Information-sharing implications of horizontal mergers

We analyze the effects of uncertainty and private information on horizontal mergers. Firms face uncertain demands or costs and receive private signals. They may decide to merge sharing their private information. If the uncertainty parameters are independent and the signals are perfect, uncertainty generates an informational advantage only to the merging firms, increasing merger incentives and decreasing free-riding effects. Thus, mergers become more profitable and stable. These results generalize to the case of correlated parameters if the correlation is not very severe, and for perfect correlation if the firms receive noisy signals. From the normative point of view, mergers are socially less harmful compared to deterministic markets and may even be welfare enhancing. If the signals are, instead, publicly observed, uncertainty does not necessarily give more incentives to merge, and mergers are not always less socially harmful.

Asymmetric demand information in uniform and discriminatory call auctions: an experimental analysis motivated by electricity markets

We study the outcomes of experimental multi-unit uniform and discriminatory auctions with demand uncertainty. Our study is motivated by the ongoing debate about market design in the electricity industry. Our main aim is to compare the effect of asymmetric demand-information between sellers on the performance of the two auction institutions. In our baseline conditions all sellers have the same information, whereas in our treatment conditions some sellers have better information than others. In both information conditions we find that average transaction prices and price volatility are not significantly different under the two auction institutions. However, when there is asymmetric information among sellers the discriminatory auction is significantly less efficient. These results are not in line with the typical arguments made in favor of discriminatory pricing in electricity industries; namely, lower consumer prices and less price volatility. Moreover, our results provide some indication that discriminatory auctions reduce technical efficiency relative to uniform auctions.

General equilibrium with asymmetric information: a dual approach

We study markets where the characteristics or decisions of certain agents are relevant but not known to their trading partners. Assuming exclusive transactions, the environment is described as a continuum economy with indivisible commodities. We characterize incentive efficient allocations as solutions to linear programming problems and appeal to duality theory to demonstrate the generic existence of external effects in these markets. Because under certain conditions such effects may generate non-convexities, randomization emerges as a theoretic possibility. In characterizing market equilibria we show that, consistently with the personalized nature of transactions, prices are generally non-linear in the underlying consumption. On the other hand, external effects may have critical implications for market efficiency. With adverse selection, in fact, cross-subsidization across agents with different private information may be necessary for optimality, and so, the market need not even achieve an incentive efficient allocation. In contrast, for the case of a single commodity, we find that when informational asymmetries arise after the trading period (e.g. moral hazard; ex post hidden types) external effects are fully internalized at a market equilibrium.

Mediation incomplete information bargaining with filtered communication

We analyze a continuous-time bilateral double auction in the presence of two-sided incomplete information and a smallest money unit. A distinguishing feature of our model is that intermediate concessions are not observable by the adversary: they are only communicated to a passive auctioneer. An alternative interpretation is that of mediated bargaining. We show that an equilibrium using only the extreme agreements always exists and display the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of (perfect Bayesian) equilibra which yield intermediate agreements. For the symmetric case with uniform type distribution we numerically calculate the equilibria. We find that the equilibrium which does not use compromise agreements is the least efficient, however, the rest of the equilibria yield the lower social welfare the higher number of compromise agreements are used.

Allocative and productive efficiency in REE with asymetric information

We characterize the divergence between informational and economic efficiency in a rational expectations competitive market with asymmetric information about the costs of production. We find that prices may contain too much or too little information with respect to incentive efficient allocations depending on whether the main role of the price is, respectively, the traditional as index of scarcity or informational. Only when REE degenerate to Cournot equilibria the market solution does not show llocative inefficiency. With multidimensional uncertainty we find that the REE price does not have in general the incentive efficient information mix: It pays to sacrifice allocative efficiency at the REE to improve productive efficiency.

Information networks and worker recruitment

This paper studies experimentally how the existence of social information networks affects the ways in which firms recruit new personnel. Through such networks firms learn about prospective employees' performance in previous jobs. Assuming individualistic preferences social networks are predicted not to affect overall labor market behavior, while with social preferences the prediction is that when bilaterally negotiated: (i) wages will be higher and (ii) that workers in jobs with incomplete contracts will respond with higher effort. Our experimental results are consistent with the social preferences view, both for the case of excess demand and excess supply of labor. In particular, the presence of information networks leads to more efficient allocations.

Documentation and sport information: the challenges and opportunities brought by new technologies

This text corresponds to the contents of the seminar “Information Services at the Sport Institutions” held by the author as part of the programme of activities of the Invited Professor of Olympism of the International Chair in Olympism (IOC-UAB) in 2001. The seminar discusses the potential of technologies such as the Internet in sports documentation.

The Olympic Movement and Information Society: New Internet Challenges and Opportunities

Article describing the current situation of the Internet, the use of Internet by sport institutions, and the relationship between the Internet and the Olympic Games, and the Olympic Movement. This paper was presented at the International Symposium on Television in the Olympic Games held in Lausanne in October 1998.

Co-movements between US and UK stock prices: the roles of macroeconomic information and time-series varying conditional correlations

This paper provides evidence on the sources of co-movement in monthly US and UK stock price movements by investigating the role of macroeconomic and financial variables in a bivariate system with time-varying conditional correlations. Crosscountry communality in response is uncovered, with changes in the US Federal Funds rate, UK bond yields and oil prices having similar negative effects in both markets. Other variables also play a role, especially for the UK market. These effects do not, however, explain the marked increase in cross-market correlations observed from around 2000, which we attribute to time variation in the correlations of shocks to these markets. A regime-switching smooth transition model captures this time variation well and shows the correlations increase dramatically around 1999-2000. JEL classifications: C32, C51, G15 Keywords: international stock returns, DCC-GARCH model, smooth transition conditional correlation GARCH model, model evaluation.

