La correspondencia entre Robert Moray y Christiaan Huygens (1661-1669): encuentros y desencuentros en la promoción del conocimiento

Sir Robert Moray (1608/9-1673) fue un soldado, cortesano y "hombre de ciencia" escocés, que estuvo en el exilio durante el período de Oliver Cromwell. Poco después de su regreso a Inglaterra en 1660 y gracias en gran medida a su amistad con Carlos II, aparece vinculado al grupo que formará la Royal Society de Londres y será nombrado el primer presidente de la institución durante los primeros meses. Moray ha sido reconocido como una figura imprescindible para entender la consolidación de la Royal Society. Establece, además, una correspondencia muy importante con Christiaan Huygens, en donde aparecen tratados temas de gran relevancia en la década de 1660, tales como la determinación de la longitud en el mar mediante el uso del reloj de péndulo y la construcción y experimentación con la máquina neumática (emblema del proyecto experimental de Robert Boyle). En esta correspondencia aparecen reflejadas, así mismo, las tensiones sobre los problemas de prioridad en diferentes áreas de conocimiento. Una de estas agrias polémicas es la que enfrenta a James Gregory y a Huygens, que acabará con la relación epistolar entre Moray y el sabio holandés.

Indirect likelihood inference

Given a sample from a fully specified parametric model, let Zn be a given finite-dimensional statistic - for example, an initial estimator or a set of sample moments. We propose to (re-)estimate the parameters of the model by maximizing the likelihood of Zn. We call this the maximum indirect likelihood (MIL) estimator. We also propose a computationally tractable Bayesian version of the estimator which we refer to as a Bayesian Indirect Likelihood (BIL) estimator. In most cases, the density of the statistic will be of unknown form, and we develop simulated versions of the MIL and BIL estimators. We show that the indirect likelihood estimators are consistent and asymptotically normally distributed, with the same asymptotic variance as that of the corresponding efficient two-step GMM estimator based on the same statistic. However, our likelihood-based estimators, by taking into account the full finite-sample distribution of the statistic, are higher order efficient relative to GMM-type estimators. Furthermore, in many cases they enjoy a bias reduction property similar to that of the indirect inference estimator. Monte Carlo results for a number of applications including dynamic and nonlinear panel data models, a structural auction model and two DSGE models show that the proposed estimators indeed have attractive finite sample properties.

Competition for Procurement Shares

We propose a new procurement procedure which allocates shares of the total amount to be procured depending on the bids of suppliers. Among the properties of the mechanism are: (i) Bidders have an incentive to par- ticipate in the procurement procedure, as equilibrium payoffs are strictly positive. (ii) The mechanism allows to vary the extent to which affirma- tive action objectives, like promoting local industries, are pursued. (iii) Surprisingly, even accomplishing affirmative action goals, procurement ex- penditures might be lower than under a classical auction format. Keywords: Procurement Auction, Affirmative Action. JEL: C72, D44, H57

Sistema de gestió de subhastes per a un portal Immobiliari

Desenvolupament de un sistema de gestió de subhastes per aun portal immobiliari i s¿engloba dintre de l¿àrea de Java Enterprise Edition.

Art contemporani xinès en el segle XXI : introducció a la pugna entre la creació i el mercat a través de cinc artistes destacats i les seves cotitzacions en les subhastes

En el relativament breu lapse de temps que suposen les tres darreres dècades, l'art contemporani xinès ha passat de ser pràcticament invisible i desconegut per al públic general, a ser present en un gran nombre d'escenaris a nivell internacional relacionats amb el món de l'art, sobre tot des de finals de la dècada dels noranta. El present TdR ha intentat apropar-se a qüestions com la imatge i les idees que sobre la RP Xina s'han transmès en l'última dècada a través de les obres o de les accions dels artistes xinesos contemporanis més exposats o cotitzats internacionalment i que viuen a la Xina, i a com s'ha arribat a inserir la producció artística d'aquests autors en el procés de globalització i hibridació de la cultura que estem vivint. Hem delimitat el camp de recerca, bàsicament a l'estudi de l'obra de cinc autors (Song Dong, Ai Weiwei, Zeng Fanzhi, Yue Minjun i Wang Qingsong) i a la seva presència en l'escena internacional de l'art contemporani a través de les subhastes de les dues cases més importants del món, Christie's i Sotheby's.

