The three horsemen of riches: Plague, war and urbanization in early modern Europe

How did Europe escape the "Iron Law of Wages?" We construct a simple Malthusian model withtwo sectors and multiple steady states, and use it to explain why European per capita incomes andurbanization rates increased during the period 1350-1700. Productivity growth can only explain a smallfraction of the rise in output per capita. Population dynamics changes of the birth and death schedules were far more important determinants of steady states. We show how a major shock to population cantrigger a transition to a new steady state with higher per-capita income. The Black Death was such ashock, raising wages substantially. Because of Engel's Law, demand for urban products increased, andurban centers grew in size. European cities were unhealthy, and rising urbanization pushed up aggregatedeath rates. This effect was reinforced by diseases spread through war, financed by higher tax revenues.In addition, rising trade also spread diseases. In this way higher wages themselves reduced populationpressure. We show in a calibration exercise that our model can account for the sustained rise in Europeanurbanization as well as permanently higher per capita incomes in 1700, without technological change.Wars contributed importantly to the "Rise of Europe", even if they had negative short-run effects. We thustrace Europe s precocious rise to economic riches to interactions of the plague shock with the belligerentpolitical environment and the nature of cities.

The elusive costs and the immaterial gains of fiscal contraints

We study whether and how fiscal restrictions alter the business cycle features macrovariables for a sample of 48 US states. We also examine the 'typical' transmission properties of fiscal disturbances and the implied fiscal rules of states with different fiscal restrictions. Fiscal constraints are characterized with a number of indicators. There are similarities in second moments of macrovariables and in the transmission properties of fiscal shocks across states with different fiscal constraints. The cyclical response of expenditure differs in size and sometimes in sign, but heterogeneity within groups makes point estimates statistically insignificant. Creative budget accounting isresponsible for the pattern. Implications for the design of fiscal rules and thereform of the Stability and Growth Pact are discussed.

Will EMU increase eurosclerosis?

In this paper we study the relationship between labor market institutions and monetary policy. We use a simple macroeconomic framework to show how optimal monetary policy rules depend on labor institutions (labor adjustment costs, and nominal and real wage rigitidy) and social preferences regarding inflation, employment, and real wages. We also calibrate our model tocompute how the change in social welfare brought about by giving up monetary policy as a result of joining the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) depends on institutions and preferences. We then use the calibrated model to analyze how EMU affects the incentives for labor market reform, both for reformsthat increase the economy's adjustment potential and for those that affect the long-run unemployment rate.

Estimating cross-industry cross-country models using benchmark industry characteristics

International industry data permits testing whether the industry-specific impact of cross-countrydifferences in institutions or policies is consistent with economic theory. Empirical implementationrequires specifying the industry characteristics that determine impact strength. Most of the literature has been using US proxies of the relevant industry characteristics. We show that usingindustry characteristics in a benchmark country as a proxy of the relevant industry characteristicscan result in an attenuation bias or an amplification bias. We also describe circumstances allowingfor an alternative approach that yields consistent estimates. As an application, we reexamine theinfluential conjecture that financial development facilitates the reallocation of capital from decliningto expanding industries.

Banks, government bonds, and default: what do the data say?

We use data from Bankscope to analyze the holdings of public bonds by over 18,000 banks located in 185 countries and the role of these bonds in 18 sovereign debt crises over the period 1998-2012. We find that: (i) banks hold a sizeable share of their assets in government bonds (about 9% on average), particularly in less financially developed countries; (ii) during sovereign crises, banks on average increase their bondholdings by 1% of their assets, but this increase is concentrated among larger and more profitable banks, and; (iii) the correlation between a bank's holdings of public bonds and its future loans is positive in normal times, but turns negative during defaults. A 10% increase in bank bond-holdings during default is associated with a 3.2% reduction in future loans, and bonds bought in normal times account for 75% of this effect. Our results are consistent with the view that there is a liquidity benefit for banks to hold public bonds in normal times, which is critical for understanding bank fragility during sovereign crises.

The great diversification and its undoing

We investigate the hypothesis that macroeconomic fluctuations are primitively theresults of many microeconomic shocks, and show that it has significant explanatorypower for the evolution of macroeconomic volatility. We define ?fundamental? volatilityas the volatility that would arise from an economy made entirely of idiosyncratic microeconomicshocks, occurring primitively at the level of sectors or firms. In its empiricalconstruction, motivated by a simple model, the sales share of different sectors vary overtime (in a way we directly measure), while the volatility of those sectors remains constant.We find that fundamental volatility accounts for the swings in macroeconomicvolatility in the US and the other major world economies in the past half century. Itaccounts for the ?great moderation? and its undoing. Controlling for our measure offundamental volatility, there is no break in output volatility. The initial great moderationis due to a decreasing share of manufacturing between 1975 and 1985. The recentrise of macroeconomic volatility is due to the increase of the size of the financial sector.We provide a model to think quantitatively about the large comovement generated byidiosyncratic shocks. As the origin of aggregate shocks can be traced to identifiablemicroeconomic shocks, we may better understand the origins of aggregate fluctuations.

Recreating the South Sea bubble: Lessons from an experiment in financial history

Major bubble episodes are rare events. In this paper, we examine what factors might cause some asset price bubbles to become very large. We recreate, in a laboratory setting, some of the specific institutional features investors in the South Sea Company faced in 1720. Several factors have been proposed as potentially contributing to one of the greatest periods of asset overvaluation in history: an intricate debt-for-equity swap, deferred payment for these shares, and the possibility of default on the deferred payments. We consider which aspect might have had the most impact in creating the South Sea bubble. The results of the experiment suggest that the company?s attempt to exchange its shares for government debt was the single biggest contributor to the stock price explosion, because of the manner in which the swap affected fundamental value. Issuing new shares with only partial payments required, in conjunction with the debt-equity swap, also had a significant effect on the size of the bubble. Limited contract enforcement, on the other hand, does not appear to have contributed significantly.

