Evidence on the determinants of foreign direct investment: the case of three european regions

This study aims at analyzing the determinants of FDI (foreign direct investment) inflows for a group of European regions. The originality of this approach lies in the use of disaggregated regional data. First, we develop a qualitative description of our database and discuss the importance of the macroeconomic determinants in attracting FDI. Then, we provide an econometric exercise to identify the potential determinants of FDI. In spite of choosing regions presenting economic similarities, we show that regional FDI inflows rely on a combination of factors that differs from one region to another.

Personal redistribution and the regional allocation of public investment

How should an equity-motivated policy-marker allocate public capital (infrastructure) across regions. Should it aim at reducing interregional differences in per capita output, or at maximizing total output? Such a normative question is examined in a model where the policy-marker is exclusively concerned about personal inequality and has access to two policy instruments. (i) a personal tax-transfer system (taxation is distortionary), and (ii) the regional allocation of public investment. I show that the case for public investment as a significant instrument for interpersonal redistribution is rather weak. In the most favorable case, when the tax code is constrained to be uniform across regions, it is optimal to distort the allocation of public investment in favor of the poor regions, but only to a limited extent. The reason is that poor individuals are relatively more sensitive to public trans fers, which are maximized by allocating public investment efficiently. If! the tax code can vary across regions then the optimal policy may involve an allocation of public investment distorted in favor of the rich regions.

Consumption externalities, habit formation, and equilibrium efficiency

We analyze the welfare properties of the competitive equilibrium in a capital accumulation model where individual preferences are subjected to both habit formation and consumption spillovers. We also discuss how consumption externalities and habits interact to generate an inefficient dynamic equilibrium. Finally, we characterize optimal tax policies aimed to restore efficient decentralized paths.

A dual characterization of incentive efficiency

We show that incentive efficient allocations in economies with adverse selection and moral hazard can be determined as optimal solutions to a linear programming problem and we use duality theory to obtain a complete characterization of the optima. Our dual analysis identifies welfare effects associated with the incentives of the agents to truthfully reveal their private information. Because these welfare effects may generate non-convexities, incentive efficient allocations may involve randomization. Other properties of incentive efficient allocations are also derived.

Allocative and productive efficiency in REE with asymetric information

We characterize the divergence between informational and economic efficiency in a rational expectations competitive market with asymmetric information about the costs of production. We find that prices may contain too much or too little information with respect to incentive efficient allocations depending on whether the main role of the price is, respectively, the traditional as index of scarcity or informational. Only when REE degenerate to Cournot equilibria the market solution does not show llocative inefficiency. With multidimensional uncertainty we find that the REE price does not have in general the incentive efficient information mix: It pays to sacrifice allocative efficiency at the REE to improve productive efficiency.

Endogeneizing know-how flows through the nature of R&D investments

In this paper we carefully link knowledge flows to and from a firms innovation process with this firms investment decisions. Three types of investments are considered: investments in applied research, investments in basic research, and investments in intellectual property protection. Only when basic research is performed, can the firm effectively access incoming knowledge flows and these incoming spillovers serve to increase the efficiency of own applied research.. The firm can at the same time influence outgoing knowledge flows, improving appropriability of its innovations, by investing in protection. Our results indicate that firms with small budgets for innovation will not invest in basic research. This occurs in the short run, when the budget for know-how creation is restricted, or in the long-run, when market opportunities are low, when legal protection is not very important, or, when the pool of accessible and relevant external know-how is limited. The ratio! of basic to applied research is non-decreasing in the size of the pool of accessible external know-how, the size and opportunity of the market, and, the effectiveness of intellectual property rights protection. This indicates the existence of economies of scale in basic research due to external market related factors. Empirical evidence from a sample of innovative manufacturing firms in Belgium confirms the economies of scale in basic research as a consequence of the firms capacity to access external knowledge flows and to protect intellectual property, as well as the complementarity between legal and strategic investments.

