The Effect of a threshold proportional reinsurance strategy on ruin probabilities

[spa] En un modelo de Poisson compuesto, definimos una estrategia de reaseguro proporcional de umbral : se aplica un nivel de retención k1 siempre que las reservas sean inferiores a un determinado umbral b, y un nivel de retención k2 en caso contrario. Obtenemos la ecuación íntegro-diferencial para la función Gerber-Shiu, definida en Gerber-Shiu -1998- en este modelo, que nos permite obtener las expresiones de la probabilidad de ruina y de la transformada de Laplace del momento de ruina para distintas distribuciones de la cuantía individual de los siniestros. Finalmente presentamos algunos resultados numéricos.

El sistema electoral de les Corts Valencianes: orígens i reforma

[cat] Aquest article vol refutar la hipòtesi que els partits decideixen sistemes electorals majoritaris i que decideixen també mantenir-los invariables, sempre que el sistema de partits s"aproximi al bipartidisme i cap dels dos grans partits pugui perdre la seva posició a favor d"un nou competidor. De manera inversa, els sistemes electorals proporcionals són la conseqüència del multipartidisme, en el qual cap partit té opcions de rebre la majoria dels vots. El cas valencià, però, confirma només parcialment la hipòtesi: els partits van aprovar el 1982 regles proporcionals perquè les eleccions dels parlaments autonòmics eren considerades secundàries, no només pel multipartidisme existent aleshores. En canvi, sí que es confirma que el canvi iniciat el 2006 amb la reforma estatutària manté, de moment, l"status quo per no alterar la formació de majories parlamentàries. Encara queda pendent, però, que es modifiqui la Llei Electoral, de la qual depèn quin mínim de vots per entrar a les Corts s"establirà.

Empirical study of correlated survival times for recurrent events with proportional hazards margins and the effect of correlation and censoring.

Background: In longitudinal studies where subjects experience recurrent incidents over a period of time, such as respiratory infections, fever or diarrhea, statistical methods are required to take into account the within-subject correlation. Methods: For repeated events data with censored failure, the independent increment (AG), marginal (WLW) and conditional (PWP) models are three multiple failure models that generalize Cox"s proportional hazard model. In this paper, we revise the efficiency, accuracy and robustness of all three models under simulated scenarios with varying degrees of within-subject correlation, censoring levels, maximum number of possible recurrences and sample size. We also study the methods performance on a real dataset from a cohort study with bronchial obstruction. Results: We find substantial differences between methods and there is not an optimal method. AG and PWP seem to be preferable to WLW for low correlation levels but the situation reverts for high correlations. Conclusions: All methods are stable in front of censoring, worsen with increasing recurrence levels and share a bias problem which, among other consequences, makes asymptotic normal confidence intervals not fully reliable, although they are well developed theoretically.

The proportional distribution in a cooperative model with external opportunities

[cat] En aquest article es considera un problema de cooperació entre agents on cada agent realitza una contribució (diners, capital, treball, esforç) per tal d'obtenir un benefici comú a repartir. El repartiment proporcional respecte a les contribucions és una distribució que pertany al nucli del joc cooperatiu associat. A partir d'aquest model bàsic s'introdueix un agent extern que pot realitzar una determinada aportació que serveix per avaluar el potencial benefici de cada subcoalició d'agents si aquest nou agent finalment entrés. Aquesta anàlisi pot produir que el poder relatiu dels agents hagi variat. en concret s'avalua si la distribució proporcional és encara robusta des del punt de vista de la seva pertinença al conjunt de negociació. Amb aquest objectiu, analitzem el problema utilitzant el model de joc cooperatius amb estructura de coalició. Donat que, en general, la distribució proporcional, no pertany al conjunt de negociació, s'estudia una condició suficient per a que així sigui. També enunciem una condició necessària, i finalment es proposa una condició suficient que garanteix que el repartiment proporcional és la única distribució existent dins del conjunt de negociació.

The proportional distribution in a cooperative model with external opportunities

[cat] En aquest article es considera un problema de cooperació entre agents on cada agent realitza una contribució (diners, capital, treball, esforç) per tal d'obtenir un benefici comú a repartir. El repartiment proporcional respecte a les contribucions és una distribució que pertany al nucli del joc cooperatiu associat. A partir d'aquest model bàsic s'introdueix un agent extern que pot realitzar una determinada aportació que serveix per avaluar el potencial benefici de cada subcoalició d'agents si aquest nou agent finalment entrés. Aquesta anàlisi pot produir que el poder relatiu dels agents hagi variat. en concret s'avalua si la distribució proporcional és encara robusta des del punt de vista de la seva pertinença al conjunt de negociació. Amb aquest objectiu, analitzem el problema utilitzant el model de joc cooperatius amb estructura de coalició. Donat que, en general, la distribució proporcional, no pertany al conjunt de negociació, s'estudia una condició suficient per a que així sigui. També enunciem una condició necessària, i finalment es proposa una condició suficient que garanteix que el repartiment proporcional és la única distribució existent dins del conjunt de negociació.

