Are these classical business cycles?

The aim of this paper is to test formally the classical business cyclehypothesis, using data from industrialized countries for the timeperiod since 1960. The hypothesis is characterized by the view that the cyclical structure in GDP is concentrated in the investment series: fixed investment has typically a long cycle, while the cycle in inventory investment is shorter. To check the robustness of our results, we subject the data for 15 OECD countries to a variety of detrending techniques. While the hypothesis is not confirmed uniformly for all countries, there is a considerably high number for which the data display the predicted pattern. None of the countries shows a pattern which can be interpreted as a clear rejection of the classical hypothesis.

Location models in the public sector

The past four decades have witnessed an explosive growth in the field of networkbased facilitylocation modeling. This is not at all surprising since location policy is one of the mostprofitable areas of applied systems analysis in regional science and ample theoretical andapplied challenges are offered. Location-allocation models seek the location of facilitiesand/or services (e.g., schools, hospitals, and warehouses) so as to optimize one or severalobjectives generally related to the efficiency of the system or to the allocation of resources.This paper concerns the location of facilities or services in discrete space or networks, thatare related to the public sector, such as emergency services (ambulances, fire stations, andpolice units), school systems and postal facilities. The paper is structured as follows: first,we will focus on public facility location models that use some type of coverage criterion,with special emphasis in emergency services. The second section will examine models based onthe P-Median problem and some of the issues faced by planners when implementing thisformulation in real world locational decisions. Finally, the last section will examine newtrends in public sector facility location modeling.

Monetary unions and the transaction cost savings of a single currency

This paper studies the transaction cost savings of moving froma multi-currency exchange system to a single currency one. Theanalysis concentrates exclusively on the transaction andprecautionary demand for money and abstracts from any othermotives to hold currency. A continuous-time, stochastic Baumol-like model similar to that in Frenkel and Jovanovic (1980) isgeneralized to include several currencies and calibrated to fitEuropean data. The analysis implies an upper bound for thesavings associated with reductions of transaction costs derivedfrom the European Monetary Union of approximately 0.6\% of theCommunity GDP. Additionally, the magnitudes of the brokeragefee and the volatility of transactions, whose estimation hastraditionally been difficult to address empirically, areapproximated for Europe.

Is altruism important for understanding the long-run effects of social security?

This paper quantifies the effects of social security on capital accumulation and wealth distribution in a life cycle framework with altruistic individuals. The main findings of this paper are that the current U.S. social security system has a significant impact on capital accumulation and wealth distribution. I find that social security crowds out 8\% of the capital stock of an economy without social security. This effect is driven by the distortions of labor supply due to the taxation of labor income rather than by the intergenerational redistribution of income imposed by the social security system. In contrast to previous analysis of social security, I found that social security does not affect the savings rate of the economy. Another interesting finding is that even though the current U.S. social security system is progressive in its benefits, it may lead to a more disperse distribution of wealth.

Endogenous Stackelberg leadership

We consider a linear quantity setting duopoly game and analyzewhich of the players will commit when both players have the possibility todo so. To that end, we study a 2-stage game in which each player caneither commit to a quantity in stage 1 or wait till stage 2. We show thatcommitting is more risky for the high cost firm and that, consequently,risk dominance considerations, as in Harsanyi and Selten (1988), allowthe conclusion that only the low cost firm will choose to commit.Hence, the low cost firm will emerge as the endogenous Stackelberg leader.

Measuring and explaining farm inefficiency in a panel data set of mixed farms

This paper aims to estimate a translog stochastic frontier production function in the analysis of a panel of 150 mixed Catalan farms in the period 1989-1993, in order to attempt to measure and explain variation in technical inefficiency scores with a one-stage approach. The model uses gross value added as the output aggregate measure. Total employment, fixed capital, current assets, specific costs and overhead costs are introduced into the model as inputs. Stochasticfrontier estimates are compared with those obtained using a linear programming method using a two-stage approach. The specification of the translog stochastic frontier model appears as an appropriate representation of the data, technical change was rejected and the technical inefficiency effects were statistically significant. The mean technical efficiency in the period analyzed was estimated to be 64.0%. Farm inefficiency levels were found significantly at 5%level and positively correlated with the number of economic size units.

On the efficiency and sensitivity of a pyramidal classification algorithm

In this paper we propose a Pyramidal Classification Algorithm,which together with an appropriate aggregation index producesan indexed pseudo-hierarchy (in the strict sense) withoutinversions nor crossings. The computer implementation of thealgorithm makes it possible to carry out some simulation testsby Monte Carlo methods in order to study the efficiency andsensitivity of the pyramidal methods of the Maximum, Minimumand UPGMA. The results shown in this paper may help to choosebetween the three classification methods proposed, in order toobtain the classification that best fits the original structureof the population, provided we have an a priori informationconcerning this structure.

Contractual allocation of decision rights and incentives: The case of automobile distribution

We analyze empirically the allocation of rights and monetary incentives in automobile franchise contracts. These contracts substantially restrict the decision rights of dealers and grant manufacturers extensive contractual completion and enforcement powers, converting the manufacturers, de facto, in a sort of quasi-judiciary instance. Variation in the allocation of decision rights andincentive intensity is explained by the incidence of moral hazard in the relation. In particular, when the cost of dealer moral hazard is higher and the risk of manufactureropportunism is lower, manufacturers enjoy more discretion in determining the performance required from their dealers and in using mechanisms such as monitoring, termination and monetary incentives to ensure such performance is provided. We also explore the existence of interdependencies between the different elements of the system. and find some complementarities between completion and termination rights, and between monitoring rights and the intensity of incentives.

