The role of the Teaching Quality and Innovation Support Unit in the ICT Engineering Studies at Universitat Pompeu Fabra

One of the strategies of Universitat Pompeu Fabra to support Quality Learning has been the creation of Units for the Support of Teaching Quality and Innovation within each faculty. In the seminar we will present the role and activities of the Polytechnic School Unit in charge or coordinating the efforts towards quality learning in the Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) Engineering Studies. We will also discuss how these activities are informed to relevant academic stakeholders.

Teaching ethnic diversity in journalism school

It has been found that the symbolic elites have a prominent role in the discursive reproduction of racism in society, because they control the public discourse through which many ethnic prejudices are spread and shared. This special position of the mass media requires that the professional education of journalists, also featuring such topics as ethnic studies, diversity and racism, is optimally adapted to the multicultural societies in Europe, North America and Australia. This paper reports about an extensive research project examining ethnic education of journalists in these white-dominated countries, by examining the websites of many journalism and communication departments. Consistent with the general finding that white symbolic elites primarily deny or ignore (their) racism in society, none of the academic programs, anywhere in the world, mentions special classes on racism in the mass media. Finally, a practical proposal is made for a course on ethnic reporting in multicultural societies.

Teaching Literature in EFL through the Story Grammar and Reader Response Approach

La Literatura ha de ser implementada a les aules com a eina per a l’ensenyament i aprenentatge de la llengua anglesa, i hauria de complementar els llibres de text d’ensenyament d’aquesta llengua. D’aquesta manera els alumnes seran exposats encara més a una varietat de registres, expressions i vocabulari d’aquesta llengua. La metodologia d’ensenyar la gramàtica dels contes o històries coneguda en anglès com “Story Grammar Approach” (SGA) i la metodologia sobre la comprensió i reacció lectora o “Reader Response Approach” (RRA) són excel•lent vehicles per a implementar la Literatura com a eina a les aules per a ensenyar anglès.La metodologia sobre la gramàtica de contes o “SGA” només es pot posar en pràctica quan els textos són narratius perquè aquests posseeixen tots els següents elements:• Personatges• Ambient• Trama• Conflicte• Resolució• Tema La metodologia de la reacció lectiva o “RRA” es centra principalment en la comprensió subjectiva i reacció del lector sobre un text, en la qual el lector formula una hipòtesis i aporta les seves idees sobre el text a una conversa grupal. Els estudiants han de poder aportar les seves reaccions, idees i respostes sobre els textos. La metodologia “RRA” també enfoca les habilitats cognitives superiors i empenya a l’alumne a millorar la seva expressió oral.Aquestes dues metodologies aporten incomptable avantatges. Treballen totes les intel•ligències múltiples i totes les competències acadèmiques (menys la matemàtica), els alumnes aprenen a treballar i a escolar als altres (i valorar altres opinions), poden aprendre sobre diferents cultures, la història, geografia, són exposats a diferents gèneres, i fomenten i estimulen la lectura i escriptura, com també treballen les habilitats productives i receptives en l’aprenentatge del anglès.

Optimal Contracts, Adverse Selection, and Social Preferences: An Experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

Completing contracts ex post: How car manufacturers manage car dealers

This article illustrates how contracts are completed ex post in practice and, in so doing, indirectly suggests what the real function of contracts may be. Our evidence comes from the contracts between automobile manufacturers and their dealers in 23 dealership networks in Spain. Franchising dominates automobile distribution because of the need to decentralize pricing and control of service decisions. It motivates local managers to undertake these activities at minimum cost for the manufacturer. However, it creates incentive conflicts, both between manufacturers and dealers and among dealers themselves, concerning the level of sales and service provided. It also holds potential for expropriation of specific investments. Contracts deal with these conflicts by restricting dealers decision rights and granting manufacturers extensive completion, monitoring and enforcement powers. The main mechanism that may prevent abuse of these powers is the manufacturers reputational capital.

