Biased representation of homothetic preferences on homogeneous sets

In the homogeneous case of one-dimensional objects, we show that any preference relation that is positive and homothetic can be represented by a quantitative utility function and unique bias. This bias may favor or disfavor the preference for an object. In the first case, preferences are complete but not transitive and an object may be preferred even when its utility is lower. In the second case, preferences are asymmetric and transitive but not negatively transitive and it may not be sufficient for an object to have a greater utility for be preferred. In this manner, the bias reflects the extent to which preferences depart from the maximization of a utility function.

Do market conditions affect preferences? Evidence from experimental markets with excess supply and excess demand

We study whether people's preferences in an unbalanced market are affected by whether they are on the excess supply side or the excess demand side of the market. Our analysis is based on the comparison of behavior between two types of experimental gift exchange markets, which vary only with respect to whether first or second movers are on the long side of the market. The direction of market imbalance could influence subjects' motivation, as second movers, workers, might react differently to favorable actions by first movers, firms, in the two cases. Our data show strong deviations from the standard game-theoretic prediction. However, we only find secondary treatment effects. First movers are not more generous when they are in excess supply and second movers do not respond less favorably when they are in excess demand. Competition has only minor psychological effects in our data.

General preferences for consumption goods in the random matching model of commodity money

This paper generalizes the original random matching model of money byKiyotaki and Wright (1989) (KW) in two aspects: first, the economy ischaracterized by an arbitrary distribution of agents who specialize in producing aparticular consumption good; and second, these agents have preferences suchthat they want to consume any good with some probability. The resultsdepend crucially on the size of the fraction of producers of each goodand the probability with which different agents want to consume eachgood. KW and other related models are shown to be parameterizations ofthis more general one.

Are Americans' musical preferences more omnivores today?

Although we found a general trend favouring the omnivorousness thesis, as soon as we adjusted it to a set of structural factors and consumers tastes it was clear that this was caused by elitist inclusive omnivores who had increased the scope of their tastes. In general, younger cohorts were becoming less omnivorous, nevertheless, they were also becoming more educated and had greater to higher levels of inc ome, making the youth moreomnivorous. As expected, upscale consumers set limits on their popular taste: musicalgenres, whose audiences had educational levels below the mean profile were less preferredby upscale respondents. In spite of this, as time passed, some popular brows gained socialstatus.

Voting with preferences over margins of victory

This paper analyzes a two-alternative voting model with the distinctive feature that voters have preferences over margins of victory. We study voting contests with a finite as well as an infinite number of voters, and with and without mandatory voting. The main result of the paper is the existence and characterization of a unique equilibrium outcome in all those situations. At equilibrium, voters who prefer a larger support for one of the alternatives vote for such alternative.The model also provides a formal argument for the conditional sincerity voting condition in Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) and the benefit of voting function in Llavador (2006). Finally, we offer new insights on explaining why some citizens may vote strategically for an alternative different from the one declared as the most preferred.

Social preferences and skill segregation

This paper shows that models where preferences of individuals dependnot only on their allocations, but also on the well-being of otherpersons, can produce both large and testable effects. We study theallocation of workers with heterogeneous productivities to firms. Weshow that even small deviations from purely selfish preferences leadsto widespread workplace skill segregation. That is, workers ofdifferent abilities tend to work in di¤erent firms, as long as theycare somewhat more about the utilities of workers who are close .

Social preferences: Some simple tests and a new model

Departures from pure self interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of "social preferences". We conduct experiments on simple two-person and three-person games with binary choices that test these theories more directly than the array of games conventionally considered. Our experiments show strong support for the prevalence of "quasi-maximin" preferences: People sacrifice to increase the payoffs for all recipients, but especially for the lowest-payoff recipients. People are also motivated by reciprocity: While people are reluctant to sacrifice to reciprocate good or bad behavior beyond what they would sacrifice for neutral parties, they withdraw willingness to sacrifice to achieve a fair outcome when others are themselves unwilling to sacrifice. Some participants are averse to getting different payoffs than others, but based on our experiments and reinterpretation of previous experiments we argue that behavior that has been presented as "difference aversion" in recent papers is actually a combination of reciprocal and quasi-maximin motivations. We formulate a model in which each player is willing to sacrifice to allocate the quasi-maximin allocation only to those players also believed to be pursuing the quasi-maximin allocation, and may sacrifice to punish unfair players.

