Eticket : gestió d'esdeveniments i venda d'entrades online

Avui dia, la gestió d’esdeveniments online i la seva promoció és un mercat creixent gràcies a l’evolució de la web 2.0 i a les xarxes socials. Ticketmaster és el referent, tot i així, no existeix una oferta clara per gestionar la venda d’entrades d’esdeveniments d’una mida petita o mitjana i que aprofiti les xarxes socials i la integració d’aplicacions que aquestes proporcionen. L’objectiu és realitzar una aplicació web on els usuaris (propis o de Facebook) puguin crear esdeveniments, publicar-los i promocionar-los a les xarxes socials, així com gestionar les tasques i característiques relacionades com la venda d’entrades i la llista de convidats.

Art contemporani xinès en el segle XXI : introducció a la pugna entre la creació i el mercat a través de cinc artistes destacats i les seves cotitzacions en les subhastes

En el relativament breu lapse de temps que suposen les tres darreres dècades, l'art contemporani xinès ha passat de ser pràcticament invisible i desconegut per al públic general, a ser present en un gran nombre d'escenaris a nivell internacional relacionats amb el món de l'art, sobre tot des de finals de la dècada dels noranta. El present TdR ha intentat apropar-se a qüestions com la imatge i les idees que sobre la RP Xina s'han transmès en l'última dècada a través de les obres o de les accions dels artistes xinesos contemporanis més exposats o cotitzats internacionalment i que viuen a la Xina, i a com s'ha arribat a inserir la producció artística d'aquests autors en el procés de globalització i hibridació de la cultura que estem vivint. Hem delimitat el camp de recerca, bàsicament a l'estudi de l'obra de cinc autors (Song Dong, Ai Weiwei, Zeng Fanzhi, Yue Minjun i Wang Qingsong) i a la seva presència en l'escena internacional de l'art contemporani a través de les subhastes de les dues cases més importants del món, Christie's i Sotheby's.

Disseny i desenvolupament d'un sistema per la identificació de compradors en processos de subhasta mitjançant IR

Disseny i desenvolupament d’un sistema per a la identificació de compradors en processos de subhasta, integrable dins d’un sistema de subhasta automatitzada

La gestió dels llibres electrònics a la Biblioteca virtual de la UOC

El text que es presenta mostra com es du a terme la gestió dels llibres electrònics a la Biblioteca virtual (d'ara endavant BV) de la Universitat Oberta de Catalunya (d'ara endavant UOC). La BV posa un èmfasi especial en l'adquisició de llibres digitals per millorar l'accés als usuaris als recursos i col¿leccions d'una universitat que es caracteritza per la virtualitat. El document presenta, en primer lloc, l'entorn en què s'adquireixen i s'utilitzen els llibres electrònics: s'expliquen els diferents escenaris d'adquisició en els quals es pot trobar la biblioteca i es defineixen els circuits interns que en permeten la gestió i els processos tècnics dels documents. A continuació es mostren les diferents opcions d'accés i consulta de llibres electrònics que actualment s'ofereixen des de la biblioteca i s'expliquen les anàlisis d'usos d'aquests documents. Finalment es presenten les conclusions a les quals arriba la BV sobre el nou context de llibres electrònics.

Heterogeneity as a coordination device

A model of directed search with a finite number of buyers and sellers is considered, where sellers compete in direct mechanisms. Buyer heterogeneity and Nash equilibrium results in perfect sorting. The restriction to complementary inputs, that the match value function Q is supermodular, in addition coordinates the sellers strategies. In that case, equilibrium implements positive assortative matching, which is efficient and consistent with the stable (cooperative equilibrium) outcome. This provides a non-cooperative and decentralizedsolution for the Assignment Game. Conversely, if buyers are identical, no such coordination is possible, and there is a continuum of equilibria, one of which exhibits price posting, another yields competition in auctions.

Network revenue management with product-specific no-shows

Revenue management practices often include overbooking capacity to account for customerswho make reservations but do not show up. In this paper, we consider the network revenuemanagement problem with no-shows and overbooking, where the show-up probabilities are specificto each product. No-show rates differ significantly by product (for instance, each itinerary andfare combination for an airline) as sale restrictions and the demand characteristics vary byproduct. However, models that consider no-show rates by each individual product are difficultto handle as the state-space in dynamic programming formulations (or the variable space inapproximations) increases significantly. In this paper, we propose a randomized linear program tojointly make the capacity control and overbooking decisions with product-specific no-shows. Weestablish that our formulation gives an upper bound on the optimal expected total profit andour upper bound is tighter than a deterministic linear programming upper bound that appearsin the existing literature. Furthermore, we show that our upper bound is asymptotically tightin a regime where the leg capacities and the expected demand is scaled linearly with the samerate. We also describe how the randomized linear program can be used to obtain a bid price controlpolicy. Computational experiments indicate that our approach is quite fast, able to scale to industrialproblems and can provide significant improvements over standard benchmarks.

