Trends in hours, balanced growth and the role of technology in the business cycle

The present paper revisits a property embedded in most dynamic macroeconomic models: the stationarity of hours worked. First, I argue that, contrary to what is often believed, there are many reasons why hours could be nonstationary in those models, while preserving the property of balanced growth. Second, I show that the postwar evidence for most industrialized economies is clearly at odds with the assumption of stationary hours per capita. Third, I examine the implications of that evidence for the role of technology as a source of economic fluctuations in the G7 countries.

Indentifying human capital externalities: Theory with an application to US cities

The identification of aggregate human capital externalities is still not fully understood. The existing (Mincerian) approach confounds positive externalities with wage changes due to a downward sloping demand curve for human capital. As a result, it yields positive externalities even when wages equal marginal social products. We propose an approach that identifies human capital externalities whether or not aggregate demand for human capital slopes downward. Another advantage of our approach is that it does not require estimates of the individual return to human capital. Applications to US cities and states between 1970 and 1990 yield no evidence of significant average -schooling externalities.

International capital flows and credit market imperfections: A tale of two frictions

The financial crisis of 2007-08 has underscored the importance of adverse selection in financialmarkets. This friction has been mostly neglected by macroeconomic models of financialimperfections, however, which have focused almost exclusively on the effects of limited pledgeability.In this paper, we fill this gap by developing a standard growth model with adverseselection. Our main results are that, by fostering unproductive investment, adverse selection:(i) leads to an increase in the economy s equilibrium interest rate, and; (ii) it generates a negativewedge between the marginal return to investment and the equilibrium interest rate. Underfinancial integration, we show how this translates into excessive capital inflows and endogenouscycles. We also extend our model to the more general case in which adverse selection and limitedpledgeability coexist. We conclude that both frictions complement one another and show thatlimited pledgeability exacerbates the effects of adverse selection.

The political consequences of unemployment

We analyze the channels by which an ill-functioning labor market changes the preferences of the people for public policy and therefore the decisions that are made. We not only discuss labour market reform but other important aspects of policy making such as the size and structure of government spending. Theclass of mechanisms that we highlight can be summarized as the very existence of unemployment generating political support for "sclerosis". This may help to explain the timid pace of reform, in particular the fact that any recovery sends them at the backfront of the political agenda, and the sometimes violent opposition generated by some measures, as we have seen mostly in France.

Employment protection, international specialization and innovation

We develop a model to analyse the implications of firing costs on incentivesfor R&D and international specialization. The Key idea is paying the firingcost, the country with a rigid labor market will tend to produce relativelysecure goods, at a late stage of their product life cycle.Under international trade, an international product cycle emerges where,roughly, new goods are first produced in the low firing cost country willspecialize in 'secondary innovations', that is, improvements in existinggoods, while the low firing cost country will more specialize in 'primaryinnovation', that is, invention of new goods.

Economic shocks and civil conflict: A comment

Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti (2004) argue that lowerrainfall levels and negative rainfall shocks increase conflictrisk in Sub-Saharan Africa. This conclusion rests on theirfinding of a negative correlation between conflict in t andrainfall growth between t-1 and t-2. I argue that this findingis driven by a positive correlation between conflict in t andrainfall levels in t-2. If lower rainfall levels or negativerainfall shocks increased conflict, one might have expectedMSS s finding to reflect a negative correlation betweenconflict in t and rainfall levels in t-1. In the latest data,conflict is unrelated to rainfall.

Nominal debt as a burden on monetary policy

We study the effects of nominal debt on the optimal sequential choice of monetary policy. When the stock of debt is nominal, the incentive to generate unanticipated inflation increases the cost of the outstanding debt even if no unanticipated inflation episodes occur in equilibrium. Without full commitment, the optimal sequential policy is to deplete the outstanding stock of debt progressively until these extra costs disappear. Nominal debt is therefore a burden on monetary policy, not only because it must be serviced, but also because it creates a time inconsistency problem that distorts interest rates. The introduction of alternative forms of taxation may lessen this burden, if there is enough commtiment to fiscal policy. If there is full commitment to an optimal fiscal policy, then the resulting monetary policy is the Friedman rule of zero nominal interest rates.

Setting standards: Information accumulation in development

We propose a model in which economic relations and institutions in advancedand less developed economies differ as these societies have access to different amounts of information. This lack of information makes it hard to give the right incentives to managers and entrepreneurs. We argue that differences in the amount of information arise because of the differences in the scale of activities in rich and poor economies; namely, there is too little repetition of similar activities in pooreconomies, thus insufficient information to set the appropriate standards for firm performance. Our model predicts a number of institutional and structural transformations as the economy accumulates capital and information.