Public enterprise reforms and efficiency in regulated environments: the case of the postal sector

Purpose - This paper focuses on analyzing the effect that public reforms have on the efficiency of state-owned enterprises in regulated environments. Design/methodology/approach - The research is focused in the postal sector where public and private companies must obey a legal framework related to provide a universal service. The analysis is carried out using a panel of 7 European postal operators for the period 1997-2003. The activity analyzed was the letter mail division; we take as key variable the unit cost of a letter and use a translog cost function where as independent variables we include traffic levels, labor cost per employee, quality and availability of the service as well as the type of ownership (public or private). Additionally, in a second stage the geographical differences among countries are considered. Findings - Results indicate that postal operators that experienced organizational changes without being privatized, such as the Spanish and Greek operators, do not have higher unit costs than privatized postal operators like the one of Germany and the Netherlands. Moreover, we find that in all cases the operator of Ireland appear to be the most efficient. In this case restructuring process has been carried out giving an important leadership role to workers. This suggests us that labor culture could be a key variable to study when analyzing reform processes in public enterprises. Originality/value - Our findings show that in a regulated environment like in the postal sector, public and private companies can obtain similar efficiency levels in term of unit costs.

Cooperative production and efficiency

We characterize the sharing rule for which a contribution mechanism achieves efficiency in a cooperative production setting when agents are heterogeneous. The sharing rule bears no resemblance to those considered by the previous literature. We also show for a large class of sharing rules that if Nash equilibrium yields efficient allocations, the production function displays constant returns to scale, a case in which cooperation in production is useless.

Inter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game

We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that our results contradict the independence of group-size prediction: conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are substantially above equilibrium. Towards the end of the experiment material losses in groups are 257% of the predicted level. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity in the investment behaviour of individual group members. Second, allowing group members to punish each other after individual contributions to the contest effort are revealed leads to even larger conflict expenditures. Now material losses are 869% of the equilibrium level and there is much less heterogeneity in individual group members' investments. These results contrast strongly with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency and leads to higher material payoffs.

Organisational status and efficiency: the case of the spanish SOE "Paradores"

The purpose of this paper is to provide new evidence on the issue of the effect on public enterprises economic performance of the introduction of some given changes in organisational status and management practices, while keeping the enterprises under public control. Our approach is case study type and relies on comparative efficiency literature. We identify relevant changes on the organisational status of a State owned large hotel group along a period of twenty years, next we measure its annual efficiency indicators, and then evaluate to which extent the observed changes in economic performance can be attributable to the corresponding management reforms carried out. As a result we find that the formally more relevant change in organisational status (the enterprise passing to be a Limited Company), which implied a substantial increase in the enterprise autonomy, did not produce a significant improvement in its economic performance; a finding contrary to what we expected according to agency theory. However, a second relevant organisational change –five years later- when both the principal (government) and the agent (firm’s CEO) changed is consistently related to a significant improvement in economic performance. As a research implication we abide for use more precise agency theory statements; and as a practical implication we argue here that potentialities of improvement brought about by a formal-legal change in the status of the enterprise may require also –in order to actually improve firm’s efficiency- some changes in the firm’s key personal positions: supervisor (principal) and CEO (agent), in the sense that a change to a greater-autonomy for the enterprise it seems should come together a parallel new ‘management culture’. Practical implications Management good practises to apply to other public enterprise’s restructuring in order to improve their efficiency. It’s the first study on organizational changes and efficiency for an important Spanish public enterprise.

Productive efficiency and regulatory reform: The case of vehicle inspection services

Measuring productive efficiency provides information on the likely effects of regulatory reform. We present a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) of a sample of 38 vehicle inspection units under a concession regime, between the years 2000 and 2004. The differences in efficiency scores show the potential technical efficiency benefit of introducing some form of incentive regulation or of progressing towards liberalization. We also compute scale efficiency scores, showing that only units in territories with very low population density operate at a sub-optimal scale. Among those that operate at an optimal scale, there are significant differences in size; the largest ones operate in territories with the highest population density. This suggests that the introduction of new units in the most densely populated territories (a likely effect of some form of liberalization) would not be detrimental in terms of scale efficiency. We also find that inspection units belonging to a large, diversified firm show higher technical efficiency, reflecting economies of scale or scope at the firm level. Finally, we show that between 2002 and 2004, a period of high regulatory uncertainty in the sample’s region, technical change was almost zero. Regulatory reform should take due account of scale and diversification effects, while at the same time avoiding regulatory uncertainty.

