Social Security in Theory and Practice (II): Efficiency Theories, Narrative Theories, and Implications for Reform

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forces create and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore "political" theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the "efficiency theories", which view creation of the SS program as a full of partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the "SS as welfare for the elderly" the "retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities", "optimal retirement insurance", the "prodigal father problem", the "misguided Keynesian", the "optimal longevity insurance", the "government economizing transaction costs", and the "return on human capital investment". We also analyze four "narrative" theories of social security: the "chain letter theory", the "lump of labor theory", the "monopoly capitalism theory", and the "Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory". The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.

Assessing the Political Viability of Labour Market Reform: The Case of Employment Protection

We analyze the political support for employment protection legislation. Unlike my previous work on the same topic, this paper pays a lot of attention to the role of obsolescence in the growth process. In voting in favour of employment protection, incumbent employees trade off lower living standards (because employment protection maintains workers in less productive activities) against longer job duration. The support for employment protection will then depend on the value of the latter relative to the cost of the former. We highlight two key deeterminants of this trade-off: first, the workers' bargaining power, second, the economy's growth rate-more precisely its rate of creative destruction.

How Doing Business Jeopardizes Institutional Reform

Simplifying business formalization and eliminating outdated formalities is often a good way of improving the institutional environment for firms. Unfortunately, the World Bank's Doing Business project is harming such policies by promoting a reform agenda that gives them priority even in countries lacking functional business registers, so that the reformed registers keep producing valueless information, but faster. Its methodology also promotes biased measurements that impede proper consideration of the essential tradeoffs in the design of formalization institutions. If Doing Business is to stop jeopardizing its true objectives and contribute positively to scientific progress, institutional reform and economic development, then its aims, governance and methodology need to change.

Principis ètics de l’assessorament a la instància judicial

Arran de les exposicions de la jornada de treball desenvolupada el passat 30 de novembre de 2007 es va veure que hi havia una preocupació comuna dels tècnics entorn dels dilemes ètics que es generen en el nostre entorn professional. De les dotze dimensions que es recollien en el qüestionari sobre com pensem que hauria de ser un bon professional, hi destacàvem: responsable, honest, coherent, competent, veraç i rigorós. D’altra banda, sobre com pensem que actuem els mateixos professionals, hi trobàvem prioritzats els valors: actitud crítica, veracitat, competència, comunicació i competències socials. El manual de bones pràctiques, que tot seguit us presentem, és el resultat de l’experiència de la pràctica professional i de l’anàlisi, discussió i revisió de documentació pel grup de tècnics que ha integrat aquest grup, com també, de totes les aportacions recollides abans i durant la jornada esmentada, esperant poder continuar-ne recollint dins el marc del Programa Compartim. Pretenem doncs, garantir-ne el seu compliment i supervisió, mitjançant el seguiment, amb els mecanismes i eines per a compartir inquietuds i objectius.

Judicial presence and rent extraction

We estimate the effect of state judiciary presence on rent extraction in Brazilian local governments.We measure rents as irregularities related to waste or corruption uncovered by auditors.Our unique dataset at the level of individual inspections allows us to separately examine extensiveand intensive margins of rent extraction. The identification strategy is based on an institutionalrule of state judiciary branches according to which prosecutors and judges tend to be assigned tothe most populous among contiguous counties forming a judiciary district. Our research designexploits this rule by comparing counties that are largest in their district to counties with identicalpopulation size from other districts in the same state, where they are not the most populous. IVestimates suggest that state judiciary presence reduces the share of inspections with irregularitiesrelated to waste or corruption by about 10 percent or 0.3 standard deviations. In contrast, we findno effect on the intensive margin of rent extraction. Finally, our estimates suggest that judicialpresence reduces rent extraction only for first-term mayors.