Teaching metaheuristics in business schools

In this work we discuss some ideas and opinions related with teaching Metaheuristics in Business Schools. The main purpose of the work is to initiate a discussion and collaboration about this topic,with the final objective to improve the teaching and publicity of the area. The main topics to be discussed are the environment and focus of this teaching. We also present a SWOT analysis which lead us to the conclusion that the area of Metaheuristics only can win with the presentation and discussion of metaheuristics and related topics in Business Schools, since it consists in a excellent Decision Support tools for future potential users.

Employment consequences of restrictive permanent contracts: Evidence from Spanish labor market reforms

Temporary employment contracts allowing unrestricted dismissals wereintroduced in Spain in 1984 and quickly came to account for most new jobs.As a result, temporary employment increased from around 10% in themid-eighties to more than 30% in the early nineties. In 1997, however,the Spanish government attempted to reduce the incidence of temporaryemployment by reducing payroll taxes and dismissal costs for permanentcontracts. In this paper, we use individual data from the Spanish LaborForce Survey to estimate the effects of reduced payroll taxes anddismissal costs on the distribution of employment and worker flows. Weexploit the fact that recent reforms apply only to certain demographicgroups to set up a natural experiment research design that can be usedto study the effects of contract regulations. Our results show that thereduction of payroll taxes and dismissal costs increased the employmentof young workers on permanent contracts, although the effects for youngwomen are not always significant. Results for older workers showinsignificant effects. The results suggest a moderately elastic responseof permanent employment to non-wage labor costs for young men. We alsofind positive effects on the transitions from unemployment and temporaryemployment into permanent employment for young and older workers, althoughthe effects for older workers are not always significant. On the otherhand, transitions from permanent employment to non-employment increasedonly for older men, suggesting that the reform had little effect ondismissals.

Recursive contracts

We obtain a recursive formulation for a general class of contractingproblems involving incentive constraints. Under these constraints,the corresponding maximization (sup) problems fails to have arecursive solution. Our approach consists of studying the Lagrangian.We show that, under standard assumptions, the solution to theLagrangian is characterized by a recursive saddle point (infsup)functional equation, analogous to Bellman's equation. Our approachapplies to a large class of contractual problems. As examples, westudy the optimal policy in a model with intertemporal participationconstraints (which arise in models of default) and intertemporalcompetitive constraints (which arise in Ramsey equilibria).

Fixed-term contracts and the duration distribution of unemployment

In the mid-1980s, many European countries introduced fixed-term contracts.Since then their labor markets have become more dynamic. This paper studiesthe implications of such reforms for the duration distribution ofunemployment, with particular emphasis on the changes in the durationdependence. I estimate a parametric duration model using cross-sectionaldata drawn from the Spanish Labor Force Survey from 1980 to 1994 to analyzethe chances of leaving unemployment before and after the introduction offixed-term contracts. I find that duration dependence has increased sincesuch reform. Semi-parametric estimation of the model also shows that forlong spells, the probability of leaving unemployment has decreased sincesuch reform.

The optimal length of contracts with application to outsourcing

This paper resolves three empirical puzzles in outsourcing by formalizing the adaptationcost of long-term performance contracts. Side-trading with a new partner alongside a long-term contract (to exploit an adaptation-requiring investment) is usually less effective than switching to the new partner when the contract expires. So long-term contracts that prevent holdup of specific investments may induce holdup of adaptation investments. Contract length therefore trades of specific and adaptation investments. Length should increase with the importance and specificity of self-investments, and decrease with the importance of adaptation investments for which side-trading is ineffective. My general model also shows how optimal length falls with cross-investments and wasteful investments.

