152 resultados para political equilibrium
Resumo:
Actual tax systems do not follow the normative recommendations of yhe theory of optimal taxation. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, the informational difficulties of knowing or estimating all relevant elasticities and parameters. Secondly, the political complexities that would arise if a new tax implementation would depart too much from current systems that are perceived as somewhat egalitarians. Hence an ex-novo overhaul of the tax system might just be non-viable. In contrast, a small marginal tax reform could be politically more palatable to accept and economically more simple to implement. The goal of this paper is to evaluate, as a step previous to any tax reform, the marginal welfare cost of the current tax system in Spain. We do this by using a computational general equilibrium model calibrated to a point-in-time micro database. The simulations results show that the Spanish tax system gives rise to a considerable marginal excess burden. Its order of magnitude is of about 0.50 money units for each additional money unit collected through taxes.
Resumo:
Following a general macroeconomic approach, this paper sets a closed micro-founded structural model to determine the long run real exchange rate of a developed economy. In particular, the analysis follows the structure of a Natrex model. The main contribution of this research paper is the development of a solid theoretical framework that analyse in depth the basis of the real exchange rate and the details of the equilibrium dynamics after any shock influencing the steady state. In our case, the intertemporal factors derived from the stock-flow relationship will be particularly determinant. The main results of the paper can be summarised as follows. In first place, a complete well-integrated structural model for long-run real exchange rate determination is developed from first principles. Moreover, within the concrete dynamics of the model, it is found that some convergence restrictions will be necessary. On one hand, for the medium run convergence the sensitivity of the trade balance to changes in real exchange rate should be higher that the correspondent one to the investment decisions. On the other hand, and regarding long-run convergence, it is also necessary both that there exists a negative relationship between investment and capital stock accumulation and that the global saving of the economy depends positively on net foreign debt accumulation. In addition, there are also interesting conclusions about the effects that certain shocks over the exogenous variables of the model have on real exchange rates.
Resumo:
When two candidates of different quality compete in a one dimensional policy space, the equilibrium outcomes are asymmetric and do not correspond to the median. There are three main effects. First, the better candidate adopts more centrist policies than the worse candidate. Second, the equilibrium is statistical, in the sense that it predicts a probability distribution of outcomes rather than a single degenerate outcome. Third, the equilibrium varies systematically with the level of uncertainty about the location of the median voter. We test these three predictions using laboratory experiments, and find strong support for all three. We also observe some biases and show that they canbe explained by quantal response equilibrium.
Resumo:
We study markets where the characteristics or decisions of certain agents are relevant but not known to their trading partners. Assuming exclusive transactions, the environment is described as a continuum economy with indivisible commodities. We characterize incentive efficient allocations as solutions to linear programming problems and appeal to duality theory to demonstrate the generic existence of external effects in these markets. Because under certain conditions such effects may generate non-convexities, randomization emerges as a theoretic possibility. In characterizing market equilibria we show that, consistently with the personalized nature of transactions, prices are generally non-linear in the underlying consumption. On the other hand, external effects may have critical implications for market efficiency. With adverse selection, in fact, cross-subsidization across agents with different private information may be necessary for optimality, and so, the market need not even achieve an incentive efficient allocation. In contrast, for the case of a single commodity, we find that when informational asymmetries arise after the trading period (e.g. moral hazard; ex post hidden types) external effects are fully internalized at a market equilibrium.
Resumo:
We analyze the welfare properties of the competitive equilibrium in a capital accumulation model where individual preferences are subjected to both habit formation and consumption spillovers. We also discuss how consumption externalities and habits interact to generate an inefficient dynamic equilibrium. Finally, we characterize optimal tax policies aimed to restore efficient decentralized paths.
Resumo:
Based on an behavioral equilibrium exchange rate model, this paper examines the determinants of the real effective exchange rate and evaluates the degree of misalignment of a group of currencies since 1980. Within a panel cointegration setting, we estimate the relationship between exchange rate and a set of economic fundamentals, such as traded-nontraded productivity differentials and the stock of foreign assets. Having ascertained the variables are integrated and cointegrated, the long-run equilibrium value of the fundamentals are estimated and used to derive equilibrium exchange rates and misalignments. Although there is statistical homogeneity, some structural differences were found to exist between advanced and emerging economies.
Resumo:
We report experimental results on one-shot two person 3x3 constant sum games played by non-economists without previous experience in the laboratory. Although strategically our games are very similar to previous experiments in which game theory predictions fail dramatically, 80% of actions taken in our experiment coincided with the prediction of the unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies and 73% of actions were best responses to elicited beliefs. We argue how social preferences, presentation effects and belief elicitation procedures may influence how subjects play in simple but non trivial games and explain the diferences we observe with respect to previous work.
Resumo:
It has traditionally been argued that the development of telecommunications infrastructure is dependent on the quality of countries' political institutions. We estimate the effect of political institutions on the diffusion of three telecommunications services and find it to be much smaller in cellular telephony than in the others. By evaluating the importance of institutions for technologies rather than for industries, we reveal important growth opportunities for developing countries and offer policy implications for alleviating differences between countries in international telecommunications development. Keywords: Political constraints, telecommunications, GMM, economic development. JEL codes: O1, O3.
Resumo:
Identifying key sectors or key locations in an interconnected economy is of paramount importance for improving policy planning and directing economic strategy. Hence the relevance of categorizing them and hence the corresponding need of evaluating their potential synergies in terms of their global economic thrust. We explain in this paper that standard measures based on gross outputs do not and cannot capture the relevant impact due to self- imposed modeling limitations. In fact, common gross output measures will be systematically downward biased. We argue that an economy wide Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) approach provides a modeling platform that overcomes these limitations since it provides (i) a more comprehensive measure of linkages and (ii) an alternate way of accounting for links' relevance that is in consonance with standard macromagnitudes in the National Income and Product Accounts.