Some optimization and decision problems in proportional reinsurance

Reinsurance is one of the tools that an insurer can use to mitigate the underwriting risk and then to control its solvency. In this paper, we focus on the proportional reinsurance arrangements and we examine several optimization and decision problems of the insurer with respect to the reinsurance strategy. To this end, we use as decision tools not only the probability of ruin but also the random variable deficit at ruin if ruin occurs. The discounted penalty function (Gerber & Shiu, 1998) is employed to calculate as particular cases the probability of ruin and the moments and the distribution function of the deficit at ruin if ruin occurs.

Empirical study of correlated survival times for recurrent events with proportional hazards margins and the effect of correlation and censoring.

Background: In longitudinal studies where subjects experience recurrent incidents over a period of time, such as respiratory infections, fever or diarrhea, statistical methods are required to take into account the within-subject correlation. Methods: For repeated events data with censored failure, the independent increment (AG), marginal (WLW) and conditional (PWP) models are three multiple failure models that generalize Cox"s proportional hazard model. In this paper, we revise the efficiency, accuracy and robustness of all three models under simulated scenarios with varying degrees of within-subject correlation, censoring levels, maximum number of possible recurrences and sample size. We also study the methods performance on a real dataset from a cohort study with bronchial obstruction. Results: We find substantial differences between methods and there is not an optimal method. AG and PWP seem to be preferable to WLW for low correlation levels but the situation reverts for high correlations. Conclusions: All methods are stable in front of censoring, worsen with increasing recurrence levels and share a bias problem which, among other consequences, makes asymptotic normal confidence intervals not fully reliable, although they are well developed theoretically.

Does illegal immigration empower rightist parties?

The main goal of this paper is to analyze the political outcome in countries where the relevant issue in elections is the control of immigration. In particular we explore the consequences on the political outcome of the fact that parties are either ideological or opportunistic with respect to this issue. In order to do that we use a simple two-party political competition model in which the issues over which parties take positions are the level of border enforcement and the way it has to be ?nanced. We show that an ideological rather than a pure opportunistic behavior gives parties an advantage to win the election. In particular, in most of the cases we consider we ?nd that rightist parties have an advantage to win in countries where the relevant issue in election is illegal immigration. This result may help us to understand the recent success of anti-immigrant and rightist parties in several countries.

Spatial competition between two candidates of different quality: the effects of candidate ideology and private information

This paper examines competition in a spatial model of two-candidate elections, where one candidate enjoys a quality advantage over the other candidate. The candidates care about winning and also have policy preferences. There is two-dimensional private information. Candidate ideal points as well as their tradeoffs between policy preferences and winning are private information. The distribution of this two-dimensional type is common knowledge. The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, with a distribution that is commonly known by both candidates. Pure strategy equilibria always exist in this model. We characterize the effects of increased uncertainty about the median voter, the effect of candidate policy preferences, and the effects of changes in the distribution of private information. We prove that the distribution of candidate policies approaches the mixed equilibrium of Aragones and Palfrey (2002a), when both candidates' weights on policy preferences go to zero.

Candidate stability and voting correspondences

We study the incentives of candidates to enter or to exit elections in order to strategically affect the outcome of a voting correspondence. We extend the results of Dutta, Jackson and Le Breton (2000), who only considered single-valued voting procedures by admitting that the outcomes of voting may consist of sets of candidates. We show that, if candidates form their preferences over sets according to Expected Utility Theory and Bayesian updating, every unanimous and non dictatorial voting correspondence violates candidate stability. When candidates are restricted to use even chance prior distributions, only dictatorial or bidictatorial rules are unanimous and candidate stable. We also analyze the implications of using other extension criteria to define candidate stability that open the door to positive results.

Democracy and the curse of natural resources

We propose a theoretical model to explain empirical regularities related to the curse of natural resources. This is an explicitly political model which emphasizes the behavior and incentives of politicians. We extend the standard voting model to give voters political control beyond the elections. This gives rise to a new restriction into our political economy model: policies should not give rise to a revolution. Our model clarifies when resource discoveries might lead to revolutions, namely, in countries with weak institutions. Natural resources may be bad for democracy by harming political turnover. Our model also suggests a non-linear dependence of human capital on natural resources. For low levels of democracy human capital depends negatively on natural resources, while for high levels of democracy the dependence is reversed. This theoretical finding is corroborated in both cross section and panel data regressions.

