On some geometry and equivalence classes of normal form games

Equivalence classes of normal form games are defined using the geometryof correspondences of standard equilibiurm concepts like correlated, Nash,and robust equilibrium or risk dominance and rationalizability. Resultingequivalence classes are fully characterized and compared across differentequilibrium concepts for 2 x 2 games. It is argued that the procedure canlead to broad and game-theoretically meaningful distinctions of games aswell as to alternative ways of viewing and testing equilibrium concepts.Larger games are also briefly considered.

A Sequential Allocation Problem: The Asymptotic Distribution of Resources

In this paper we consider a sequential allocation problem with n individuals. The first individual can consume any amount of some endowment leaving the remaining for the second individual, and so on. Motivated by the limitations associated with the cooperative or non-cooperative solutions we propose a new approach. We establish some axioms that should be satisfied, representativeness, impartiality, etc. The result is a unique asymptotic allocation rule. It is shown for n = 2; 3; 4; and a claim is made for general n. We show that it satisfies a set of desirable properties. Key words: Sequential allocation rule, River sharing problem, Cooperative and non-cooperative games, Dictator and ultimatum games. JEL classification: C79, D63, D74.

The EU as a security provider in its neighbourhood: the case of non-proliferation of WMD in the Mediterranean area

As a consequence of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the US-led war against Iraq, WMD and their proliferation have become a central element of the EU security agenda. In December 2003, the European Council adopted even a EU Strategy against Proliferation of WMD. The approach adopted in this Strategy can be largely described as a ‘cooperative security provider’ approach and is based on effective multilateralism, the promotion of a stable international and regional environment and the cooperation with key partners. The principal objective of this paper is to examine in how far the EU has actually implemented the ‘cooperative security provider’ approach in the area which the Non-proliferation Strategy identifies as one of its priorities – the Mediterranean. Focusing on the concept of security interdependence, the paper analyses first the various WMD dangers with which the EU is confronted in the Mediterranean area. Afterwards, it examines how the EU has responded to these hazards in the framework of the Barcelona process and, in particular, the new European Neighbourhood Policy. It is argued that despite its relatively powerful rhetoric, the EU has largely failed, for a wide range of reasons, to apply effectively its non-proliferation approach in the Mediterranean area and, thus, to become a successful security provider.

On Cooperative solutions of a generalized assignment game: limit theorems to the set of competitive equilibria

We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We first establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and it contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. We then state and prove three limit results for replicated markets. First, the sequence of Cores of replicated markets converges to the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs when the number of replicas tends to infinity. Second, the Set-wise stable set of a two-fold replicated market already coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. Third, for any number of replicas there is a market with a Core payoff that is not a competitive equilibrium payoff.

Max-convex decompositions for cooperative TU games

We show that any cooperative TU game is the maximum of a finite collection of convex games. This max-convex decomposition can be refined by using convex games with non-negative dividends for all coalitions of at least two players. As a consequence of the above results we show that the class of modular games is a set of generators of the distributive lattice of all cooperative TU games. Finally, we characterize zero-monotonic games using a strong max-convex decomposition

Max-convex decompositions for cooperative TU games

We show that any cooperative TU game is the maximum of a finite collection of convex games. This max-convex decomposition can be refined by using convex games with non-negative dividends for all coalitions of at least two players. As a consequence of the above results we show that the class of modular games is a set of generators of the distributive lattice of all cooperative TU games. Finally, we characterize zero-monotonic games using a strong max-convex decomposition

Cooperative games with size-truncated information

[Eng] We study the marginal worth vectors and their convex hull, the socalled Weber set, from the original coalitional game and the transformed one, which is called the Weber set of level k. We prove that the core of the original game is included in each of the Weber set of level k, for any k, and that the Weber sets of consecutive levels form a chain if and only if the original game is 0-monotone. Even if the game is not 0-monotone, the intersection of the Weber sets for consecutive levels is always not empty, what is not the case for non-consecutive ones. Spanish education system.

Cooperative games with size-truncated information

[Eng] We study the marginal worth vectors and their convex hull, the socalled Weber set, from the original coalitional game and the transformed one, which is called the Weber set of level k. We prove that the core of the original game is included in each of the Weber set of level k, for any k, and that the Weber sets of consecutive levels form a chain if and only if the original game is 0-monotone. Even if the game is not 0-monotone, the intersection of the Weber sets for consecutive levels is always not empty, what is not the case for non-consecutive ones. Spanish education system.

Steady-state global optimization of metabolic non-linear dynamic models through recasting into power-law canonical models

Background: Design of newly engineered microbial strains for biotechnological purposes would greatly benefit from the development of realistic mathematical models for the processes to be optimized. Such models can then be analyzed and, with the development and application of appropriate optimization techniques, one could identify the modifications that need to be made to the organism in order to achieve the desired biotechnological goal. As appropriate models to perform such an analysis are necessarily non-linear and typically non-convex, finding their global optimum is a challenging task. Canonical modeling techniques, such as Generalized Mass Action (GMA) models based on the power-law formalism, offer a possible solution to this problem because they have a mathematical structure that enables the development of specific algorithms for global optimization. Results: Based on the GMA canonical representation, we have developed in previous works a highly efficient optimization algorithm and a set of related strategies for understanding the evolution of adaptive responses in cellular metabolism. Here, we explore the possibility of recasting kinetic non-linear models into an equivalent GMA model, so that global optimization on the recast GMA model can be performed. With this technique, optimization is greatly facilitated and the results are transposable to the original non-linear problem. This procedure is straightforward for a particular class of non-linear models known as Saturable and Cooperative (SC) models that extend the power-law formalism to deal with saturation and cooperativity. Conclusions: Our results show that recasting non-linear kinetic models into GMA models is indeed an appropriate strategy that helps overcoming some of the numerical difficulties that arise during the global optimization task.

Cooperative games with size-truncated information

[Eng] We study the marginal worth vectors and their convex hull, the socalled Weber set, from the original coalitional game and the transformed one, which is called the Weber set of level k. We prove that the core of the original game is included in each of the Weber set of level k, for any k, and that the Weber sets of consecutive levels form a chain if and only if the original game is 0-monotone. Even if the game is not 0-monotone, the intersection of the Weber sets for consecutive levels is always not empty, what is not the case for non-consecutive ones. Spanish education system.

Cooperative games with size-truncated information

[Eng] We study the marginal worth vectors and their convex hull, the socalled Weber set, from the original coalitional game and the transformed one, which is called the Weber set of level k. We prove that the core of the original game is included in each of the Weber set of level k, for any k, and that the Weber sets of consecutive levels form a chain if and only if the original game is 0-monotone. Even if the game is not 0-monotone, the intersection of the Weber sets for consecutive levels is always not empty, what is not the case for non-consecutive ones. Spanish education system.

On the number of limit cycles bifurcating from a non-global degenerated center

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