Jurisdictional immunity in tax haven countries

El següent projecte conté informació sobre què són els paradisos fiscals, els seus avantatges, i on s'ubiquen. També s'analitza el procés que algú ha de seguir per anar a un paradís fiscal i avalua com la gent rica i les grans empreses operen els seus negocis a través dels paradisos fiscals i prenen avantatge d'ells reduint les seves obligacions fiscals de manera significativa. El projecte també considera la qüestió del secret bancari, que ha estat un gran conflicte entre els països en els darrers anys.

Tax Coordination Between Regions in Spain. The Role of the Courts

Overview of the Tax Coordination of the Regions in Spain from the point of view of the role of the Courts in developing the present system

Tax Coordination Between Regions in Spain - Role of the Courts

Análisis de la jurisprudencia constitucional española sobre la distribución de competencias tributarias entre los distintos niveles de gobierno.

Tax evasion, technology shocks, and the cyclicality of government revenues

This paper analyzes the behavior of the tax revenue to output ratio over the business cycle. In order to replicate the empirical evidence, we develop a simple model combining the standard Ak growth model with the tax evasion phenomenon. When individuals conceal part of their true income from the tax authority, they face the risk of being audited and hence of paying the corresponding fine. Under the empirically plausible assumptions that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution exhibits a sufficiently small value and that productivity shocks are serially correlated, we show that the elasticity of government revenue with respect to output is larger than one, which agrees with the empirical evidence. This result holds even if the tax system displays flat tax rates. We extend the previous setup to generate larger fiscal deficits when the economy experiences a recession.

Haar wavelets-based approach for quantifying credit portfolio losses

This paper proposes a new methodology to compute Value at Risk (VaR) for quantifying losses in credit portfolios. We approximate the cumulative distribution of the loss function by a finite combination of Haar wavelet basis functions and calculate the coefficients of the approximation by inverting its Laplace transform. The Wavelet Approximation (WA) method is specially suitable for non-smooth distributions, often arising in small or concentrated portfolios, when the hypothesis of the Basel II formulas are violated. To test the methodology we consider the Vasicek one-factor portfolio credit loss model as our model framework. WA is an accurate, robust and fast method, allowing to estimate VaR much more quickly than with a Monte Carlo (MC) method at the same level of accuracy and reliability.

Credit risk contributions under the Vasicek one-factor model: a fast wavelet expansion approximation

To measure the contribution of individual transactions inside the total risk of a credit portfolio is a major issue in financial institutions. VaR Contributions (VaRC) and Expected Shortfall Contributions (ESC) have become two popular ways of quantifying the risks. However, the usual Monte Carlo (MC) approach is known to be a very time consuming method for computing these risk contributions. In this paper we consider the Wavelet Approximation (WA) method for Value at Risk (VaR) computation presented in [Mas10] in order to calculate the Expected Shortfall (ES) and the risk contributions under the Vasicek one-factor model framework. We decompose the VaR and the ES as a sum of sensitivities representing the marginal impact on the total portfolio risk. Moreover, we present technical improvements in the Wavelet Approximation (WA) that considerably reduce the computational effort in the approximation while, at the same time, the accuracy increases.

“Tonnage tax” : régimen especial de las entidades navieras en función del tonelaje

El present treball analitzarà el règim del Tonnage Tax com a resposta legislativa de la Unió Europea davant la continua davallada de la seva flota mercant, derivada de la competència provinent de tercers països. S’oferirà una visió general d’aquest règim especial de l’Impost sobre Societats en l’àmbit de la Unió Europea prestant un especial interès a la regulació d’aquest a Espanya, al temps que procedirem a l’estudi en detall d’una de les aplicacions pràctiques del Tonnage Tax a Espanya que més ha atret l’atenció dels inversors, el “Tax Lease”.

Environmental Tax on Products and Services Based on Their Carbon Footprint: A Case Study of the Pulp and Paper Sector

The main aim of this work is to define an environmental tax on products and services based on their carbon footprint. We examine the relevance of conventional life cycle analysis (LCA) and environmentally extended input-output analysis (EIO) as methodological tools to identify emission intensities of products and services on which the tax is based. The short-term price effects of the tax and the policy implications of considering non-GHG are also analyzed. The results from the specific case study on pulp production show that the environmental tax rate based on the LCA approach (1,8%) is higher than both EIO approaches (0,8% for product and 1,4% for industry approach), but they are comparable. Even though LCA is more product specific and provides detailed analysis, EIO would be the more relevant approach to apply economy wide environmental tax. When the environmental tax considers non-GHG emissions instead of only CO2, sectors such as agriculture, mining of coal and extraction of peat, and food exhibit higher environmental tax and price effects. Therefore, it is worthwhile for policy makers to pay attention on the implication of considering only CO2 tax or GHG emissions tax in order for such a policy measure to be effective and meaningful. Keywords: Environmental tax; Life cycle analysis; Environmental input-output analysis.

