Transfers, social safety nets and economic growth

The role of social safety nets in the form of redistributional transfersand wage subsidies is analyzed using a simple model of criminal behavior. Itis argued that public welfare programs act as a crime--preventing ordisruption--preventing devices because they tend to increase the opportunitycost of engaging in crime or disruptive activities. It is shown that, in thepresence of a leisure choice, wage subsidies may be better than pure transfers. Using a simple growth model, it is shown that it is not optimal for the governmentto try to fully eliminate crime. The optimal size of the public welfare programis found and it is argued that public welfare should be financed with income(not lump--sum) taxes, despite the fact that income taxes are distortionary.The intuition for this result is that income taxes act as a user fee oncongested public goods and transfers can be thought of as {\it productive}public goods {\it subject to congestion}. Finally, using a cross-section of 75 countries, the partial correlation betweentransfers and growth is shown to be significantly positive.

Social preferences: Some simple tests and a new model

Departures from pure self interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of "social preferences". We conduct experiments on simple two-person and three-person games with binary choices that test these theories more directly than the array of games conventionally considered. Our experiments show strong support for the prevalence of "quasi-maximin" preferences: People sacrifice to increase the payoffs for all recipients, but especially for the lowest-payoff recipients. People are also motivated by reciprocity: While people are reluctant to sacrifice to reciprocate good or bad behavior beyond what they would sacrifice for neutral parties, they withdraw willingness to sacrifice to achieve a fair outcome when others are themselves unwilling to sacrifice. Some participants are averse to getting different payoffs than others, but based on our experiments and reinterpretation of previous experiments we argue that behavior that has been presented as "difference aversion" in recent papers is actually a combination of reciprocal and quasi-maximin motivations. We formulate a model in which each player is willing to sacrifice to allocate the quasi-maximin allocation only to those players also believed to be pursuing the quasi-maximin allocation, and may sacrifice to punish unfair players.

An evaluation of the life-cycle effects of minimum pensions on retirement behavior

In this paper we explore the effects of the minimum pension program on welfare andretirement in Spain. This is done with a stylized life-cycle model which provides a convenient analytical characterization of optimal behavior. We use data from the Spanish Social Security to estimate the behavioral parameters of the model and then simulate the changes induced by the minimum pension in aggregate retirement patterns. The impact is substantial: there is threefold increase in retirement at 60 (the age of first entitlement) with respect to the economy without minimum pensions, and total early retirement (before or at 60) is almost 50% larger.

Optimal contracts, adverse selection and social preferences: An experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

Elicited beliefs and social information in modified dictator games: What do dictators believe other dictators do?

We use subjects actions in modified dictator games to perform a within-subject classification ofindividuals into four different types of interdependent preferences: Selfish, Social Welfaremaximizers, Inequity Averse and Competitive. We elicit beliefs about other subjects actions inthe same modified dictator games to test how much of the existent heterogeneity in others actions is known by subjects. We find that subjects with different interdependent preferences infact have different beliefs about others actions. In particular, Selfish individuals cannotconceive others being non-Selfish while Social Welfare maximizers are closest to the actualdistribution of others actions. We finally provide subjects with information on other subjects actions and re-classify individuals according to their (new) actions in the same modified dictatorgames. We find that social information does not affect Selfish individuals, but that individualswith interdependent preferences are more likely to change their behavior and tend to behavemore selfishly.

Pay-as-you-go social security and the distribution of bequests

This paper studies the impact of an unfunded social security system on the distribution of bequests in a framework where savings are due both by life cycle and by random altruistic motivations. We show that the impact of social security on the distribution of bequests depends crucially on the importance of the bequest motive in explaining savings behavior. If the bequest motive is strong, then an increase in the social security tax raises the bequests left by altruistic parents. On the other hand, when the importance of bequests in motivating savings is sufficiently low, theincrease in the social security tax could result in a reduction of the bequests left by altruistic parents under some conditions on the attitude of individuals toward risk and on the relative returns associated with private saving and social security. Some implications concerning the transitional effects of introducing an unfunded social security scheme are also discussed.

Modelling diffusion of innovations in a social network

A simple model of diffusion of innovations in a social network with upgrading costs is introduced. Agents are characterized by a single real variable, their technological level. According to local information, agents decide whether to upgrade their level or not, balancing their possible benefit with the upgrading cost. A critical point where technological avalanches display a power-law behavior is also found. This critical point is characterized by a macroscopic observable that turns out to optimize technological growth in the stationary state. Analytical results supporting our findings are found for the globally coupled case.

An overall statistic for testing symmetry in social interactions

The present work focuses the attention on the skew-symmetry index as a measure of social reciprocity. This index is based on the correspondence between the amount of behaviour that each individual addresses to its partners and what it receives from them in return. Although the skew-symmetry index enables researchers to describe social groups, statistical inferential tests are required. The main aim of the present study is to propose an overall statistical technique for testing symmetry in experimental conditions, calculating the skew-symmetry statistic (Φ) at group level. Sampling distributions for the skew- symmetry statistic have been estimated by means of a Monte Carlo simulation in order to allow researchers to make statistical decisions. Furthermore, this study will allow researchers to choose the optimal experimental conditions for carrying out their research, as the power of the statistical test has been estimated. This statistical test could be used in experimental social psychology studies in which researchers may control the group size and the number of interactions within dyads.

