy. However, in many instances, an off-the-shelf approach isdesirable, such as for cell therapy of acute conditions or when the patient’s somatic cells are altered as a consequence of a chronicdisease or aging. Cord blood (CB) stem cells appear ideally suited for this purpose as they are young cells expected to carryminimal somatic mutations and possess the immunological immaturity of newborn cells; additionally, several hundred thousandimmunotyped CB units are readily available through a worldwide network of CB banks. Here we present a detailed protocol for thederivation of CB stem cells and how they can be reprogrammed to pluripotency by retroviral transduction with only two factors(OCT 4 and SO X2) in 2 weeks and without the need for additional chemical compounds.

Book vs. Fair Value Accounting in Banking, and Intertemporal Smoothing

The aim of this paper is to examine the pros and cons of book and fair value accounting from the perspective of the theory of banking. We consider the implications of the two accounting methods in an overlapping generations environment. As observed by Allen and Gale(1997), in an overlapping generation model, banks have a role as intergenerational connectors as they allow for intertemporal smoothing. Our main result is that when dividends depend on profits, book value ex ante dominates fair value, as it provides better intertemporal smoothing. This is in contrast with the standard view that states that, fair value yields a better allocation as it reflects the real opportunity cost of assets. Banking regulation play an important role by providing the right incentives for banks to smooth intertemporal consumption whereas market discipline improves intratemporal efficiency.

Adverse Selection, Credit, and Efficiency: the Case of the Missing Market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our envi- ronment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow from banks. As is generally the case in economies with adverse selection, the competitive equilibrium of our economy is shown to be ine¢ cient. Under adverse selection, the choices made by one type of agents limit what can be o¤ered to other types in an incentive-compatible manner. This gives rise to an externality, which cannot be internalized in a competitive equilibrium. We show that, in this type of environment, the ine¢ ciency associated to adverse selection is the consequence of one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added (say, a .security market.), in which entrepreneurs can obtain funds beyond those o¤ered by banks, we show that the e¢ cient allocation is an equilibrium of the economy. In such an equilibrium, all entrepreneurs borrow at a pooling rate in the security market. When they apply to bank loans, though, only entrepreneurs with good projects pledge these additional funds as collateral. This equilibrium thus simultaneously entails cross- subsidization and separation between di¤erent types of entrepreneurs.

Interbank Competition with Costly Screening

We analyse credit market equilibrium when banks screen loan applicants. When banks have a convex cost function of screening, a pure strategy equilibrium exists where banks optimally set interest rates at the same level as their competitors. This result complements Broecker s (1990) analysis, where he demonstrates that no pure strategy equilibrium exists when banks have zero screening costs. In our set up we show that interest rate on loans are largely independent of marginal costs, a feature consistent with the extant empirical evidence. In equilibrium, banks make positive profits in our model in spite of the threat of entry by inactive banks. Moreover, an increase in the number of active banks increases credit risk and so does not improve credit market effciency: this point has important regulatory implications. Finally, we extend our analysis to the case where banks have differing screening abilities.

Institutions, Public Debt and Foreign Finance

We study the role of domestic financial institutions in sustaining capital flows to the private and public sector of a country whose government can default on its debt. As in recent public debt crises, in our model public defaults weaken banks' balance sheets, disrupting domestic financial markets. This effect leads to a novel complementarity between private capital inflows and public borrowing, where the former sustain the latter by boosting the government's cost of default. Our key message is that, by shaping the direction of private capital flows, financial institutions determine whether financial integration improves or reduces government discipline. We explore the implications of this complementarity for financial liberalization and debt-financed bailouts of banks. We present some evidence consistent with complementarity.

Interbank market integration under asymmetric information

We argue that the main barrier to an integrated international interbankmarket is the existence of asymmetric information between differentcountries, which may prevail in spite of monetary integration or successfulcurrency pegging. In order to address this issue, we study the scope forinternational interbank market integration with unsecured lending whencross-country information is noisy. We find not only that an equilibriumwith integrated markets need not always exist, but also that when it does,the integrated equilibrium may coexist with one of interbank marketsegmentation. Therefore, market deregulation, per se, does not guaranteethe emergence of an integrated interbank market. The effect of a repo marketwhich, a priori, was supposed to improve efficiency happens to be morecomplex: it reduces interest rate spreads and improves upon the segmentationequilibrium, but\ it may destroy the unsecured integrated equilibrium, sincethe repo market will attract the best borrowers. The introduction of othertransnational institutional arrangements, such as multinational banking,correspondent banking and the existence of "too-big-to-fail" banks mayreduce cross country interest spreads and provide more insurance againstcountry wide liquidity shocks. Still, multinational banking, as theintroduction of repos, may threaten the integrated interbank marketequilibrium.

An overall perspective on banking regulation

We survey the theory of banking regulation from the general perspectiveof regulatory theory. Starting by considering the different justificationsof financial intermediation, we proceed to identify the market failuresthat make banking regulation necessary. We then succinctly compare how theanalysis of regulation compares in the domains of banking and industrialorganization. Finally we analyse why a safety net for banks could be partof banking regulation and how it can be structured in an efficient way.

Macroprudential policy, countercyclical bank capital buffers and credit supply: Evidence from the Spanish dynamic provisioning experiments

We analyze the impact of countercyclical capital buffers held by banks on the supplyof credit to firms and their subsequent performance. Spain introduced dynamicprovisioning unrelated to specific bank loan losses in 2000 and modified its formulaparameters in 2005 and 2008. In each case, individual banks were impacteddifferently. The resultant bank-specific shocks to capital buffers, coupled withcomprehensive bank-, firm-, loan-, and loan application-level data, allow us toidentify its impact on the supply of credit and on real activity. Our estimates showthat countercyclical dynamic provisioning smooths cycles in the supply of credit andin bad times upholds firm financing and performance.

Fair pricing of deposit insurance. Is it possible? Yes. Is it desirable? No

This note elaborates on a recent article by Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor(1992) who contend that fairly priced deposit insurance is incompatiblewithfree competition in the banking sector, in the presence of adverseselection.We show here that at soon as one introduces a real economic motivationfromprivate banks to manage the deposits from the public, then fairly priceddeposit insurance becomes possible. However, we also show that sucha fairlypriced insurance is never desirable, precisely because of adverseselection.We compute the characteristics of the optimal premium schedule, whichtradesoff between the cost of adverse selection and the cost of ``unfaircompetition ''.

Book vs. fair value accounting in banking and intertemporal smoothing

The aim of this paper is to examine the pros and cons of book and fair value accounting from the perspective of the theory of banking. We consider the implications of the two accounting methods in an overlapping generations environment. As observed by Allen and Gale(1997), in an overlapping generation model, banks have a role as intergenerational connectors as they allow for intertemporal smoothing. Our main result is that when dividends depend on profits, book value ex ante dominates fair value, as it provides better intertemporal smoothing. This is in contrast with the standard view that states that, fair value yields a better allocation as it reflects the real opportunity cost of assets. Banking regulation play an important role by providing the right incentives for banks to smooth intertemporal consumption whereas market discipline improves intratemporal efficiency.

Identifying monetary policy shocks in Japan

It is sometimes argued that the central banks influence the private economy in the short run through controlling a specific component of high powered money, not its total amount. Using a structural VAR approach, this paper evaluates this claim empirically, in the context of the Japanese economy. I estimate a model based on the standard view that the central bank controls the total amount of high powered money, and another model based on the alternative view that it controls only a specific component. It is shown that the former yields much more sensible estimates than thelatter.