Teaching, research and service: Experience and opinions of accounting Spanish academics

Research, teaching and service are the main activities carried out in almost all European universities. Previous research, which has been mainlycentred in North-American universities, has found solid results indicatingthat research and teaching are not equally valued when deciding on facultypromotion. This conclusion creates a potential conflict for accountingacademics on how to distribute working time in order to accomplish personalcareer objectives. This paper presents the results of a survey realisedin two European countries: Spain and the United Kingdom, which intendedto explore the opinions and personal experience of accounting academicsworking in these countries. Specifically, we focus on the following issues:(i) The impact of teaching and service on time available for research;(ii) The integration of teaching and research; (iii) The perceived valueof teaching and research for career success and (iv) The interaction betweenprofessional accounting and accounting research. The results show thatboth in Spain and in the United Kingdom there is a conflict between teachingand research, which has its origin in the importance attached to researchactivities on promotion decisions. It also seems evident that so far, theconflict is being solved in favour of research in prejudice of teaching.

On the valuation and incentive effects of executive cash bonus contracts

Executive compensation packages are often valued in an inconsistent manner: while employee stock options (ESOs) are typically valued ex-ante, cash bonuses are valued ex-post. This renders the existing valuation models of employee compensation packages theoretically unsatisfactory and, potentially, empirically distortive. In this paper, we propose an option-based framework for ex-ante valuation of cash bonus contracts. After obtaining closed-form expressions for ex-ante values of several frequently used types of bonus contracts, we utilize them to explore the e¤ects that the shape of a bonus contract has on the executive s attitude toward risk-taking. We, also, study pay-performance sensitivity of such contracts. We show that the terms of a bonus contract can dramatically impact both risk-taking behavior as well as pay-performance incentives. Several testable predictions are made, and venues of future research outlined.

Competition and cost overruns. Optimal misspecification of procurement contracts

Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in the initial project design. This paper deals with the problem of design specification in public procurement and provides a rationale for design misspecification. We propose a model in which the sponsor decides how much to invest in design specification and awards competitively the project to a contractor. After the project has been awarded the sponsor engages in bilateral renegotiation with the contractor, in order to accommodate changes in the initial project s design that new information makes desirable. When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design s specification level is seen to affect the resulting degree of competition. The paper highlights this interaction between market competition and design specification and shows that the sponsor s optimal strategy, when facing an imperfectly competitive market supply, is to underinvest in design specification so as to make significant cost overruns likely. Since no such misspecification occurs in a perfectly competitive market, cost overruns are seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market.

Optimal contracts, adverse selection and social preferences: An experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

Finance versus costs for teaching hospitals in Spain

In this paper we analyse the observed systematic differences incosts for teaching hospitals (THhenceforth) in Spain. Concernhas been voiced regarding the existence of a bias in thefinancing of TH s has been raised once prospective budgets arein the arena for hospital finance, and claims for adjusting totake into account the legitimate extra costs of teaching onhospital expenditure are well grounded. We focus on theestimation of the impact of teaching status on average cost. Weused a version of a multiproduct hospital cost function takinginto account some relevant factors from which to derive theobserved differences. We assume that the relationship betweenthe explanatory and the dependent variables follows a flexibleform for each of the explanatory variables. We also model theunderlying covariance structure of the data. We assumed twoqualitatively different sources of variation: random effects andserial correlation. Random variation refers to both general levelvariation (through the random intercept) and the variationspecifically related to teaching status. We postulate that theimpact of the random effects is predominant over the impact ofthe serial correlation effects. The model is estimated byrestricted maximum likelihood. Our results show that costs are 9%higher (15% in the case of median costs) in teaching than innon-teaching hospitals. That is, teaching status legitimatelyexplains no more than half of the observed difference in actualcosts. The impact on costs of the teaching factor depends on thenumber of residents, with an increase of 51.11% per resident forhospitals with fewer than 204 residents (third quartile of thenumber of residents) and 41.84% for hospitals with more than 204residents. In addition, the estimated dispersion is higher amongteaching hospitals. As a result, due to the considerable observedheterogeneity, results should be interpreted with caution. From apolicy making point of view, we conclude that since a higherrelative burden for medical training is under public hospitalcommand, an explicit adjustment to the extra costs that theteaching factor imposes on hospital finance is needed, beforehospital competition for inpatient services takes place.