47 resultados para information criteria
Resumo:
This paper studies the impact of instrumental voting on information demand and mass media behaviour during electoral campaigns. If voters act instrumentally then information demand should increase with the closeness of an election. Mass media are modeled as profit-maximizing firms that take into account information demand, the value of customers to advertisers and the marginal cost of customers. Information supply should be larger in electoral constituencies where the contest is expected to be closer, there is a higher population density, and customers are on average more profitable for advertisers. The impact of electorate size is theoretically undetermined. These conclusions are then tested with comfortable results on data from the 1997 general election in Britain.
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This paper examines competition in a spatial model of two-candidate elections, where one candidate enjoys a quality advantage over the other candidate. The candidates care about winning and also have policy preferences. There is two-dimensional private information. Candidate ideal points as well as their tradeoffs between policy preferences and winning are private information. The distribution of this two-dimensional type is common knowledge. The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, with a distribution that is commonly known by both candidates. Pure strategy equilibria always exist in this model. We characterize the effects of increased uncertainty about the median voter, the effect of candidate policy preferences, and the effects of changes in the distribution of private information. We prove that the distribution of candidate policies approaches the mixed equilibrium of Aragones and Palfrey (2002a), when both candidates' weights on policy preferences go to zero.
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We analyze the effects of uncertainty and private information on horizontal mergers. Firms face uncertain demands or costs and receive private signals. They may decide to merge sharing their private information. If the uncertainty parameters are independent and the signals are perfect, uncertainty generates an informational advantage only to the merging firms, increasing merger incentives and decreasing free-riding effects. Thus, mergers become more profitable and stable. These results generalize to the case of correlated parameters if the correlation is not very severe, and for perfect correlation if the firms receive noisy signals. From the normative point of view, mergers are socially less harmful compared to deterministic markets and may even be welfare enhancing. If the signals are, instead, publicly observed, uncertainty does not necessarily give more incentives to merge, and mergers are not always less socially harmful.
Resumo:
We construct estimates of educational attainment for a sample of OECD countries using previously unexploited sources. We follow a heuristic approach to obtain plausible time profiles for attainment levels by removing sharp breaks in the data that seem to reflect changes in classification criteria. We then construct indicators of the information content of our series and a number of previously available data sets and examine their performance in several growth specifications. We find a clear positive correlation between data quality and the size and significance of human capital coefficients in growth regressions. Using an extension of the classical errors in variables model, we construct a set of meta-estimates of the coefficient of years of schooling in an aggregate Cobb-Douglas production function. Our results suggest that, after correcting for measurement error bias, the value of this parameter is well above 0.50.
Resumo:
We study the outcomes of experimental multi-unit uniform and discriminatory auctions with demand uncertainty. Our study is motivated by the ongoing debate about market design in the electricity industry. Our main aim is to compare the effect of asymmetric demand-information between sellers on the performance of the two auction institutions. In our baseline conditions all sellers have the same information, whereas in our treatment conditions some sellers have better information than others. In both information conditions we find that average transaction prices and price volatility are not significantly different under the two auction institutions. However, when there is asymmetric information among sellers the discriminatory auction is significantly less efficient. These results are not in line with the typical arguments made in favor of discriminatory pricing in electricity industries; namely, lower consumer prices and less price volatility. Moreover, our results provide some indication that discriminatory auctions reduce technical efficiency relative to uniform auctions.
Resumo:
We study markets where the characteristics or decisions of certain agents are relevant but not known to their trading partners. Assuming exclusive transactions, the environment is described as a continuum economy with indivisible commodities. We characterize incentive efficient allocations as solutions to linear programming problems and appeal to duality theory to demonstrate the generic existence of external effects in these markets. Because under certain conditions such effects may generate non-convexities, randomization emerges as a theoretic possibility. In characterizing market equilibria we show that, consistently with the personalized nature of transactions, prices are generally non-linear in the underlying consumption. On the other hand, external effects may have critical implications for market efficiency. With adverse selection, in fact, cross-subsidization across agents with different private information may be necessary for optimality, and so, the market need not even achieve an incentive efficient allocation. In contrast, for the case of a single commodity, we find that when informational asymmetries arise after the trading period (e.g. moral hazard; ex post hidden types) external effects are fully internalized at a market equilibrium.
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We analyze a continuous-time bilateral double auction in the presence of two-sided incomplete information and a smallest money unit. A distinguishing feature of our model is that intermediate concessions are not observable by the adversary: they are only communicated to a passive auctioneer. An alternative interpretation is that of mediated bargaining. We show that an equilibrium using only the extreme agreements always exists and display the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of (perfect Bayesian) equilibra which yield intermediate agreements. For the symmetric case with uniform type distribution we numerically calculate the equilibria. We find that the equilibrium which does not use compromise agreements is the least efficient, however, the rest of the equilibria yield the lower social welfare the higher number of compromise agreements are used.
Resumo:
We characterize the divergence between informational and economic efficiency in a rational expectations competitive market with asymmetric information about the costs of production. We find that prices may contain too much or too little information with respect to incentive efficient allocations depending on whether the main role of the price is, respectively, the traditional as index of scarcity or informational. Only when REE degenerate to Cournot equilibria the market solution does not show llocative inefficiency. With multidimensional uncertainty we find that the REE price does not have in general the incentive efficient information mix: It pays to sacrifice allocative efficiency at the REE to improve productive efficiency.