The gain-loss asymmetry and single-self preferences

Kahneman and Tversky asserted a fundamental asymmetry between gains and losses, namely a reflection effect which occurs when an individual prefers a sure gain of $ pz to anuncertain gain of $ z with probability p, while preferring an uncertain loss of $z with probability p to a certain loss of $ pz.We focus on this class of choices (actuarially fair), and explore the extent to which thereflection effect, understood as occurring at a range of wealth levels, is compatible with single-self preferences.We decompose the reflection effect into two components, a probability switch effect,which is compatible with single-self preferences, and a translation effect, which is not. To argue the first point, we analyze two classes of single-self, nonexpected utility preferences, which we label homothetic and weakly homothetic. In both cases, we characterize the switch effect as well as the dependence of risk attitudes on wealth.We also discuss two types of utility functions of a form reminiscent of expected utility but with distorted probabilities. Type I always distorts the probability of the worst outcome downwards, yielding attraction to small risks for all probabilities. Type II distorts low probabilities upwards, and high probabilities downwards, implying risk aversion when the probability of the worst outcome is low. By combining homothetic or weak homothetic preferences with Type I or Type II distortion functions, we present four explicit examples: All four display a switch effect and, hence, a form of reflection effect consistent a single self preferences.

Optimal contracts, adverse selection and social preferences: An experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

Biased quantitative measurement of interval ordered homothetic preferences

We represent interval ordered homothetic preferences with a quantitative homothetic utility function and a multiplicative bias. When preferences are weakly ordered (i.e. when indifference is transitive), such a bias equals 1. When indifference is intransitive, the biasing factor is a positive function smaller than 1 and measures a threshold of indifference. We show that the bias is constant if and only if preferences are semiordered, and we identify conditions ensuring a linear utility function. We illustrate our approach with indifference sets on a two dimensional commodity space.

Eliciting consumers preferences using stated preference discrete choice models: Contingent ranking versus choice experiment

The aim of this paper is twofold: firstly, to carry out a theoreticalreview of the most recent stated preference techniques used foreliciting consumers preferences and, secondly, to compare the empiricalresults of two dierent stated preference discrete choice approaches.They dier in the measurement scale for the dependent variable and,therefore, in the estimation method, despite both using a multinomiallogit. One of the approaches uses a complete ranking of full-profiles(contingent ranking), that is, individuals must rank a set ofalternatives from the most to the least preferred, and the other usesa first-choice rule in which individuals must select the most preferredoption from a choice set (choice experiment). From the results werealize how important the measurement scale for the dependent variablebecomes and, to what extent, procedure invariance is satisfied.

The extraordinarily bright optical afterglow of GRB 991208 and its host galaxy

Observations of the extraordinarily bright optical afterglow (OA) of GRB 991208 started 2.1 d after the event. The flux decay constant of the OA in the R-band is -2.30 +/- 0.07 up to 5 d, which is very likely due to the jet effect, and after that it is followed by a much steeper decay with constant -3.2 +/- 0.2, the fastest one ever seen in a GRB OA. A negative detection in several all-sky films taken simultaneously to the event implies either a previous additional break prior to 2 d after the occurrence of the GRB (as expected from the jet effect). The existence of a second break might indicate a steepening in the electron spectrum or the superposition of two events. Once the afterglow emission vanished, contribution of a bright underlying SN is found, but the light curve is not sufficiently well sampled to rule out a dust echo explanation. Our determination of z = 0.706 indicates that GRB 991208 is at 3.7 Gpc, implying an isotropic energy release of 1.15 x 10E53 erg which may be relaxed by beaming by a factor > 100. Precise astrometry indicates that the GRB coincides within 0.2' with the host galaxy, thus given support to a massive star origin. The absolute magnitude is M_B = -18.2, well below the knee of the galaxy luminosity function and we derive a star-forming rate of 11.5 +/- 7.1 Mo/yr. The quasi-simultaneous broad-band photometric spectral energy distribution of the afterglow is determined 3.5 day after the burst (Dec 12.0) implying a cooling frequency below the optical band, i.e. supporting a jet model with p = -2.30 as the index of the power-law electron distribution.

