69 resultados para fiscal autonomy
Resumo:
En el presente trabajo se lleva a cabo una descripción general del régimen de responsabilidad de los administradores societarios en el Derecho tributario español. Desde la delimitación del concepto general de responsabilidad tributaria y de las posiciones jurídicas subjetivas de responsabilidad -solidaria y subsidiaria- contempladas en la Ley General Tributaria se abordan los supuestos específicamente referidos a los administradores para terminar con una exposición de tres procedimientos de derivación de responsabilidad que pueden, también, terminar afectando a quienes participan del gobierno de entidades societarias.
Resumo:
El Dret Financer-Tributari d’un estat membre es doblega a les directrius i als objectius d’harmonització contemplats al bloc normatiu comunitari de la Unió Europea. La incidència i l’impacte del Dret Comunitari sobre la sobirania fiscal dels seus integrants és evident, sotmetent i delimitant determinantment les mesures fiscals a finalitats extrafiscals. Un clar exemple d’aquest fenomen el constitueix la qualificació del règim espanyol d’amortització fiscal del Fons de Comerç Financer Internacional (previst a l’article 12.5 del TRLIS) com ajut d’Estat per part de la Comissió Europea. L’anàlisi jurídic que aborda aquest treball sobre l’evolució i Decisió final d’aquest expedient d’ajut d’Estat en particular, permet concloure que, l’existència, d’una banda, d’una concepció genèrica i indeterminada de la institució d’ ajut d’Estat i, de l’altre, d’un soft law comunitari que dóna contingut a l’esmentada institució i que ha estat evacuat per el propi organisme encarregat de decidir sobre aquests expedients (la Comissió Europea), esbossen un instrument discrecional d’harmonització fiscal negativa en seu de la imposició directa al marc de la Unió Europea. En efecte, la presència de la regla d’unanimitat en la presa de decisions en matèria tributaria des de els organismes comunitaris i l’absència d’una norma d’harmonització comunitària en seu d’imposició directa, propicien una notable inseguretat jurídica a l’hora de dissenyar beneficis fiscals per part dels legisladors d’un Estat. Mesures fiscals, que en cas de ser qualificades contràries a l’ordenament comunitari per part de la Comissió Europea, com al cas que ens ocuparà aquí, despleguen conseqüències especialment greus per als operadors econòmics que s’han beneficiat d’aquesta i que distorsionen la seva voluntat a la presa de decisions a posteriori i amb efectes retroactius. És necessari als efectes de dotar una major seguretat jurídica al sistema comunitari d’imposició directa, la substitució de la regla d’unanimitat per la de majories simples o qualificades, la voluntat de cedir parcel•les de sobirania fiscal per part dels Estats membre i Reglaments, per tal d’evitar d’arrel el fenomen de la desharmonització en aquest àmbit, així com l’ús abusiu d’instruments arbitraris d’harmonització fiscal negativa.
Resumo:
The paradox of autonomy is about whether self-rule accommodates or exacerbates armed conflict. This study attempts to unpack the puzzle examining the effectiveness of territorial autonomy as a state response to self-determination conflicts throughout the world. It challenges the conflict-inducing features of autonomy arguing that territorial autonomy can mitigate armed conflict by channeling group grievances into peaceful forms of protest. Thus, this study aims at arriving at a comprehensive theory that identifies which factors are responsible for violent escalation of conflicts grounded in self-determination demands. By using the concepts of opportunity structures and willingness dimension, this study shows that conflict escalation only takes place when minorities with greater bargaining power vis-à-vis the center, in contexts of high levels of economic inequality within dyad, are mobilized around autonomy and separatist demands.
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This paper analyses the impact of different instruments of fiscal policy on economic growth as well as on income inequality, using an unbalanced panel of 43 upper-middle and high income countries for the period 1972-2006. We consider and estimate two individual equations explaining growth and inequality in order to assess the incidence of different fiscal policies. Firstly, our approach considers imposing orthogonal assumptions between growth and inequality in both equations, and secondly, it allows growth to be included in the inequality equation, and inequality to be included in the growth equation. The empirical results suggest that an increase in the size of government measured through current expenditures and direct taxes diminishes economic growth while reducing inequality, being public investment the only fiscal policy that may break this trade-off between efficiency and equity, since increases in this item reduces inequality without harming output. Therefore, the results reflect that the trade-off between efficiency and equity that governments often confront when designing their fiscal policies may be avoided.
Resumo:
We study the effects of government spending by using a structural, large dimensional, dynamic factor model. We find that the government spending shock is non-fundamental for the variables commonly used in the structural VAR literature, so that its impulse response functions cannot be consistently estimated by means of a VAR. Government spending raises both consumption and investment, with no evidence of crowding out. The impact multiplier is 1.7 and the long run multiplier is 0.6.
Resumo:
This paper investigates the effects of fiscal policy on the trade balance using a structural factor model. A fiscal policy shock worsens the trade balance and produces an appreciation of the domestic currency but the effects are quantitatively small. The findings match the theoretical predictions of the standard Mundell-Fleming model, although fiscal policy should not be considered one of the main causes of the large US external deficit. My conclusions differ from those reached using VAR models since the fiscal shock, possibly due to fiscal foresight, is nonfundamental for the variables typically used in open economy VARs.