Evaluating Spanish pension expenditure under alternativa reform scenario

In this paper we evaluate the quantitative impact that a number ofalternative reform scenarios may have on the total expenditure for publicpensions in Spain. Our quantitative findings can be summarized in twosentences. For all the reforms considered, the financial impact of themechanical effect (change in benefits) is order of magnitudes larger thanthe behavioral impact or change in behavior. For the two Spanish reforms,we find once again that their effect on the outstanding liability of theSpanish Social Security System is essentially negligible: neither themechanical nor the behavioral effects amount to much for the 1997 reform,and amount to very little for the 2002 amendment.

Social security in theory and practice (II): Efficiency theories, narrative theories and implications for reform

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forcescreate and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore "political" theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the "efficiency theories", which view creation of the SS program as a full of partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the "SS as welfare for the elderly" the "retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities", "optimal retirement insurance", the "prodigal father problem", the "misguided Keynesian", the "optimal longevity insurance", the "governmenteconomizing transaction costs", and the "return on human capital investment". We also analyze four "narrative" theories of social security: the "chain letter theory", the "lump of labor theory", the "monopoly capitalism theory", and the "Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory".The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.

Assesing the political viability of labour market reform: The case of employment protection

We analyze the political support for employment protection legislation.Unlike my previous work on the same topic, this paper pays a lot ofattention to the role of obsolescence in the growth process.In voting in favour of employment protection, incumbent employeestrade off lower living standards (because employment protectionmaintains workers in less productive activities) against longer jobduration. The support for employment protection will then depend onthe value of the latter relative to the cost of the former. Wehighlight two key deeterminants of this trade-off: first, the workers'bargaining power, second, the economy's growth rate-more preciselyits rate of creative destruction.

Resistance to reform: Reconsidering the role of individual-specific uncertainty

Individual-specific uncertainty may increase the chances of reform beingenacted and sustained. Reform may be more likely to be enacted because amajority of agents might end up losing little from reform and a minoritygaining a lot. Under certainty, reform would therefore be rejected, butit may be enacted with uncertainty because those who end up losing believethat they might be among the winners. Reform may be more likely to besustained because, in a realistic setting, reform will increase theincentives of agents to move into those economic activities that benefit.Agents who respond to these incentives will vote to sustain reform infuture elections, even if they would have rejected reform under certainty.These points are made using the trade-model of Fernandez and Rodrik (AER,1991).

The impact of firing costs on turnover and unemployment: Evidence from the Colombian labour market reform

Reductions in firing costs are often advocated as a way of increasingthe dynamism of labour markets in both developed and less developed countries. Evidence from Europe and the U.S. on the impact of firing costs has, however, been mixed. Moreover, legislative changes both in Europe and the U.S. have been limited. This paper, instead, examines the impact of the Colombian Labour Market Reform of 1990, which substantially reduced dismissal costs. I estimate the incidence of a reduction in firing costs on worker turnover by exploiting the temporal change in the Colombian labour legislation as well as the variability in coverage between formal and informal sector workers. Using a grouping estimator to control for common aggregate shocks and selection, I find that the exit hazard rates into and out of unemployment increased after the reform by over 1% for formal workers (covered by the legislation) relative to informal workers (uncovered). The increase of the hazards implies a net decrease in unemployment of a third of a percentage point, which accounts for about one quarter of the fall in unemployment during the period of study.

How "Doing Business" jeopardizes institutional reform

Simplifying business formalization and eliminating outdated formalities is often a good way of improving the institutional environment for firms. Unfortunately, the World Bank s "Doing Business" project is harming such policies by promoting a reform agenda that gives them priority even in countries lacking functional business registers, so that the reformed registers keep producing valueless information, but faster. Its methodology also promotes biased measurements that impede proper consideration of the essential tradeoffs in the design of formalization institutions. If "Doing Business" is to stop jeopardizing its true objectives and contribute positively to scientific progress, institutional reform and economic development, then its aims, governance and methodology need to change.