Monetary policy and rational asset price bubbles

I examine the impact of alternative monetary policy rules on arational asset price bubble, through the lens of an overlapping generations model with nominal rigidities. A systematic increase in interestrates in response to a growing bubble is shown to enhance the fluctuations in the latter, through its positive effect on bubble growth. Theoptimal monetary policy seeks to strike a balance between stabilization of the bubble and stabilization of aggregate demand. The paper'smain findings call into question the theoretical foundations of the casefor "leaning against the wind" monetary policies.

Patterns of convergence and divergence in the euro area

We study the extent of macroeconomic convergence/divergence among euro area countries. Our analysis focuses on four variables (unemployment, inflation, relative prices and the current account), and seeks to uncover the role played by monetary union as a convergence factor by using non-euro developed economies and the pre-EMU period as control samples.

Sovereign debt markets in turbulent times: Creditor discrimination and crowding-out effects

In 2007, countries in the Euro periphery were enjoying stable growth, low deficits, and lowspreads. Then the financial crisis erupted and pushed them into deep recessions, raising theirdeficits and debt levels. By 2010, they were facing severe debt problems. Spreads increased and,surprisingly, so did the share of the debt held by domestic creditors. Credit was reallocatedfrom the private to the public sectors, reducing investment and deepening the recessions evenfurther. To account for these facts, we propose a simple model of sovereign risk in which debtcan be traded in secondary markets. The model has two key ingredients: creditor discriminationand crowding-out effects. Creditor discrimination arises because, in turbulent times, sovereigndebt offers a higher expected return to domestic creditors than to foreign ones. This providesincentives for domestic purchases of debt. Crowding-out effects arise because private borrowingis limited by financial frictions. This implies that domestic debt purchases displace productiveinvestment. The model shows that these purchases reduce growth and welfare, and may lead toself-fulfilling crises. It also shows how crowding-out effects can be transmitted to other countriesin the Eurozone, and how they may be addressed by policies at the European level.

Reprisals remembered: German-Greek conflict and car sales during the Euro crisis

During the Greek debt crisis after 2010, the German government insisted on harshausterity measures. This led to a rapid cooling of relations between the Greekand German governments. We compile a new index of public acrimony betweenGermany and Greece based on newspaper reports and internet search terms. Thisinformation is combined with historical maps on German war crimes during theoccupation between 1941 and 1944. During months of open conflict between Germanand Greek politicians, German car sales fell markedly more than those of cars fromother countries. This was especially true in areas affected by German reprisals duringWorldWar II: areas where German troops committed massacres and destroyed entirevillages curtailed their purchases of German cars to a greater extent during conflictmonths than other parts of Greece. We conclude that cultural aversion was a keydeterminant of purchasing behavior, and that memories of past conflict can affecteconomic choices in a time-varying fashion. These findings are compatible withbehavioral models emphasizing the importance of salience for individual decision-making.

Declining labor force attachment and downward trends in unemployment and participation

The US labor market witnessed two apparently unrelated secular movements in thelast 30 years: a decline in unemployment between the early 1980s and the early 2000s,and a decline in participation since the early 2000s. Using CPS micro data and a stock-flow accounting framework, we show that a substantial, and hitherto unnoticed, factorbehind both trends is a decline in the share of nonparticipants who are at the margin ofparticipation. A lower share of marginal nonparticipants implies a lower unemploymentrate, because marginal nonparticipants enter the labor force mostly through unemployment,while other nonparticipants enter the labor force mostly through employment.

Labor market heterogeneity and the aggregate matching function

The matching function -a key building block in models of labor market frictions- impliesthat the job finding rate depends only on labor market tightness. We estimate such amatching function and find that the relation, although remarkably stable over 1967-2007,broke down spectacularly after 2007. We argue that labor market heterogeneities are notfully captured by the standard matching function, but that a generalized matching functionthat explicitly takes into account worker heterogeneity and market segmentation is fullyconsistent with the behavior of the job finding rate. The standard matching function canbreak down when, as in the Great Recession, the average characteristics of the unemployedchange too much, or when dispersion in labor market conditions -the extent to which somelabor markets fare worse than others- increases too much.

Las relaciones económicas internacionales de la "España Europea"

[eng] Since the year 1986 in which Spain became full member of the European Communities, the quantity and quality of the Spanish international economic relations measured in terms of Balance of Payments have change dramatically. In the past Spanish workers moved to Europe. Now Spain is among the three major countries attracting immigrants from developing countries. In the past Spain received a lot of Foreign Investment, today many Spanish companies are investing abroad. The changes are not only due to membership to the EU but also to the Spanish accommodation to the Globalization.

Las relaciones económicas internacionales de la "España Europea"

[eng] Since the year 1986 in which Spain became full member of the European Communities, the quantity and quality of the Spanish international economic relations measured in terms of Balance of Payments have change dramatically. In the past Spanish workers moved to Europe. Now Spain is among the three major countries attracting immigrants from developing countries. In the past Spain received a lot of Foreign Investment, today many Spanish companies are investing abroad. The changes are not only due to membership to the EU but also to the Spanish accommodation to the Globalization.