The Complete Information First. Price Auction or the Importance of Being Indivisible

Abstract Despite the popularity of auction theoretical thinking, it appears that no one has presented an elementary equilibrium analysis of the first-price sealed-bid auction mechanism under complete information. This paper aims to remedy that omission. We show that the existence of pure strategy undominated Nash equilibria requires that the bidding space is not "too divisible" (that is, a continuum). In fact, when bids must form part of a finite grid there always exists a "high price equilibrium". However, there might also be "low price equilibria" and when the bidding space is very restrictive the revenue obtained in these "low price equilibria" might be very low. We discuss the properties of the equilibria and an application of auction theoretical thinking in which "low price equilibria" may be relevant. Keywords: First-price auctions, undominated Nash equilibria. JEL Classification Numbers: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D44 (Auctions).

Government information transparency

This paper studies a model of announcements by a privately informed government about the future state of the economic activity in an economy subject to recurrent shocks and with distortions due to income taxation. Although transparent communication would ex ante be desirable, we find that even a benevolent government may ex-post be non-informative, in an attempt to countervail the tax distortion with a "second best" compensating distortion in information. This result provides a rationale for independent national statistical offices, committed to truthful communication. We also find that whether inequality in income distribution favors or harms government transparency depends on labor supply elasticity.

Testing low-altitude infrared digital photography from a mini-UAV to retrieve information for biological conservation

Satellite remote sensing imagery is used for forestry, conservation and environmental applications, but insufficient spatial resolution, and, in particular, unavailability of images at the precise timing required for a given application, often prevent achieving a fully operational stage. Airborne remote sensing has the advantage of custom-tuned sensors, resolution and timing, but its price prevents using it as a routine technique for the mentioned fields. Some Unmanned Aerial Vehicles might provide a “third way” solution as low-cost techniques for acquiring remotely sensed information, under close control of the end-user, albeit at the expense of lower quality instrumentation and instability. This report evaluates a light remote sensing system based on a remotely-controlled mini-UAV (ATMOS-3) equipped with a color infra-red camera (VEGCAM-1) designed and operated by CATUAV. We conducted a testing mission over a Mediterranean landscape dominated by an evergreen woodland of Aleppo pine (Pinus halepensis) and (Holm) oak (Quercus ilex) in the Montseny National Park (Catalonia, NE Spain). We took advantage of state-of-the-art ortho-rectified digital aerial imagery (acquired by the Institut Cartogràfic de Catalunya over the area during the previous year) and used it as quality reference. In particular, we paid attention to: 1) Operationality of flight and image acquisition according to a previously defined plan; 2) Radiometric and geometric quality of the images; and 3) Operational use of the images in the context of applications. We conclude that the system has achieved an operational stage regarding flight activities, although with meteorological limits set by wind speed and turbulence. Appropriate landing areas can be sometimes limiting also, but the system is able to land on small and relatively rough terrains such as patches of grassland or short matorral, and we have operated the UAV as far as 7 km from the control unit. Radiometric quality is sufficient for interactive analysis, but probably insufficient for automated processing. A forthcoming camera is supposed to greatly improve radiometric quality and consistency. Conventional GPS positioning through time synchronization provides coarse orientation of the images, with no roll information.

Information Dispersion and Equilibrium Multiplicity

This paper studies the implications of correlation of private signals about the liquidation value of a risky asset in a variation of a standard noisy rational expectations model in which traders receive endowment shocks which are private information and have a common component. We …nd that a necessary condition to generate multiple linear partially revealing rational expectations equilibria is the existence of several sources of information dispersion. In this context equilibrium multiplicity tends to occur when information is more dispersed. A necessary condition to have strategic complementarity in information acquisition is to have mul- tiple equilibria. When the equilibrium is unique there is strategic substi- tutability in information acquisition, corroborating the result obtained in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). JEL Classi…cation: D82, D83, G14 Keywords: Multiplicity of equilibria, strategic complementarity, asym- metric information.

Dynamic stackelberg game with risk-averse players: optimal risk-sharing under asymmetric information

The objective of this paper is to clarify the interactive nature of the leader-follower relationship when both players are endogenously risk-averse. The analysis is placed in the context of a dynamic closed-loop Stackelberg game with private information. The case of a risk-neutral leader, very often discussed in the literature, is only a borderline possibility in the present study. Each player in the game is characterized by a risk-averse type which is unknown to his opponent. The goal of the leader is to implement an optimal incentive compatible risk-sharing contract. The proposed approach provides a qualitative analysis of adaptive risk behavior profiles for asymmetrically informed players in the context of dynamic strategic interactions modelled as incentive Stackelberg games.

Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information

We propose a definition of egalitarian equivalence that extends Pazner and Schmeidler's (1978) concept to environments with incomplete information. If every feasible allocation rule can be implemented by an incentive compatible mechanism (as, for instance, in the case of non-exclusive information), then interim egalitarian equivalence and interim incentive efficiency remain compatible, as they were under complete information. When incentive constraints are more restrictive, on the other hand, the two criteria may become incompatible.