Spatial behavior in groups: an agent-based approach

We present an agent-based model with the aim of studying how macro-level dynamics of spatial distances among interacting individuals in a closed space emerge from micro-level dyadic and local interactions. Our agents moved on a lattice (referred to as a room) using a model implemented in a computer program called P-Space in order to minimize their dissatisfaction, defined as a function of the discrepancy between the real distance and the ideal, or desired, distance between agents. Ideal distances evolved in accordance with the agent's personal and social space, which changed throughout the dynamics of the interactions among the agents. In the first set of simulations we studied the effects of the parameters of the function that generated ideal distances, and in a second set we explored how group macrolevel behavior depended on model parameters and other variables. We learned that certain parameter values yielded consistent patterns in the agents' personal and social spaces, which in turn led to avoidance and approaching behaviors in the agents. We also found that the spatial behavior of the group of agents as a whole was influenced by the values of the model parameters, as well as by other variables such as the number of agents. Our work demonstrates that the bottom-up approach is a useful way of explaining macro-level spatial behavior. The proposed model is also shown to be a powerful tool for simulating the spatial behavior of groups of interacting individuals.

Superstars need social benefits: an experiment on network formation

We investigate contributions to the provision of public goods on a network when efficient provision requires the formation of a star network. We provide a theoretical analysis and study behavior is a controlled laboratory experiment. In a 2x2 design, we examine the effects of group size and the presence of (social) benefits for incoming links. We find that social benefits are highly important. They facilitate convergence to equilibrium networks and enhance the stability and efficiency of the outcome. Moreover, in large groups social benefits encourage the formation of superstars: star networks in which the core contributes more than expected in the stage-game equilibrium. We show that this result is predicted by a repeated game equilibrium.

Emotional intelligence and social interest : are they related constructs?

In the last 15 years, a new psychological construct has emerged in the field of psychology: Emotional Intelligence. Some models of Emotional Intelligence bear ressemblence with aspects of one of the core constructs of Adlerian Psychology: Social Interest. The authors investigated, if both constructs are also empirically related and which is their capacity to predict psychiatric symptoms and antisocial behavior. Results indicate that Social Interest and Emotional Intelligence are empirically different constructs; Social Interest was negatively correlated to aspects of antisocial attitudes (but not to antisocial behavior). Social Interest also failed to predict symptoms of psychological distress. Emotional Intelligence, in change, was a better predictor for mental problems than Social Interest. The results are discussed in view of the validity of Social Interest measurement.

Personality, social values, and marital satisfaction as predictors of parents’ rearing styles

Los estilos de crianza parentales pueden afectar la conducta y socialización de los adolescentes, por lo que es de interés conocer cómo algunas variables psicológicas de los padres se relacionan con los estilos de crianza. Este estudio tiene el objetivo de analizar los estilos de crianza de los padres, valores sociales (prestigio social, orden, benevolencia, y conservadurismo-liberalismo), los cinco grandes factores de personalidad, y la satisfacción de pareja (acuerdo general, afecto, satisfacción, y cohesión) en los padres de adolescentes. Este es un estudio prospectivo basado en método de análisis correlacional. Se encontró que los estilos educativos definidos por el cariño y aceptación se relacionan con los rasgos de personalidad como responsabilidad y estabilidad emocional, alta satisfacción de pareja y preferencia por valores prosociales. Al contrario, los estilos de crianza de sobreprotección y favoritismo se relacionan con baja amabilidad y baja apertura el poco ajuste de pareja con falta de cohesión y valores sociales definidos por falta de benevolencia y preferencia por valores de prestigio social.

Quantifying Social Asymmetric Structures

Many social phenomena involve a set of dyadic relations among agents whose actions may be dependent. Although individualistic approaches have frequently been applied to analyze social processes, these are not generally concerned with dyadic relations nor do they deal with dependency. This paper describes a mathematical procedure for analyzing dyadic interactions in a social system. The proposed method mainly consists of decomposing asymmetric data into their symmetrical and skew-symmetrical parts. A quantification of skew-symmetry for a social system can be obtained by dividing the norm of the skew-symmetrical matrix by the norm of the asymmetric matrix. This calculation makes available to researchers a quantity related to the amount of dyadic reciprocity. Regarding agents, the procedure enables researchers to identify those whose behavior is asymmetric with respect to all agents. It is also possible to derive symmetric measurements among agents and to use multivariate statistical techniques.

Measuring and making decisions for social reciprocity

Social reciprocity may explain certain emerging psychological processes, which are likely to be founded on dyadic relations. Although some indices and statistics have been proposed to measure and make statistical decisions regarding social reciprocity in groups, these were generally developed to identify association patterns rather than to quantify the discrepancies between what each individual addresses to his/her partners and what is received from them in return. Additionally, social researchers are not only interested in measuring groups at the global level, since dyadic and individual measurements are also necessary for a proper description of social interactions. This study is concerned with a new statistic for measuring social reciprocity at the global level and with decomposing it in order to identify those dyads and individuals which account for a significant part of asymmetry in social interactions. In addition to a set of indices some exact analytical results are derived and a way of making statistical decisions is proposed.

Digital social media: An interactive technology incorporated as a competitive advantage for business

In a more transparent and dynamic world, in which consumers trust other consumers more for advice and recommendations on products and services, the continuity of organizations appears to be associated with socialization, the sharing of interests and the interaction with the audience. This is associated with the incorporation of digital technologies to business, specifically the use of social media. Consequently, it is timely and interesting to explore the phenomenon of virtual socialization, although it is a littlestudied field and what is needed is an innovative and theoretical approach based upon theories of marketing and communication. Expertise in these areas is present in all organizations and their performance is important for appropriate development of them. This work is a qualitative analysis about the behavior, reactions and attitudes of individuals to organizations, in order to understand the social factors that contribute to sustainable competitive advantages of organizations which can support strategic and future actions. We conclude that relevant factors associated with the tacit knowledge of the organization, specifically to learning and social interaction of the organization and their knowledge of virtual communities. The higher the coexistence of factors, the more difficult is the replication and greater will be the hypothesis of sustainable competitive advantage.