Eliciting preferences for collectively financed health programmes : the "willingness to assign" approach

Improving public involvement in health system decision making stands as a primary goal in health systems reform. However, still limited evidence is found on how best to elicit preferences for health care programs. This paper examines a contingent choice technique to elicit preferences among health programs so called, willingness to assign (WTAS): Moreover, we elicited contingents rankings as well as the willingness to pay extra taxes for comparative purposes. We argue that WTAS reveals relative ( monetary-based) values of a set of competing public programmes under a hypothetical healthcare budget assessment. Experimental evidence is reported from a delibertive empirical study valuing ten health programmes in the context of the Catalan Health Services. Evidence from a our experimental study reveals that perferences are internally more consistent and slightly less affected by "preference reversals" as compared to values revealed from the willingness to pay (WTP) extra taxes approach. Consistent with prior studies, we find that the deliberative approach helped to avoid possible misunderstandings. Interestingly, although programmes promoting health received the higher relative valuation, those promoting other health benefits also ranked highly

In vitro susceptibility to pentavalent antimony in Leishmania infantum strains is not modified during in vitro or in vivo passages but is modified after host treatment with meglumine antimoniate

Background: Leishmaniasis is a common parasitic disease in Southern Europe, caused by Leishmania infantum. The failures of current treatment with pentavalent antimonials are partially attributable to the emergence of antimony-resistant Leishmania strains. This study analyses the in vitro susceptibility to pentavalent antimony of intracellular amastigotes from a range of L. infantum strains, derived from the same infected animal, during in vitro and in vivo passages and after host treatment with meglumine antimoniate. Results: SbV-IC50 values for strains from two distinct isolates from the same host and one stock after two years of culture in NNN medium and posterior passage to hamster were similar (5.0 ± 0.2; 4.9 ± 0.2 and 4.4 ± 0.1 mgSbV/L, respectively). In contrast, a significant difference (P < 0.01, t test) was observed between the mean SbV-IC50 values in the stocks obtained before and after treatment of hosts with meglumine antimoniate (4.7 ± 0.4 mgSbV/L vs. 7.7 ± 1.5 mgSbV/L). Drug-resistance after drug pressure in experimentally infected dogs increased over repeated drug administration (6.4 ± 0.5 mgSbV/L after first treatment vs. 8.6 ± 1.4 mgSbV/L after the second) (P < 0.01, t test). Conclusions: These results confirm previous observations on strains from Leishmania/HIV co-infected patients and indicate the effect of the increasing use of antimony derivatives for treatment of canine leishmaniasis in endemic areas on the emergence of Leishmania antimony-resistant strains.

Eliciting preferences for collectively financed health programmes : the "willingness to assign" approach

Improving public involvement in health system decision making stands as a primary goal in health systems reform. However, still limited evidence is found on how best to elicit preferences for health care programs. This paper examines a contingent choice technique to elicit preferences among health programs so called, willingness to assign (WTAS): Moreover, we elicited contingents rankings as well as the willingness to pay extra taxes for comparative purposes. We argue that WTAS reveals relative ( monetary-based) values of a set of competing public programmes under a hypothetical healthcare budget assessment. Experimental evidence is reported from a delibertive empirical study valuing ten health programmes in the context of the Catalan Health Services. Evidence from a our experimental study reveals that perferences are internally more consistent and slightly less affected by "preference reversals" as compared to values revealed from the willingness to pay (WTP) extra taxes approach. Consistent with prior studies, we find that the deliberative approach helped to avoid possible misunderstandings. Interestingly, although programmes promoting health received the higher relative valuation, those promoting other health benefits also ranked highly