Credit consulting : anàlisi de l'amortització anticipada de crèdits mitjançant el VAD

El projecte que he dut a terme és la implementació d'una pàgina web orientada a aquells usuaris que necessiten assessorament davant d'un crèdit bancari que ja posseeixen o que vulguin realitzar. Aquesta web financera té com a objectiu donar un cop de mà a tota aquella gent que té demanat un crèdit bancari a interès fixe i vol saber en un moment determinat si és convenient o no amortitzar anticipadament tenint en compte variables com: interès del mercat, penalització deguda a l'anticipació, la fiscalitat en el cas de les empreses, anys que queden per acabar de pagar el crèdit, sistema d'amortització financera utilitzat, etc.

Foundation Funded OER vs. Tax Payer Funded OER - A Tale of Two Mandates

Compare and contrast foundation funded OER with taxpayer funded OER in terms of global vs. local goals, licensing options, use cases, and outcomes.

The efficiency of direct payments versus tax reductions under uncertainty

This paper analyzes the optimal behavior of farmers in the presence of direct payments and uncertainty. In an empirical analysis for Switzerland, it confirms previously obtained theoretical results and determines the magnitude of the theoretical predicted effects. The results show that direct payments increase agricultural production between 3.7% to 4.8%. Alternatively to direct payments, the production effect of tax reductions is evaluated in order to determine its magnitude. The empirical analysis corroborates the theoretical results of the literature and demonstrates that tax reductions are also distorting, but to a substantially lesser degree if losses are not offset. However, tax reductions, independently whether losses are offset or not, lead to higher government spending than pure direct payments

Tax incentives and direct support for R&D: What do firms use and why?

This paper studies whether firms' use of R&D subsidies and R&D tax incentives is correlated to two sources of underinvestment in R&D, financing constraints and appropriability. We find that financially constrained SMEs are less likely to use R&D tax credits and more likely to obtain subsidies. SMEs using legal methods to protect their intellectual property are more likely to use tax incentives. Results are ambiguous for large firms. For both having previous experience in R&D increases the likelihood of using tax incentives, while it reduces the likelihood of using exclusively subsidies, suggesting that the latter induce entry into R&D. Results imply that direct funding and tax credits do not have the same ability to address each source of R&D underinvestment, and that on average subsidies may be better suited than tax credits at least for SMEs. From a policy perspective these tools may be complements rather than substitutes.

Endogenous Credit Cycles and Financial Dampening in an Adverse Selection Economy

We propose an adverse selection framework in which the financial sector has a dual role. It amplifies or dampens exogenous shocks and also generates endogenous fluctuations. We fully characterize constrained optimal contracts in a setting in which entrepreneurs need to borrow and are privately informed about the quality of their projects. Our characterization is novel in analyzing pooling and separating allocations in a context of multi-dimensional screening: specifically, the amounts of investment undertaken and of entrepreneurial net worth are used to screen projects. We then embed these results in a dynamic competitive economy. First, we show how endogenous regime switches in financial contracts may generate fluctuations in an economy that exhibits no dynamics under full information. Unlike previous models of endogenous cycles, our result does not rely on entrepreneurial net worth being counter-cyclical or inconsequential for determining investment. Secondly, the model shows the different implications of adverse selection as opposed to pure moral hazard. In particular, and contrary to standard results in the macroeconomic literature, the financial system may dampen exogenous shocks in the presence of adverse selection.

Adverse Selection, Credit, and Efficiency: the Case of the Missing Market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our envi- ronment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow from banks. As is generally the case in economies with adverse selection, the competitive equilibrium of our economy is shown to be ine¢ cient. Under adverse selection, the choices made by one type of agents limit what can be o¤ered to other types in an incentive-compatible manner. This gives rise to an externality, which cannot be internalized in a competitive equilibrium. We show that, in this type of environment, the ine¢ ciency associated to adverse selection is the consequence of one implicit assumption: entrepreneurs can only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added (say, a .security market.), in which entrepreneurs can obtain funds beyond those o¤ered by banks, we show that the e¢ cient allocation is an equilibrium of the economy. In such an equilibrium, all entrepreneurs borrow at a pooling rate in the security market. When they apply to bank loans, though, only entrepreneurs with good projects pledge these additional funds as collateral. This equilibrium thus simultaneously entails cross- subsidization and separation between di¤erent types of entrepreneurs.