Market institutions and judicial rulemaking

Assuming that the degree of discretion granted to judges was the main distinguishing feature between common and civil law until the 19th century, we argue that constraining judicial discretion was instrumental in protecting freedom of contract and developing the market order in civil law. We test this hypothesis by analyzing the history of Western law. In England, a unique institutional balance between the Crown and the Parliament guaranteed private property and prompted the gradual evolution towards a legal framework that facilitated market relationships, a process that was supported by the English judiciary. On the Continent, however, legal constraints on the market were suppressed in a top-down fashion by the founders of the liberal state, often against the will of the incumbent judiciary. Constraining judicial discretion there was essential for enforcing freedom of contract and establishing the legal order of the market economy. In line with this evidence, our selection hypothesis casts doubts on the normative interpretation of empirical results that proclaim the superiority of one legal system over another, disregarding the local conditions and institutional interdependencies on which each legal system was grounded.

The quasi-judicial role of large retailers: An efficiency hypothesis of their relation with suppliers

The paper explores an efficiency hypothesis regarding the contractual process between large retailers, such as Wal-Mart and Carrefour, and their suppliers. The empirical evidence presented supports the idea that large retailers play a quasi-judicial role, acting as "courts of first instance" in their relationships with suppliers. In this role, large retailers adjust the terms of trade to on-going changes and sanction performance failures, sometimes delaying payments. A potential abuse of their position is limited by the need for re-contracting and preserving their reputations. Suppliers renew their confidence in their retailers on a yearly basis, through writing new contracts. This renovation contradicts the alternative hypothesis that suppliers are expropriated by large retailers as a consequence of specific investments.

Consideracions a tenir en compte en les peticions d’accés a la documentació judicial per part de persones privades

El règim d’accés de persones privades a la documentació, informació o dades, generada pels poders públics, en general, i per l’Administració de justícia, en particular, està actualment dispers en principis i criteris legals continguts dins d’un ampli ventall normatiu, que s’ha d’interpretar i aplicar d’acord amb el principi d’unitat de l’ordenament jurídic. En aquest document s’elabora una aproximació al règim d’accés general a la documentació judicial per part de persones privades a partir d’una recopilació i organització de la normativa vigent i dels principis i criteris generals que conté i que configuren aquest règim d’accés, amb l’objectiu d’ajudar els responsables de la documentació i dels arxius judicials en la seva aplicació. A més, s’analitzen les característiques de la documentació judicial respecte als nivells de reserva i es proposen 15 consideracions que caldria formalitzar en el procés de canalització de les consultes, tot atenent les característiques de la documentació sol·licitada i la condició o interès acreditat per part de la persona sol·licitant. Aquestes 15 consideracions estan precedides d’unes consideracions prèvies en relació amb els principis o drets, reconeguts en el marc constitucional, que cal valorar en les sol·licituds d’accés a la documentació judicial per part de persones privades.

Actuación del servicio de inspección del Consejo General del Poder Judicial

En la actualidad existe una Comisión Delegada para el Servicio de Inspección, integrada por cuatro Vocales del Consejo General del Poder Judicial, y la Inspección está compuesta por una Jefatura del Servicio, con de un Jefe, un Adjunto y un Secretario, que configuran la Unidad Central y trece Unidades Inspectoras, formadas por dos, tres o cuatro Letrados, cada una de las cuales tiene asignados, o bien todos los órganos de un determinado orden jurisdiccional: penal, violencia sobre la mujer, menores, vigilancia penitenciaria, incapacidades, contencioso-administrativo, social y mercantil, o bien todos los órganos de 1ª Instancia, Instrucción y Mixtos de cada una de las Comunidades Autónomas, una de ellas se ocupa de todas las Audiencias Provinciales del territorio español y la Unidad Central tiene asignado el Tribunal Supremo, los Tribunales Superiores de Justicia, la Audiencia Nacional y los Tribunales y Juzgados Togados. Hay además un coordinador territorial por cada Comunidad Autónoma, que es quien coordina la información procedente de todos los órganos de su territorio, independientemente del Orden Jurisdiccional de que se trate, así como un coordinador por cada jurisdicción, trabajando todos en equipo. Forma también parte del Servicio, la Sección de Informes, que tramita, en coordinación con la Unidad de Atención Ciudadana, las quejas y denuncias presentadas por los ciudadanos, cuando éstas puedan dar lugar a responsabilidad disciplinaria de un Juez o Magistrado.