Gerontocracy, retirement, and social security

Why are the old politically successful? We build a simple interest group model in which political pressure is time-intensive, showing that in the political competitive equilibrium each group lobbies for government policies that lower their own value of time but the old do so to a greater extent and as a result are net gainers from the political process. What distinguishes the elderly from other political groups (and what makes them more succesful) is that they have lower labor productivity and/or that we are all likely to become elderly at some point, while we are relatively unlikely to change gender, race, sexual orientation, or even ocupation, The model has a variety of implications for the design of social security programs, which we test using data from the Social Security Administration. For example, the model predicts that social security programs with retirement incentives are larger and that the old are more "single-minded" in their politics, implications which we verify using cross-country government finance data and cross-country political participation surveys. Finally, we show that the forced savings programs intended to "reform" the social security system may increase the amount of intergenerational redistribution. As a model for evaluating policy reforms, ours has the attractive feature that reforms must be time time consistent from a political point of view rather than a public interest point of view.

Flexibility vs. rigidity: Does Spain have the worst of both worlds?

In this paper we study the structure of labor market flows in Spain and compare them with France and the US. We characterize a number of empirical regularities and stylized facts. One striking result is that the job finding rate is slightly higher than in France, while the jon loss rate is much higher, putting Spain half-way between France and the US. This suggests that while Spain has borne the full cost of its labor market reforms in terms of job precarity, the benefits in terms of job creation have been quite modest. We hypothesize that this has been due to the reform s credibility being imperfect, which leads toexpectation of reversal.

Asset prices and the measurement of wealth and saving

The paper defines concepts of real wealth and saving which take into account the intertemporal index number problem that results from changing interest rates. Unlike conventional measures of real wealth, which are based on the market value of assets and ignore the index number problem, the new measure correctly reflects the changes in the welfare of households over time. An empirically operational approximation to the theoretical measure is provided and applied to US data. A major empirical finding is that US real financial wealth increased strongly in the 1980s, much more than is revealed by the market value of assets.

Unemployment insurance with endogenous search intensity and precautionary saving

A welfare analysis of unemployment insurance (UI) is performed in a generalequilibrium job search model. Finitely-lived, risk-averse workers smooth consumption over time by accumulating assets, choose search effort whenunemployed, and suffer disutility from work. Firms hire workers, purchasecapital, and pay taxes to finance worker benefits; their equity is the assetaccumulated by workers. A matching function relates unemployment, hiringexpenditure, and search effort to the formation of jobs. The model is calibrated to US data; the parameters relating job search effort to the probability of job finding are chosen to match microeconomic studies ofunemployment spells. Under logarithmic utility, numerical simulation shows rather small welfaregains from UI. Even without UI, workers smooth consumption effectivelythrough asset accumulation. Greater risk aversion leads to substantiallylarger welfare gains from UI; however, even in this case much of its welfareimpact is due not to consumption smoothing effects, but rather to decreased work disutility, or to a variety of externalities.

A model of collateral, investment and adverse selection

This paper characterizes the relationship between entrepreneurial wealth and aggregate investmentunder adverse selection. Its main finding is that such a relationship need not bemonotonic. In particular, three results emerge from the analysis: (i) pooling equilibria, in whichinvestment is independent of entrepreneurial wealth, are more likely to arise when entrepreneurialwealth is relatively low; (ii) separating equilibria, in which investment is increasing inentrepreneurial wealth, are most likely to arise when entrepreneurial wealth is relatively highand; (iii) for a given interest rate, an increase in entrepreneurial wealth may generate a discontinuousfall in investment.

Monetary policy and unemployment

Much recent research has focused on the development and analysisof extensions of the New Keynesian framework that model labor marketfrictions and unemployment explicitly. The present paper describessome of the essential ingredients and properties of those models, andtheir implications for monetary policy.

Which inflation to target? A small open economy with sticky wages indexed to past inflation

In a closed economy context there is common agreement on price inflation stabilization being one of the objects of monetary policy. Moving to an open economy context gives rise to the coexistence of two measures of inflation: domestic inflation (DI) and consumer price inflation (CPI). Which one of the two measures should be the target variable? This is the question addressed in this paper. In particular, I use a small open economy model to show that once sticky wages indexed to past CPI inflation are introduced, a complete inward looking monetary policy is no more optimal. I first, derive a loss function from a secondorder approximation of the utility function and then, I compute the fully optimalmonetary policy under commitment. Then, I use the optimal monetary policy as a benchmark to compare the performance of different monetary policy rules. The main result is that once a positive degree of indexation is introduced in the model the rule performing better (among the Taylor type rules considered) is the one targeting wage inflation and CPI inflation. Moreover this rule delivers results very close to the one obtained under the fully optimal monetary policy with commitment.