Credit constraints in general equilibrium: Experimental results

Our work attempts to investigate the influence of credit tightness orexpansion on activity and relative prices in a multimarket set-up. We report on somedouble- auction, two-market experiments where subjects had to satisfy an inequalityinvolving the use of credit. The experiments display two regimes, characterizedby high and low credit availability. The critical value of credit at the commonboundary of the two regimes has a compelling interpretation as the maximal credituse at the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium of the abstract economy naturally associatedto our experimental environment. Our main results are that changes in theavailability of credit: (a): have minor and unsystematic effects on quantitiesand relative prices in the high-credit regime, (b): have substantial effects, bothon quantities and relative prices, in the low-credit regime.

Dynamic price competition with fixed capacities

Many revenue management (RM) industries are characterized by (a) fixed capacities in theshort term (e.g., hotel rooms, seats on an airline flight), (b) homogeneous products (e.g., twoairline flights between the same cities at similar times), and (c) customer purchasing decisionslargely influenced by price. Competition in these industries is also very high even with just twoor three direct competitors in a market. However, RM competition is not well understood andpractically all known implementations of RM software and most published models of RM donot explicitly model competition. For this reason, there has been considerable recent interestand research activity to understand RM competition. In this paper we study price competitionfor an oligopoly in a dynamic setting, where each of the sellers has a fixed number of unitsavailable for sale over a fixed number of periods. Demand is stochastic, and depending on howit evolves, sellers may change their prices at any time. This reflects the fact that firms constantly,and almost costlessly, change their prices (alternately, allocations at a price in quantity-basedRM), reacting either to updates in their estimates of market demand, competitor prices, orinventory levels. We first prove existence of a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium for a duopoly.In equilibrium, in each state sellers engage in Bertrand competition, so that the seller withthe lowest reservation value ends up selling a unit at a price that is equal to the equilibriumreservation value of the competitor. This structure hence extends the marginal-value conceptof bid-price control, used in many RM implementations, to a competitive model. In addition,we show that the seller with the lowest capacity sells all its units first. Furthermore, we extendthe results transparently to n firms and perform a number of numerical comparative staticsexploiting the uniqueness of the subgame-perfect equilibrium.

Noise and aggregation of information in large markets

We study a novel class of noisy rational expectations equilibria in markets with largenumber of agents. We show that, as long as noise increases with the number of agents inthe economy, the limiting competitive equilibrium is well-defined and leads to non-trivialinformation acquisition, perfect information aggregation, and partially revealing prices,even if per capita noise tends to zero. We find that in such equilibrium risk sharing and price revelation play dierent roles than in the standard limiting economy in which per capita noise is not negligible. We apply our model to study information sales by a monopolist, information acquisition in multi-asset markets, and derivatives trading. Thelimiting equilibria are shown to be perfectly competitive, even when a strategic solutionconcept is used.

The evolution of conventions under incomplete information

We formulate an evolutionary learning process in the spirit ofYoung (1993a) for games of incomplete information. The process involves trembles. For many games, if the amount of trembling is small, play will be in accordance with the games' (semi-strict) Bayesian equilibria most of the time. This supports the notion of Bayesian equilibrium. Further, often play will most of the time be in accordance with exactly one Bayesian equilibrium. This gives a selection among the Bayesian equilibria. For two specific games of economic interest wecharacterize this selection. The first is an extension to incomplete information of the prototype strategic conflict known as Chicken. The second is an incomplete information bilateral monopoly, which is also an extension to incompleteinformation of Nash's demand game, or a simple version ofthe so-called sealed bid double auction. For both gamesselection by evolutionary learning is in favor of Bayesianequilibria where some types of players fail to coordinate, such that the outcome is inefficient.