Characterisation of neutron spectra in mixed high energy fields in lineal accelerators: response functions validation

Actualment, la resposta de la majoria d’instrumentació operacional i dels dosímetres personals utilitzats en radioprotecció per a la dosimetria neutrònica és altament dependent de l’energia dels espectres neutrònics a analitzar, especialment amb camps neutrònics amb una important component intermitja. En conseqüència, la interpretació de les lectures d’aquests aparells es complicada si no es té un coneixement previ de la distribució espectral de la fluència neutrònica en els punts d’interès. El Grup de Física de les Radiacions de la Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (GFR-UAB) ha desenvolupat en els últims anys un espectròmetre de neutrons basat en un Sistema d’Esferes Bonner (BSS) amb un contador proporcional d’3He com a detector actiu. Els principals avantatges dels espectròmetres de neutrons per BSS són: la seva resposta isotròpica, la possibilitat de discriminar la component neutrònica de la gamma en camps mixtos, i la seva alta sensibilitat neutrònica als nivells de dosi analitzats. Amb aquestes característiques, els espectròmetres neutrònics per BSS compleixen amb els estándards de les últimes recomanacions de la ICRP i poden ser utilitzats també en el camp de la dosimetria neutrònica per a la mesura de dosis en el rang d’energia que va dels tèrmics fins als 20 MeV, en nou ordres de magnitud. En el marc de la col•laboració entre el GFR - UAB i el Laboratorio Nazionale di Frascati – Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare (LNF-INFN), ha tingut lloc una experiència comparativa d’espectrometria per BSS amb els feixos quasi monoenergètics de 2.5 MeV i 14 MeV del Fast Neutron Generator de l’ENEA. En l’exercici s’ha determinat l’espectre neutrònic a diferents distàncies del blanc de l’accelerador, aprofitant el codi FRUIT recentment desenvolupat pel grup LNF. Els resultats obtinguts mostren una bona coherència entre els dos espectròmetres i les dades mesurades i simulades.

All-pay auction equilibria in contests

We analyze (non-deterministic) contests with anonymous contest success functions. There is no restriction on the number of contestants or on their valuations for the prize. We provide intuitive and easily verifiable conditions for the existence of an equilibrium with properties similar to the one of the (deterministic) all-pay auction. Since these conditions are fulfilled for a wide array of situations, the predictions of this equilibrium are very robust to the specific details of the contest. An application of this result contributes to fill a gap in the analysis of the popular Tullock rent- seeking game because it characterizes properties of an equilibrium for increasing returns to scale larger than two, for any number of contestants and in contests with or without a common value. Keywords: (non-) deterministic contest, all-pay auction, contest success functions. JEL Classification Numbers: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D44 (Auctions).

Foundations for contest success functions

In the literature the outcome of contests is either interpreted as win probabilities or as shares of the prize. With this in mind, we examine two approaches to contest success functions. In the first we analyze the implications of contestants' incomplete information concerning the "type" of the contest administrator. While in the case of two contestants this approach can rationalize prominent contest success functions, we show that it runs into difficulties when there are more agents. Our second approach interprets contest success functions as sharing rules and establishes a connection to bargaining and claims problems which is independent of the number of contestants. Both approaches provide foundations for popular contest success functions and guidelines for the definition of new ones. Keywords: Endogenous Contests, Contest Success Function. JEL Classification: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D74 (Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances).

The Electoral Determinants of Collective Remittances: The Mexican 3x1 Program for Migrants

The 3x1 Program for Migrants is a matching grant scheme that seeks to direct the money sent by migrant organizations abroad to the provision of public and social infrastructure, and to productive projects in migrants’ communities of origin. To do so, the municipal, state, and federal administrations match the amount sent by hometown associations by 3 to 1. This opens the door to the political manipulation of the program. We explore the impact of a particular facet of Mexican political life on the operation of the 3x1: its recent democratization and the increasing political competition at the municipal level. Relying on the literature on redistributive politics, we posit that an increasing number of effective parties in elections may have two different effects. On the one hand, the need to cater to more heterogeneous constituencies may increase the provision of public projects. On the other hand, since smaller coalitions are needed to win elections under tighter competition, fewer public and more private (clientelistic) projects could be awarded. Using a unique dataset on the 3x1 Program for Migrants for over 2,400 municipalities in the period 2002 through 2007, we find a lower provision of public goods in electorally competitive jurisdictions. Thus, we remain sceptical about the program success in promoting public goods in politically competitive locations with high migration levels.