Els arbres singulars del Parc Natural de l'Alt Pirineu: estudi i proposta d'educació ambiental

Aquest estudi s’ha realitzat amb el principal objectiu de localitzar, analitzar i diagnosticar els arbres singulars subjectes a ser declarats monumentals dins el Parc Natural de l’Alt Pirineu. Concretament s’han inventariat la Vall Ferrera i la Vall de Cardós. L’objectiu secundari ha estat fer una proposta innovadora d’educació ambiental, utilitzant l’arbre com a un instrument pedagògic. S’han inventariat vint-i-tres arbres sent un d’ells ja declarat Arbre Monumental, “l’Avet del Pla de la Selva”. Primerament s’han localitzats els arbres amb l’ajuda dels tècnics del Parc, el coneixement popular i documentació. S’ha utilitzat una metodologia basada en estudis anteriors, mitjançant uns formularis de camp que recullen totes les característiques ecològiques i socioculturals de cada arbre. Posteriorment s’han analitzat les dades obtingudes i s’ha realitzat la diagnosi. S’ha proposat un mètode quantitatiu i un mètode qualitatiu (Rànquing d’Arbres Monumentals). Aquest últim valora cada arbre comparant-lo amb un llistat de tots aquells arbres monumentals de la mateixa espècie en el territori català realitzat per la Generalitat de Catalunya, segons tres paràmetres, l’alçada, el volt de canó i el diàmetre de la capçada. Finalment es proposa a cada arbre la protecció corresponent segons el seu estat de conservació i altres paràmetres. Un dels resultats obtinguts d’aquest estudi ha estat la realització d’una carpeta de material divulgatiu utilitzant cada arbre com a eix central per explicar el medi natural que l’envolta. Amb aquesta iniciativa es vol destacar l’important paper dels arbres monumentals com a connectors amb el medi natural i sociocultural i la necessitat de protegir en tots els Parcs Naturals els arbres singulars.

The Political Economy of Resource Rent Distribution

I model the link between political regime and level of diversification following a windfall of natural resource revenues. The explanatory variables I make use of are the political support functions embedded within each type of regime and the disparate levels of discretion, openness, transparency, and accountability of government. I show that a democratic government seeks to maximize the long-term consumption path of the representative consumer, in order to maximize its chances of re-election, while an authoritarian government, in the absence of any electoral mechanism of accountability, seeks to buy off and entrench a group of special interests loyal to the government and potent enough to ensure its short-term survival. Essentially the contrast in the approaches towards resource rent distribution comes down to a variation in political weights on aggregate welfare and rentierist special interests endogenized by distinct political support functions.

Private Governance of Financial Markets: the US Regulatory Regime on Hedge Funds

The article investigates the private governance of financial markets by looking at the evolution of the regulatory debate on hedge funds in the US market. It starts from the premise that the privatization of regulation is always the result of a political decision and analyzes how this decision came about and was implemented in the case of hedge funds. The starting point is the failure of two initiatives on hedge funds that US regulators launched between 1999 an 2004, which the analysis explains by elaborating the concept of self-capture. Facing a trade off between the need to tackle publicly demonized issues and the difficulty of monitoring increasingly sophisticated and powerful private markets, regulators purposefully designed initiatives that were not meant to succeed, that is, they “self-captured” their own activity. By formulating initiatives that were inherently flawed, regulators saved their public role and at the same time paved the way for the privatization of hedge fund regulation. This explanation identifies a link between the failure of public initiatives and the success of private ones. It illustrates a specific case of formation of private authority in financial markets that points to a more general practice emerging in the regulation of finance.

Authoritarian Responses to Foreign Pressure: Spending, Repression, and Sanctions

This paper explores how international sanctions affect authoritarian rulers’ decisions concerning repression and public spending composition, and how different authoritarian rulers respond to foreign pressure. If sanctions are assumed to increase the price of loyalty to the regime, then rulers whose budgets are not severely constrained by sanctions will tend to increase spending in those categories that most benefit their core support groups. In contrast, when constraints are severe due to reduced aid and trade, dictators are expected to greatly increase their levels of repression. Using data on regime types, public expenditures and spending composition (1970–2000) as well as on repression levels (1976–2001), we show that the empirical patterns conform well to our theoretical expectations. Single-party regimes, when targeted by sanctions, increase spending on subsidies and transfers which largely benefit more substantial sectors of the population and especially the urban classes. Likewise, military regimes increase their expenditures on goods and services, which include military equipment and soldiers’ and officers’ wages. Conversely, personalist regimes reduce spending in all categories, especially capital expenditures, while increasing repression much more than other regime types when targeted by sanctions.

