Optimal contracts, adverse selection and social preferences: An experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

Wild bids. Gambling for resurrection in procurement contracts

This paper analyzes the problem of abnormally low tenders in theprocurement process. Limited liability causes firms in a bad financialsituation to bid more aggressively than good firms in the procurementauction. Therefore, it is more likely that the winning firm is a firm infinancial difficulties with a high risk of bankruptcy. The paper analyzesthe different regulatory practices to face this problem with a specialemphasis on surety bonds used e.g. in the US. We characterize the optimalsurety bond and show that it does not coincide with the current USregulation. In particular we show that under a natural assumption the USregulation is too expensive and provides overinsurance to the problem ofabnormally low tenders.

Moral hazard and non-exclusive contracts

This paper studies equilibria for economies characterized by moral hazard(hidden action), in which the set of contracts marketed in equilibrium isdetermined by the interaction of financial intermediaries.The crucial aspect of the environment that we study is thatintermediaries are restricted to trade non-exclusive contracts: theagents' contractual relationships with competing intermediaries cannot bemonitored (or are not contractible upon). We fully characterize equilibrium allocations and contracts. In thisset-up equilibrium allocations are clearly incentive constrainedinefficient. A robust property of equilibria with non-exclusivity isthat the contracts issued in equilibrium do not implement the optimalaction. Moreover we prove that, whenever equilibrium contracts doimplement the optimal action, intermediaries make positive profits andequilibrium allocations are third best inefficient (where the definitionof third best efficiency accounts for constraints which capture thenon-exclusivity of contracts).

Financing constraints and fixed-term employment contracts

This paper studies the interactions between financing constraints and theemployment decisions of firms when both fixed-term and permanent employmentcontracts are available. We first develop a dynamic model that shows theeffects of financing constraints and firing costs on employment decisions. Oncecalibrated, the model shows that financially constrained firms tend to use moreintensely fixed term workers, and to make them absorb a larger fraction of thetotal employment volatility than financially unconstrained firms do. We testand confirm the predictions of the model on a unique panel data of Italian manufacturingfirms with detailed information about the type of workers employedby the firms and about firm financing constraints.

A virtual exhibition of open source software for libraries

Frequently the choice of a library management program is conditioned by social, economic and/or political factors that result in the selection of a system that is not altogether suitable for the library’s needs, characteristics and functions. Open source software is quickly becoming a preferred solution, owing to the freedom to copy, modify and distribute it and the freedom from contracts, as well as for greater opportunities for interoperability with other applications. These new trends regarding open source software in libraries are also reflected in LIS studies, as evidenced by the different courses addressing automated programs, repositorymanagement, including the Linux/GNU operating system, among others. The combination of the needs of the centres and the new trends for open source software is the focus of a virtual laboratory for the use of open source software for library applications. It was the result of a project, whose aim was to make a useful contribution to the library community, that was carried out by a group of professors of the School of Library and Information Science of the University of Barcelona, together with a group of students, members of a Working Group on Open Source Software for Information Professionals, of the Professional Library Association of Catalonia.

Growth, selection and appropriate contracts

We study a dynamic model where growth requires both long-term investmentand the selection of talented managers. When ability is not ex-ante observable and contracts are incomplete, managerial selection imposes a cost, as managers facing the risk ofbeing replaced choose a sub-optimally low level of long-term investment. This generates atrade-off between selection and investment that has implications for the choice of contractualrelationships and institutions. Our analysis shows that rigid long-term contracts sacrificingmanagerial selection may prevail at early stages of economic development and when heterogeneity in ability is low. As the economy grows, however, knowledge accumulation increasesthe return to talent and makes it optimal to adopt flexible contractual relationships, wheremanagerial selection is implemented even at the cost of lower investment. Measures of investor protection aimed at limiting the bargaining power of managers improve selection undershort-term contract. Given that knowledge accumulation raises the value of selection, theoptimal level of investor protection increases with development.

Regulating Concessions of Toll Motorways, An Empirical Study on Fixed vs. Variable Term Contracts

Recent theoretical developments on concession contracts for long term infrastructure projects under uncertain demand show the benefits of allowing for flexible term contracts rather than fixing a rigid term. This study presents a simulation to compare both alternatives by using real data from the oldest Spanish toll motorway. For this purpose, we analyze how well the flexible term would have performed instead of the fixed length actually established. Our results show a huge reduction of the term of concession that would have dramatically decreased the firm’s benefits and the user’s overpayment due to the internalization of an unexpected traffic increase.