Bargaining one-dimensional policies and the efficiency of super majority rules

We consider negotiations selecting one-dimensional policies. Individuals have single-peaked preferences, and they are impatient. Decisions arise from a bargaining game with random proposers and (super) majority approval, ranging from the simple majority up to unanimity. The existence and uniqueness of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium is established, and its explicit characterization provided. We supply an explicit formula to determine the unique alternative that prevails, as impatience vanishes, for each majority. As an application, we examine the efficiency of majority rules. For symmetric distributions of peaks unanimity is the unanimously preferred majority rule. For asymmetric populations rules maximizing social surplus are characterized.

Inter-regional redistribution through infrastructure investment: tactical or programmatic?

In this paper we analyze the effects of both tactical and programmatic politics on the inter-regional allocation of infrastructure investment. We use a panel of data for the Spanish electoral districts during the period 1964-2004 to estimate an equation where investment depends both on economic and political variables. The results show that tactical politics do matter since, after controlling for economic traits, the districts with more ‘Political power’ still receive more investment. These districts are those where the incumbents’ Vote margin of victory/ defeat in the past election is low, where the Marginal seat price is low, where there is Partisan alignment between the executives at the central and regional layers of government, and where there are Pivotal regional parties which are influential in the formation of the central executive. However, the results also show that programmatic politics matter, since inter-regional redistribution (measured as the elasticity of investment to per capita income) is shown to increase with the arrival of the Democracy and EU Funds, with Left governments, and to decrease the higher is the correlation between a measure of ‘Political power’ and per capita income.

Assesing advertising efficiency: does the internet play a role?

This research focuses on a major concern for marketers addressing the claims of inefficiency of the spending on advertising. We examine whether the Internet can help increase overall advertising efficiency. Using a sample from the Spanish automobile industry, we combine a nonparametric method - Data Envelopment Analysis - with recent important insights from statistics and econometrics studies, and we find that online advertising improves the efficiency levels and this effect is more pronounced in the long-term temporal framework.

Assessing the quality of alternative energy sources: Energy Return On the Investment (EROI), the metabolic pattern of societies and energy statistics

This paper presents an initial challenge to tackle the every so "tricky" points encountered when dealing with energy accounting, and thereafter illustrates how such a system of accounting can be used when assessing for the metabolic changes in societies. The paper is divided in four main sections. The first three, present a general discussion on the main issues encountered when conducting energy analyses. The last section, subsequently, combines this heuristic approach to the actual formalization of it, in quantitative terms, for the analysis of possible energy scenarios. Section one covers the broader issue of how to account for the relevant categories used when accounting for Joules of energy; emphasizing on the clear distinction between Primary Energy Sources (PES) (which are the physical exploited entities that are used to derive useable energy forms (energy carriers)) and Energy Carriers (EC) (the actual useful energy that is transmitted for the appropriate end uses within a society). Section two sheds light on the concept of Energy Return on Investment (EROI). Here, it is emphasized that, there must already be a certain amount of energy carriers available to be able to extract/exploit Primary Energy Sources to thereafter generate a net supply of energy carriers. It is pointed out that this current trend of intense energy supply has only been possible to the great use and dependence on fossil energy. Section three follows up on the discussion of EROI, indicating that a single numeric indicator such as an output/input ratio is not sufficient in assessing for the performance of energetic systems. Rather an integrated approach that incorporates (i) how big the net supply of Joules of EC can be, given an amount of extracted PES (the external constraints); (ii) how much EC needs to be invested to extract an amount of PES; and (iii) the power level that it takes for both processes to succeed, is underlined. Section four, ultimately, puts the theoretical concepts at play, assessing for how the metabolic performances of societies can be accounted for within this analytical framework.