The Electoral Determinants of Collective Remittances: The Mexican 3x1 Program for Migrants

The 3x1 Program for Migrants is a matching grant scheme that seeks to direct the money sent by migrant organizations abroad to the provision of public and social infrastructure, and to productive projects in migrants’ communities of origin. To do so, the municipal, state, and federal administrations match the amount sent by hometown associations by 3 to 1. This opens the door to the political manipulation of the program. We explore the impact of a particular facet of Mexican political life on the operation of the 3x1: its recent democratization and the increasing political competition at the municipal level. Relying on the literature on redistributive politics, we posit that an increasing number of effective parties in elections may have two different effects. On the one hand, the need to cater to more heterogeneous constituencies may increase the provision of public projects. On the other hand, since smaller coalitions are needed to win elections under tighter competition, fewer public and more private (clientelistic) projects could be awarded. Using a unique dataset on the 3x1 Program for Migrants for over 2,400 municipalities in the period 2002 through 2007, we find a lower provision of public goods in electorally competitive jurisdictions. Thus, we remain sceptical about the program success in promoting public goods in politically competitive locations with high migration levels.

Still in the Era of Area Studies? Political-Scientific Perspectives on European Competition Policy in the 2000s

This note reviews the political-scientific literature on European competition policy (ECP) in the 2000s. Based on a data set extracted from four well-known journals, and using an upfront methodology and explicit criteria, it analyzes the literature both quantitatively and qualitatively. On the quantitative side, it shows that, although a few sub-policy areas are still neglected, ECP is not the under-researched policy it used to be. On the qualitative side, the literature has greatly improved since the 1990s: Almost all articles now present a clear research question, and most advance specific theoretical claims/hypotheses. Yet, improvements can be made on research design, statistical testing, and, above all, state-of-the-art theorizing (e.g. in the game-theoretical treatment of delegation problems). Indeed, it is paradoxical that ECP specialists do not pay more attention to theoretical questions which are so central to the actual policy area they study.

Are Dictators Immune to Human Rights Shaming?

This paper examines whether human rights naming and shaming destabilizes the rule of authoritarian leaders. We argue that human rights shaming can destabilize autocratic leaders by signaling international disapproval to elites in the targeted country, increasing their capacity to replace the incumbent. In personalist regimes, shaming increases the risk of irregular exit because regime elite do not have a means to peacefully replace the incumbent. Shaming campaigns also decrease foreign aid and international trade in personalist regimes, denying the leader access to resources to pay his coalition – further destabilizing his rule. In non-personalist regimes where parties or the military allow elites to peacefully replace incumbents, human rights shaming increases the risk of regular turnover of power, but has little effect on the risk of irregular exit or international flows of aid and trade. These findings have implications for understanding when and where shaming campaigns are likely to reduce or deter repression.

Trabajo y niveles de vida en el Franquismo. Un estado de la cuestión desde una perspectiva de género.

El objetivo del trabajo es plantear preguntas sobre la situación general de las mujeres en el franquismo. Para ver cómo se ha estudiado el trabajo y los niveles de vida de las mujeres en el franquismo es útil distinguir tres grandes temas o niveles de análisis: (a) el Estado franquista, (b) la construcción ideológica y jurídica de "la mujer" y "el varón" como grupos sociales con distintos derechos y funciones, y (c) la división del trabajo entre mujeres y hombres.

GAPS: generador de aplicaciones sintéticas

Gaps es un generador de aplicaciones sintéticas de estructura compuesta Master/Worker de pipelines. Para crear una aplicación sintética, el investigador utilizará Gaspar, que recibe un fichero de texto con los parámetros de la aplicación a generar: cantidad de workers, etapas, tamaño de mensaje a enviar, etc., y genera un fichero con las propiedades de cada etapa. A partir de estos datos, Gaps, que esta hecho en C con MPI, genera y ejecuta la aplicación paralela. Estas aplicaciones se utilizan para comprobar en un entorno real los estudios analíticos que constituyen el modelo de rendimiento y sintonización dinámica.