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Análisis del origen, evolución y perspectivas del modelo de financiación autonómica español, de corte federal, en el marco de la crisis del Estado
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A l’article es pretén traçar una primera cronologia de l’evolució de les competències fiscals del municipi barceloní fins a la consolidació d’un veritable sistema fiscal. Més que conclusions definitives, el treball vol establir unes primeres hipòtesis dins d’una investigació pròpia en curs sobre la fiscalitat reial a la ciutat de Barcelona que, fins al moment, s’havia centrat sobretot en l’anàlisi del patrimoni reial
Resumo:
This paper proposes to promote autonomy in digital ecosystems so that it provides agents with information to improve the behavior of the digital ecosystem in terms of stability. This work proposes that, in digital ecosystems, autonomous agents can provide fundamental services and information. The final goal is to run the ecosystem, generate novel conditions and let agents exploit them. A set of evaluation measures must be defined as well. We want to provide an outline of some global indicators, such as heterogeneity and diversity, and establish relationships between agent behavior and these global indicators to fully understand interactions between agents, and to understand the dependence and autonomy relations that emerge between the interacting agents. Individual variations, interaction dependencies, and environmental factors are determinants of autonomy that would be considered. The paper concludes with a discussion of situations when autonomy is a milestone
Resumo:
The low quality of education is a persistent problem in many developed countries. Parallel to in the last decades exists a tendency towards decentralization in many developed and developing countries. Using micro data from the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) referred to 22 countries, we test whether there exists an impact of fiscal and political decentralization on student performance in the areas of mathematics, reading skills and science. We observe that fiscal decentralization exerts an unequivocal positive effect on students’ outcomes in all areas, while the effect of political decentralization is more ambiguous. On the one hand, the capacity of the subnational governments to rule on its region has a positive effect on students’ performance in mathematics. On the other hand, the capacity to influence the country as a whole has a negative impact on mathematics achievement. As a general result, we observe that students’ performance in Mathematics is more sensible to these exogenous variations than in Sciences and reading skills. Keywords: School outcomes, PISA, fiscal decentralization, political decentralization JEL codes: H11, H77, I21
Resumo:
This paper argues that the current Spanish system of regional financing does not adequately respect the principles of equality, autonomy, responsibility and transparency that should guide its design. It also advances a series of recommendations for the reform of the system that can be classified into two broad headings: guaranteeing the effective application of the constitucional principle of equality and reinforcing the fiscal responsibility and the accountability of regional governments.
Resumo:
En este trabajo se argumenta que la propuesta de Pacto Fiscal defendida por el actual Gobierno catalán es inviable constitucional y políticamente y desaconsejable en términos de racionalidad económica y administrativa. Esta reivindicación sólo servirá para excitar sentimientos de agravio dentro de Cataluña y de rechazo fuera de ella, alimentando así un sentimiento de confrontación que, aunque podría ser beneficioso electoralmente para algunos partidos nacionalistas catalanes, no serviría a los intereses de ninguna de las partes.
Resumo:
This paper investigates the effects of government spending on the real exchange rate and the trade balance in the US using a new VAR identification procedure based on spending forecast revisions. I find that the real exchange rate appreciates and the trade balance deteriorates after a government spending shock, although the effects are quantitatively small. The findings broadly match the theoretical predictions of the standard Mundell-Fleming model and differ substantially from those existing in literature. Differences are attributable to the fact that, because of fiscal foresight, the government spending is non-fundamental for the variables typically used in open economy VARs. Here, on the contrary, the estimated shock is fundamental.
Resumo:
En esta nota se cuestiona la tesis de que el déficit fiscal de Catalunya es mucho mayor que el que registran otras regiones con niveles similares de renta relativa en los países de nuestro entorno. Cataluña encaja perfectamente en el patrón de redistribución territorial que se observa en Estados Unidos cuando abstraemos del tamaño de la Administración Central y trabajamos con el gasto que ''vuelve'' a cada territorio por euro o dolar de impuestos soportados. Esto hace muy difícil pensar que el saldo fiscal catalán pueda ser muy inferior al que presentan las regiones ricas de los países de Europa continental, que generalmente cuentan con sectores públicos mayores y mucho más redistributivos que el norteamericano.
Resumo:
The empirical evidence testing the validity of the rational partisan theory (RPT) has been mixed. In this article, we argue that the inclusion of other macroeconomic policies and the presence of an independent central bank can partly contribute to explain this inconclusiveness. This article expands Alesina s (1987) RPT model to include an extra policy and an independent central bank. With these extensions, the implications of RPT are altered signi ficantly. In particular, when the central bank is more concerned about output than public spending (an assumption made by many papers in this literature), then the direct relationship between in flation and output derived in Alesina (1987) never holds. Keywords: central bank, conservativeness, political uncertainty. JEL Classi fication: E58, E63.