Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?

A social choice function is group strategy-proof on a domain if no group of agents can manipulate its final outcome to their own benefit by declaring false preferences on that domain. Group strategy-proofness is a very attractive requirement of incentive compatibility. But in many cases it is hard or impossible to find nontrivial social choice functions satisfying even the weakest condition of individual strategy-proofness. However, there are a number of economically significant domains where interesting rules satisfying individual strategy-proofness can be defined, and for some of them, all these rules turn out to also satisfy the stronger requirement of group strategy-proofness. This is the case, for example, when preferences are single-peaked or single-dipped. In other cases, this equivalence does not hold. We provide sufficient conditions defining domains of preferences guaranteeing that individual and group strategy-proofness are equivalent for all rules defined on the

Analytic approximation of matrix functions in Lp

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Differentiability of functions of contractions

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The simultaneous conjugacy problem in groups of piecewise linear functions

Guba and Sapir asked, in their joint paper [8], if the simultaneous conjugacy problem was solvable in Diagram Groups or, at least, for Thompson's group F. We give an elementary proof for the solution of the latter question. This relies purely on the description of F as the group of piecewise linear orientation-preserving homeomorphisms of the unit. The techniques we develop allow us also to solve the ordinary conjugacy problem as well, and we can compute roots and centralizers. Moreover, these techniques can be generalized to solve the same questions in larger groups of piecewise-linear homeomorphisms.

Locally univalent functions, VMOA, and the Dirichlet space

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Inversion of analytic characteristic functions and infinite convolutions of exponential and Laplace densities

This paper shows that certain quotients of entire functions are characteristic functions. Under some conditions, we provide expressions for the densities of such characteristic functions which turn out to be generalized Dirichlet series which in turn can be expressed as an infinite linear combination of exponential or Laplace densities. We apply these results to several examples.

A Schoenflies extension theorem for a class of locally bi-Lipschitz homeomorphisms

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On Strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness

We characterize the class of strategy-proof social choice functions on the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences. This class is strictly larger than the set of generalized median voter schemes (the class of strategy-proof and tops-only social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences characterized by Moulin (1980)) since, under the domain of symmetric single-peaked preferences, generalized median voter schemes can be disturbed by discontinuity points and remain strategy-proof on the smaller domain. Our result identifies the specific nature of these discontinuities which allow to design non-onto social choice functions to deal with feasibility constraints.

Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information

We propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends Pazner and Schmeidler's (1978) concept to environments with incomplete information. If every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for instance, in the case of non-exclusive information), then interim egalitarian equivalence and interim incentive efficiency remain compatible, as they were under complete information. When incentive constraints are more restrictive, on the other hand, the two criteria may become incompatible.

Weighted norm inequalities for Fourier transforms of radial functions

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Renovar la il·lusió de l'estudiant universitari amb els seus estudis : desenvolupament d'una metodologia que incrementi l'èxit mitjançant la implicació i el raonament (RIE)

El departament d'Economia i Organització d'Empreses, de la Facultat d'Economia i Empresa de la Universitat de Barcelona, sempre ha mostrat una preocupació perquè els alumnes siguin capaços d'entendre i, sobretot, de veure aplicables a la vida laboral els conceptes de les diverses assignatures de la nostra àrea -organització i direcció d'empreses-. Donada la falta d'experiència laboral que tenen, sovint entenen els conceptes d'una manera superficial i teòrica ja que els queden una mica lluny de la seva vida diària. A més, la falta d'assistència, el baix rendiment acadèmic i la falta de motivació dels estudiants són temes habituals entre el col·lectiu de professors. Per tot això sorgeix la necessitat de millorar el rendiment dels estudiants, en el marc de l'Espai d'Educació Europeu Superior, amb una metodologia docent generalizable a la resta d'assignatures que aconsegueixi motivar-les tant per estudiar com per assistir a classe. La finalitat principal del projecte és millorar el rendiment acadèmic dels estudiants mitjançant una metodologia docent basada en l'anàlisi de casos audiovisuals. En concret es volen arribar a aconseguir els objectius formatius fonamentals de l'àrea d'Organització d'Empreses així com també es pretén que els alumnes adquireixin capacitats desitjables per dur a terme les funcions administratives. La durada del projecte ha estat d'un any. Concretament des de novembre de 2007 a octubre de 2008.

Welfare Maximizing Contest Success Functions when the Planner Cannot Commit

We analyze how a contest organizer chooses optimally the winner when the contestants' efforts are already exerted and commitment to the use of a given contest success function is not possible. We de…ne the notion of rationalizability in mixed-strategies to capture such a situation. Our approach allows to derive different contest success functions depending on the aims and attitudes of the decider. We derive contest success functions which are closely related to commonly used functions providing new support for them. By taking into account social welfare considerations our approach bridges the contest literature and the recent literature on political economy. Keywords: Endogenous Contests, Contest Success Function, Mixed-Strategies. JEL Classi…cation: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D74 (Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances)

Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results

We define different concepts of group strategy-proofness for social choice functions. We discuss the connections between the defined concepts under different assumptions on their domains of definition. We characterize the social choice functions that satisfy each one of them and whose ranges consist of two alternatives, in terms of two types of basic properties.

On continuity of the Álvarez class under deformation

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On Borel equivalence relations in generalized Baire space

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