The Acquisition of Actional Passives in Catalan

L'objectiu del present treball de recerca va ser avaluar les dues teories predominants (BORER & WEXLER 1987, WEXLER 2004; FOX & GRODZINSKY 1997) que miren d'explicar el tardà desenvolupament de la forma passiva en la gramàtica dels nens. Es van seleccionar tres grups de nens de ambdós sexes d'edats compreses entre els 3,1 i els 5;9 i es va a dur a terme un experiment per verificar la competència dels nens en les frases actives, passives curtes i passives llargues (amb el complement agentiu per...) . Mentre la comprensió de les actives és com l'adulta des del principi, la comprensió de las passives curtes és significativament més dolenta que la de les actives i la comprensió de les passives llargues és molt deficient fins i tot per al grup més gran d'edat. Les diferencies significatives trobades afavoreixen la hipòtesi de la maduració. Es discuteixen els resultats en relació amb estudis similars i es suggereixen noves vies d'investigació més enllà de les passives agentives.

Markets and linguistic diversity

The choice of language is a crucial decision for firms competing in cultural goods and media markets with a bilingual or multilingual consumer base. To the extent that multilingual consumers have preferences over the intrinsic characteristics (content) as well as over the language of the product, we can examine the efficiency of market outcomes regarding linguistic diversity. In this paper, I extend the spokes model and introduce language as an additional dimension of product differentiation. I show that: (i) if firms supply their product in a single language (the adoption model) then the degree of linguistic diversity is inefficiently low, and (ii) if some firms supply more than one linguistic version (the translation model) then in principle the market outcome may exhibit insufficient or excessive linguistic diversity. However, excessive diversity is associated to markets where the fraction of products in the minority language is disproportionately high with respect to the relative size of the linguistic minority.

Development and Democratization

Current studies, mainly focused on the postwar period, are split on the impact of development on democracy. Examining panel data that runs from early nineteenth century (a time where hardly any democracy was in place) to the end of the twentieth century, I show income matters positively for democratization – both after controlling for country and time effects and instrumenting for income. Since the effect of time partly varies over time, with some historical periods that are more favorable to democracy than others, I investigate the domestic variables (a decreasing marginal effect of growth in already developed economies) and international factors (the strategies of great powers toward small countries) generating that result. I finally probe the underlying processes through which income shapes political institutions, showing that development produces key changes in the distribution and nature of wealth that, in turn, make democracy a stable political outcome.

International Institutions as Solutions to Underlying Games of Cooperation

This Working Paper was presented at the international workshop "Game Theory in International Relations at 50", organized and coordinated by Professor Jacint Jordana and Dr. Yannis Karagiannis at the Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals on May 22, 2009. The day-long Workshop was inspired by the desire to honour the ground-breaking work of Professor Thomas Schelling in 1959-1960, and to understand where the discipline International Relations lies today vis-à-vis game theory.

Cognition, Resources, and Institutions in the Explanation of Attitudes to Free Trade

This article proposes a framework for the analysis of attitudes to foreign trade policies that challenges the traditional skill-endowment approach. The traditional approach assumes informed individuals who calculate the costs and benefits of alternative policies. We propose that individuals lack information and that their positions rest on economic vulnerability, as mediated through risk-aversion. We also stress the role of environmental signals and political endorsements in guiding individuals' views on trade policy. We test this alternative approach with a Spanish survey conducted in May 2009 and the ISSP survey conducted in 2003 in a large number of less developed and more developed countries. The Spanish data show that the population is largely uninformed and that their ideas about the consequences of free trade policy do not explain attitudes among different socio-demographic groups. Meanwhile, the ISSP data contradict important aspects of the traditional approach and are consistent with the alternative approach.

Ciencia, industria e ideología en la Cataluña del siglo XX: el Instituto Ravetllat-Pla en Sudamérica entre 1924 y 1936

En 1923, Ramón Plá i Armengol (1880-1958) fundó el Instituto Ravetllat-Pla para la comercialización y producción de dos productos antituberculosos (Hemo-Antitoxina y Suero Ravetllat-Pla) fundamentados en una teoría heterodoxa postulada por el veterinario Joaquim Ravetllat i Estech (1871-1923). A través del instituto creó una gran red internacional científico-comercial principalmente en Latinoamérica. Plá i Armengol fue doctor en medicina y participó activamente en la lucha antituberculosa en Cataluña sin dejar de lado su militancia socialista. A través de estos dos productos, logró crear un mercado que se sustentaba en una teoría heterodoxa que integraban sus principios e ideología.