Money, fame and the allocation of talent: Brain drain and the institution of science

The earning structure in science is known to be flat relative to the one in theprivate sector, which could cause a brain drain toward the private sector. In thispaper, we assume that agents value both money and fame and study the role ofthe institution of science in the allocation of talent between the science sector andthe private sector. Following works on the Sociology of Science, we model theinstitution of science as a mechanism distributing fame (i.e. peer recognition). Weshow that since the intrinsic performance is less noisy signal of talent in the sciencesector than in the private sector, a good institution of science can mitigate thebrain drain. We also find that providing extra monetary incentives through themarket might undermine the incentives provided by the institution and therebyworsen the brain drain. Finally, we study the optimal balance between monetaryand non-monetary incentives in science.

Dynamic adverse selection and debt

This paper argues that the strategic use of debt favours the revelationof information in dynamic adverse selection problems. Our argument is basedon the idea that debt is a credible commitment to end long term relationships.Consequently, debt encourages a privately informed party to disclose itsinformation at early stages of a relationship. We illustrate our pointwith the financing decision of a monopolist selling a good to a buyerwhose valuation is private information. A high level of (renegotiable)debt, by increasing the scope for liquidation, may induce the highvaluation buyer to buy early at a high price and thus increase themonopolist's expected payoff. By affecting the buyer's strategy, it mayreduce the probability of excessive liquidation. We investigate theconsequences of good durability and we examine the way debt mayalleviate the ratchet effect.

Multiple correspondence analysis of a subset of response categories

In the analysis of multivariate categorical data, typically the analysis of questionnaire data, it is often advantageous, for substantive and technical reasons, to analyse a subset of response categories. In multiple correspondence analysis, where each category is coded as a column of an indicator matrix or row and column of Burt matrix, it is not correct to simply analyse the corresponding submatrix of data, since the whole geometric structure is different for the submatrix . A simple modification of the correspondence analysis algorithm allows the overall geometric structure of the complete data set to be retained while calculating the solution for the selected subset of points. This strategy is useful for analysing patterns of response amongst any subset of categories and relating these patterns to demographic factors, especially for studying patterns of particular responses such as missing and neutral responses. The methodology is illustrated using data from the International Social Survey Program on Family and Changing Gender Roles in 1994.

Pharmaceutical generics, vertical product differentiation and public policy

This paper studies oligopolistic competition in off-patent pharmaceuticalmarkets using a vertical product differentiation model. This model canexplain the observation that countries with stronger regulations havesmaller generic market shares. It can also explain the differences inobserved regulatory regimes. Stronger regulation may be due to a higherproportion of production that is done by foreign firms. Finally, a closelyrelated model can account for the observed increase in prices by patentowners after entry of generic producers.

Female labour supply in Spain: The importance of behavioural assumptions and unobserved heterogeneity specification

We estimate four models of female labour supply using a Spanish sampleof married women from 1994, taking into account the complete form of theindividual s budget set. The models differ in the hypotheses relating tothe presence of optimisation errors and/or the way non-workers contributeto the likelihood function. According to the results, the effects of wagesand non-labour income on the labour supply of Spanish married women dependon the specification used. The model which has both preference andoptimisation errors and allows for both voluntarily and involuntarilyunemployed females desiring to participate seems to better fit the evidencefor Spanish married women.

Corporate criminal law and organization incentives: A managerial perspective

Corporate criminal liability puts a serious challenge to the economictheory of enforcement. Are corporate crimes different from other crimes?Are these crimes best deterred by punishing individuals, punishing corporations, or both? What is optimal structure of sanctions? Shouldcorporate liability be criminal or civil? This paper has two majorcontributions to the literature. First, it provides a common analyticalframework to most results presented and largely discussed in the field.In second place, by making use of the framework, we provide new insightsinto how corporations should be punished for the offenses committed bytheir employees.

Social preferences: Some simple tests and a new model

Departures from pure self interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of "social preferences". We conduct experiments on simple two-person and three-person games with binary choices that test these theories more directly than the array of games conventionally considered. Our experiments show strong support for the prevalence of "quasi-maximin" preferences: People sacrifice to increase the payoffs for all recipients, but especially for the lowest-payoff recipients. People are also motivated by reciprocity: While people are reluctant to sacrifice to reciprocate good or bad behavior beyond what they would sacrifice for neutral parties, they withdraw willingness to sacrifice to achieve a fair outcome when others are themselves unwilling to sacrifice. Some participants are averse to getting different payoffs than others, but based on our experiments and reinterpretation of previous experiments we argue that behavior that has been presented as "difference aversion" in recent papers is actually a combination of reciprocal and quasi-maximin motivations. We formulate a model in which each player is willing to sacrifice to allocate the quasi-maximin allocation only to those players also believed to be pursuing the quasi-maximin allocation, and may sacrifice to punish unfair players.