Periodic orbits of the planar collision restricted 3-body problem

Using the continuation method we prove that the circular and the elliptic symmetric periodic orbits of the planar rotating Kepler problem can be continued into periodic orbits of the planar collision restricted 3–body problem. Additionally, we also continue to this restricted problem the so called “comets orbits”.

Polynomial-time complexity for instances of the endomorphism problem in free groups

We say the endomorphism problem is solvable for an element W in a free group F if it can be decided effectively whether, given U in F, there is an endomorphism Φ of F sending W to U. This work analyzes an approach due to C. Edmunds and improved by C. Sims. Here we prove that the approach provides an efficient algorithm for solving the endomorphism problem when W is a two- generator word. We show that when W is a two-generator word this algorithm solves the problem in time polynomial in the length of U. This result gives a polynomial-time algorithm for solving, in free groups, two-variable equations in which all the variables occur on one side of the equality and all the constants on the other side.

Intermediate asymptotics beyond homogeneity and self-similarity: long time behavior for [formula]

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."

Periodic orbits near a heteroclinic loop formed by one dimensional orbit and a 2-dimensional manifold: application to the charged collinear 3-body problem

The paper is devoted to the study of a type of differential systems which appear usually in the study of some Hamiltonian systems with 2 degrees of freedom. We prove the existence of infinitely many periodic orbits on each negative energy level. All these periodic orbits pass near the total collision. Finally we apply these results to study the existence of periodic orbits in the charged collinear 3–body problem.

The optimal behaviour of firms facing stochastic costs

This paper aims at assessing the optimal behavior of a firm facing stochastic costs of production. In an imperfectly competitive setting, we evaluate to what extent a firm may decide to locate part of its production in other markets different from which it is actually settled. This decision is taken in a stochastic environment. Portfolio theory is used to derive the optimal solution for the intertemporal profit maximization problem. In such a framework, splitting production between different locations may be optimal when a firm is able to charge different prices in the different local markets.

The behavior of money velocity in low and high inflation countries

This paper presents a general equilibrium model of money demand where the velocity of money changes in response to endogenous fluctuations in the interest rate. The parameter space can be divided into two subsets: one where velocity is constant as in standard cash-in-advance models, and another one where velocity fluctuates as in Baumol (1952). The model provides an explanation of why, for a sample of 79 countries, the correlation between the velocity of money and the inflation rate appears to be low, unlike common wisdom would suggest. The reason is the diverse transaction technologies available in different economies.

Bribe-proof rules in the division problem

The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate another agent to misrepresent his preference and, after an appropriate redistribution of their shares, each obtain a strictly preferred share. We characterize all bribe-proof rules as the class of efficient, strategy-proof, and weak replacement monotonic rules. In addition, we identify the functional form of all bribe-proof and tops-only rules.

A maximal domain of preferences for tops-only rules in the division problem

The division problem consists of allocating an amount M of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, the uniform rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. Ching and Serizawa (1998) extended this result by showing that the set of single-plateaued preferences is the largest domain, for all possible values of M, admitting a rule (the extended uniform rule) satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency and symmetry. We identify, for each M and n, a maximal domain of preferences under which the extended uniform rule also satisfies the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, continuity, and "tops-onlyness". These domains (called weakly single-plateaued) are strictly larger than the set of single-plateaued preferences. However, their intersection, when M varies from zero to infinity, coincides with the set of single-plateaued preferences.

How universal is behavior? A four country comparison of spite, cooperation and errors in voluntary contribution mechanisms

This paper studies behavior in experiments with a linear voluntary contributions mechanism for public goods conducted in Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and the USA. The same experimental design was used in the four countries. Our 'contribution function' design allows us to obtain a view of subjects' behavior from two complementary points of view. If yields information about situations where, in purely pecuniary terms, it is a dominant strategy to contribute all the endowment and about situations where it is a dominant strategy to contribute nothing. Our results show, first, that differences in behavior across countries are minor. We find that when people play "the same game" they behave similarly. Second, for all four countries our data are inconsistent with the explanation that subjects contribute only out of confusion. A common cooperative motivation is needed to explain the date.

On Boas-Type Problem

R.P. Boas has found necessary and sufficient conditions of belonging of function to Lipschitz class. From his findings it turned out, that the conditions on sine and cosine coefficients for belonging of function to Lip α(0 & α & 1) are the same, but for Lip 1 are different. Later his results were generalized by many authors in the viewpoint of generalization of condition on the majorant of modulus of continuity. The aim of this paper is to obtain Boas-type theorems for generalized Lipschitz classes. To define generalized Lipschitz classes we use the concept of modulus of smoothness of fractional order.

Normal forms for rational difference equations with applications to the global periodicity problem

We propose a classification and derive the associated normal forms for rational difference equations with complex coefficients. As an application, we study the global periodicity problem for second order rational difference equations with complex coefficients. We find new necessary conditions as well as some new examples of globally periodic equations.

Personal relations and their effect on behavior in an organizational setting: an experimental study

We study how personal relations affect performance in organizations. In the experimental game we use a manager has to assign different degrees of decision power to two employees. These two employees then have to make distributive decisions which affect themselves and the manager. Our focus is on the effects on managers' assignment of decision power and on employees' distributive decisions of one of the employees and the manager knowing each other personally. Our evidence shows that managers tend to favor employees that they personally know and that these employees tend, more than other employees, to favor the manager in their distributive decisions. However, this behavior does not affect the performance of the employees that do not know the manager. All these effects are independent of whether the employees that know the manager are more or less productive than those who do not know the manager. The results shed light on discrimination and nepotism and its consequences for the performance of family firms and other organizations.

The Social contract with endogenous sentiments

Moral values infuence individual behavior and social interactions. A specially signif- cant instance is the case of moral values concerning work e¤ort. Individuals determine what they take to be proper behaviour and judge the others, and themselves, accordingly. They increase their esteem -and self-esteem- for those who perform in excess of the standard and decrease their esteem for those who work less. These changes in self-esteem result from the self-regulatory emotions of guilt or pride extensively studied in Social Psychology. We examine the interactions between sentiments, individual behaviour and the social contract in a model of rational voting over redistribution where individual self-esteem and relative es-teem for others are endogenously determined. Individuals di¤er in their productivities. The desired extent of redistribution depends both on individual income and on individual attitudes toward others. We characterize the politico-economic equilibria in which sentiments, labor supply and redistribution are simultaneously determined. The model has two types of equilibria. In "cohesive" equilibria, all individuals conform to the standard of proper behav- iour, income inequality is low and social esteem is not biased toward any particular type. Under these conditions equilibrium redistribution increases in response to larger inequality. In a "clustered" equilibrium skilled workers work above the mean while unskilled workers work below. In such an equilibrium, income inequality is large and sentiments are biased in favor of the industrious. As inequality increases, this bias may eventually overtake the egoistic demand for greater taxation and equilibrium redistribution decreases. The type of equilibrium that emerges crucially depends on inequality. We contrast the predictions of the model with data on inequality, redistribution, work values and attitudes toward work and toward the poor for a set of OECD countries.