Ignorance promotes competition: An auction model with endogenous private valuations

We study a situation in which an auctioneer wishes to sell an object toone of N risk-neutral bidders with heterogeneous preferences. Theauctioneer does not know bidders preferences but has private informationabout the characteristics of the ob ject, and must decide how muchinformation to reveal prior to the auction. We show that the auctioneerhas incentives to release less information than would be efficient andthat the amount of information released increases with the level ofcompetition (as measured by the number of bidders). Furthermore, in aperfectly competitive market the auctioneer would provide the efficientlevel of information.

Wild bids. Gambling for resurrection in procurement contracts

This paper analyzes the problem of abnormally low tenders in theprocurement process. Limited liability causes firms in a bad financialsituation to bid more aggressively than good firms in the procurementauction. Therefore, it is more likely that the winning firm is a firm infinancial difficulties with a high risk of bankruptcy. The paper analyzesthe different regulatory practices to face this problem with a specialemphasis on surety bonds used e.g. in the US. We characterize the optimalsurety bond and show that it does not coincide with the current USregulation. In particular we show that under a natural assumption the USregulation is too expensive and provides overinsurance to the problem ofabnormally low tenders.

On bounds for network revenue management

The Network Revenue Management problem can be formulated as a stochastic dynamic programming problem (DP or the\optimal" solution V *) whose exact solution is computationally intractable. Consequently, a number of heuristics have been proposed in the literature, the most popular of which are the deterministic linear programming (DLP) model, and a simulation based method, the randomized linear programming (RLP) model. Both methods give upper bounds on the optimal solution value (DLP and PHLP respectively). These bounds are used to provide control values that can be used in practice to make accept/deny decisions for booking requests. Recently Adelman [1] and Topaloglu [18] have proposed alternate upper bounds, the affine relaxation (AR) bound and the Lagrangian relaxation (LR) bound respectively, and showed that their bounds are tighter than the DLP bound. Tight bounds are of great interest as it appears from empirical studies and practical experience that models that give tighter bounds also lead to better controls (better in the sense that they lead to more revenue). In this paper we give tightened versions of three bounds, calling themsAR (strong Affine Relaxation), sLR (strong Lagrangian Relaxation) and sPHLP (strong Perfect Hindsight LP), and show relations between them. Speciffically, we show that the sPHLP bound is tighter than sLR bound and sAR bound is tighter than the LR bound. The techniques for deriving the sLR and sPHLP bounds can potentially be applied to other instances of weakly-coupled dynamic programming.

Internet e-ethics in confrontation with an activists' agenda: Yahoo! on trial

A prolonged confrontation between Yahoo! Inc. and French anti-racismactivists who ask for the removal of Nazi items from auction sitesas well as restricted access to neo-Nazis sites is analyzed. We presentthe case and its development up to the decision of Yahoo! Inc. to removethe items from yahoo.com following a French court s verdict against thefirm. Using a business ethics approach, we distinguish the legal,technical, philosophical and managerial issues involved in the case andtheir management by Yahoo! We conclude on the difficulty of governingrelations with society from corporate and legal affairs departments atthe headquarters level, and on the clash of two visions over theregulation of social freedom.

Traducción técnica del capítulo III del libro Advanced Data Warehouse design: from conventional to spatial and temporal applications

The proposal to work on this final project came after several discussions held with Dr. Elzbieta Malinowski Gadja, who in 2008 published the book entitled Advanced Data Warehouse Design: From Conventional to Spatial and Temporal Applications (Data-Centric Systems and Applications). The project was carried out under the technical supervision of Dr. Malinowski and the direct beneficiary was the University of Costa Rica (UCR) where Dr. Malinowski is a professor at the Department of Computer Science and Informatics. The purpose of this project was twofold: First, to translate chapter III of said book with the intention of generating educational material for the use of the UCR and, second, to venture in the field of technical translation related to data warehouse. For the first component, the goal was to generate a final product that would eventually serve as an educational tool for the post-graduate courses of the UCR. For the second component, this project allowed me to acquire new skills and put into practice techniques that have helped me not only to perfom better in my current job as an Assistant Translator of the Inter-American BAnk (IDB), but also to use them in similar projects. The process was lenggthy and required torough research and constant communication with the author. The investigation focused on the search of terms and definitions to prepare the glossary, which was the basis to start the translation project. The translation process itself was carried out by phases, so that comments and corrections by the author could be taken into account in subsequent stages. Later, based on the glossary and the translated text, illustrations had been created in the Visio software were translated. In addition to the technical revision by the author, professor Carme Mangiron was in charge of revising the non-technical text. The result was a high-quality document that is currently used as reference and study material by the Department of Computer Science and Informatics of Costa Rica.