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This paper studies experimentally how the existence of social information networks affects the ways in which firms recruit new personnel. Through such networks firms learn about prospective employees' performance in previous jobs. Assuming individualistic preferences social networks are predicted not to affect overall labor market behavior, while with social preferences the prediction is that when bilaterally negotiated: (i) wages will be higher and (ii) that workers in jobs with incomplete contracts will respond with higher effort. Our experimental results are consistent with the social preferences view, both for the case of excess demand and excess supply of labor. In particular, the presence of information networks leads to more efficient allocations.
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Estudio elaborado a partir de una estancia en la Universitat Polictecnica de Cataluña entre marzo i junio del 2007.El proyecto tiene como objetivo general el perfeccionamiento de las metodologías docentes en la enseñanza de la construcción mixta en grado y postgrado en la Universidad Politécnica de Cataluña (UPC) y la Universidad de Camagüey (UC), en correspondencia con la situación actual y perspectiva de la normativa europea, española y cubana. En el trabajo se realiza una valoración sobre programas experimentales en estructuras mixtas y sus resultados, así como su interrelación con la modelación numérica. Se evalúa la correspondencia entre las normativas europeas, española y cubana y se definen los aspectos específicos que deben ser perfeccionados o complementados en la normatividad vigente en Cuba, así como la estrategia general para acometerlo. Para caracterizar la enseñanza de la construcción mixta en la UPC y la UC, se parte de la valoración de información sobre asignaturas similares en un grupo seleccionado de universidades y sobre el contexto que sirve de marco al perfeccionamiento. Se realiza el diagnostico del sistema de objetivos, conocimientos y organización metodológica en los programas de grado y postgrado y se ofrecen recomendaciones generales para el perfeccionamiento de la enseñanza de la construcción mixta en la UPC y la UC. Finalmente, se realizan propuestas detalladas para ambas instituciones, para el perfeccionamiento de las metodologías docentes, con enfoques generales similares, respetando los criterios específicos y formatos de cada entorno. Se concibe un sistema integrado de actividades para cada asignatura, lográndose que, a pesar de las particularidades de cada contexto, el enfoque de trabajo sea coincidente en gran medida, lo que favorece la continuidad en las relaciones de colaboración entre ambas instituciones.
Resumo:
This text corresponds to the contents of the seminar “Information Services at the Sport Institutions” held by the author as part of the programme of activities of the Invited Professor of Olympism of the International Chair in Olympism (IOC-UAB) in 2001. The seminar discusses the potential of technologies such as the Internet in sports documentation.
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Article describing the current situation of the Internet, the use of Internet by sport institutions, and the relationship between the Internet and the Olympic Games, and the Olympic Movement. This paper was presented at the International Symposium on Television in the Olympic Games held in Lausanne in October 1998.
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This paper provides evidence on the sources of co-movement in monthly US and UK stock price movements by investigating the role of macroeconomic and financial variables in a bivariate system with time-varying conditional correlations. Crosscountry communality in response is uncovered, with changes in the US Federal Funds rate, UK bond yields and oil prices having similar negative effects in both markets. Other variables also play a role, especially for the UK market. These effects do not, however, explain the marked increase in cross-market correlations observed from around 2000, which we attribute to time variation in the correlations of shocks to these markets. A regime-switching smooth transition model captures this time variation well and shows the correlations increase dramatically around 1999-2000. JEL classifications: C32, C51, G15 Keywords: international stock returns, DCC-GARCH model, smooth transition conditional correlation GARCH model, model evaluation.
Resumo:
Informe de investigación realizado a partir de una estancia en el Équipe de Recherche en Syntaxe et Sémantique de la Université de Toulouse-Le Mirail, Francia, entre julio y setiembre de 2006. En la actualidad existen diversos diccionarios de siglas en línea. Entre ellos sobresalen Acronym Finder, Abbreviations.com y Acronyma; todos ellos dedicados mayoritariamente a las siglas inglesas. Al igual que los diccionarios en papel, este tipo de diccionarios presenta problemas de desactualización por la gran cantidad de siglas que se crean a diario. Por ejemplo, en 2001, un estudio de Pustejovsky et al. mostraba que en los abstracts de Medline aparecían mensualmente cerca de 12.000 nuevas siglas. El mecanismo de actualización empleado por estos recursos es la remisión de nuevas siglas por parte de los usuarios. Sin embargo, esta técnica tiene la desventaja de que la edición de la información es muy lenta y costosa. Un ejemplo de ello es el caso de Abbreviations.com que en octubre de 2006 tenía alrededor de 100.000 siglas pendientes de edición e incorporación definitiva. Como solución a este tipo de problema, se plantea el diseño de sistemas de detección y extracción automática de siglas a partir de corpus. El proceso de detección comporta dos pasos; el primero, consiste en la identificación de las siglas dentro de un corpus y, el segundo, la desambiguación, es decir, la selección de la forma desarrollada apropiada de una sigla en un contexto dado. En la actualidad, los sistemas de detección de siglas emplean métodos basados en patrones, estadística, aprendizaje máquina, o combinaciones de ellos. En este estudio se analizan los principales sistemas de detección y desambiguación de siglas y los métodos que emplean. Cada uno se evalúa desde el punto de vista del rendimiento, medido en términos de precisión (porcentaje de siglas correctas con respecto al número total de siglas extraídas por el sistema) y exhaustividad (porcentaje de siglas correctas identificadas por el sistema con respecto al número total de siglas existente en el corpus). Como resultado, se presentan los criterios para el diseño de un futuro sistema de detección de siglas en español.