Comparison of Work Scheduling Using Constraint Programming or Auctions

Business processes designers take into account the resources that the processes would need, but, due to the variable cost of certain parameters (like energy) or other circumstances, this scheduling must be done when business process enactment. In this report we formalize the energy aware resource cost, including time and usage dependent rates. We also present a constraint programming approach and an auction-based approach to solve the mentioned problem including a comparison of them and a comparison of the proposed algorithms for solving them

Implementación de un SMA de negociación basado en subastas electrónicas

El presente proyecto se centra en el ámbito del comercio electrónico en la modalidad de agentes de subasta (auction bots). Lo que se pretende es llevar a cabo todo el proceso de negociación de las subastas sin intervención humana, por medio de sus agentes representantes.

Credit constraints in general equilibrium: Experimental results

Our work attempts to investigate the influence of credit tightness orexpansion on activity and relative prices in a multimarket set-up. We report on somedouble- auction, two-market experiments where subjects had to satisfy an inequalityinvolving the use of credit. The experiments display two regimes, characterizedby high and low credit availability. The critical value of credit at the commonboundary of the two regimes has a compelling interpretation as the maximal credituse at the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium of the abstract economy naturally associatedto our experimental environment. Our main results are that changes in theavailability of credit: (a): have minor and unsystematic effects on quantitiesand relative prices in the high-credit regime, (b): have substantial effects, bothon quantities and relative prices, in the low-credit regime.

Strategic behavior and price discovery

The paper analyzes the effects of strategic behavior by an insider in a price discovery process, akin to an information tatonnement, in the presence of a competitive informed sector. Such processes are used in the preopening period of continuous trading systems in several exchanges. It is found that the insider manipulates the market using a contrarian strategy in order to neutralize the effect of the trades of competitive informed agents. Furthermore, consistently with the empirical evidence available, we find that information revelation accelerates close to the opening, that the market price does not converge to the fundamental value no matter how many rounds the tatonnement has, and that the expected trading volume displays a U-shaped pattern. We also find that a market with a larger competitive sector (smaller insider) has an improved informational efficiency and an increased trading volume. The insider provides a public good (a lower informativeness of the price) for the competitive informed sector.

Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty

This paper introduces a new solution concept, a minimax regret equilibrium, which allows for the possibility that players are uncertain about the rationality and conjectures of their opponents. We provide several applications of our concept. In particular, we consider pricesetting environments and show that optimal pricing policy follows a non-degenerate distribution. The induced price dispersion is consistent with experimental and empirical observations (Baye and Morgan (2004)).

The evolution of conventions under incomplete information

We formulate an evolutionary learning process in the spirit ofYoung (1993a) for games of incomplete information. The process involves trembles. For many games, if the amount of trembling is small, play will be in accordance with the games' (semi-strict) Bayesian equilibria most of the time. This supports the notion of Bayesian equilibrium. Further, often play will most of the time be in accordance with exactly one Bayesian equilibrium. This gives a selection among the Bayesian equilibria. For two specific games of economic interest wecharacterize this selection. The first is an extension to incomplete information of the prototype strategic conflict known as Chicken. The second is an incomplete information bilateral monopoly, which is also an extension to incompleteinformation of Nash's demand game, or a simple version ofthe so-called sealed bid double auction. For both gamesselection by evolutionary learning is in favor of Bayesianequilibria where some types of players fail to coordinate, such that the outcome is inefficient.

Tracking the invisible hand: Convergence of double auctions to competitive equilibrium

Economics is the science of want and scarcity. We show that want andscarcity, operating within a simple exchange institution (double auction),are sufficient for an economy consisting of multiple inter--related marketsto attain competitive equilibrium (CE). We generalize Gode and Sunder's(1993a, 1993b) single--market finding to multi--market economies, andexplore the role of the scarcity constraint in convergence of economies to CE.When the scarcity constraint is relaxed by allowing arbitrageurs in multiple markets to enter speculative trades, prices still converge to CE,but allocative efficiency of the economy drops. \\Optimization by individual agents, often used to derive competitive equilibria,are unnecessary for an actual economy to approximately attain such equilibria.From the failure of humans to optimize in complex tasks, one need not concludethat the equilibria derived from the competitive model are descriptivelyirrelevant. We show that even in complex economic systems, such equilibriacan be attained under a range of surprisingly weak assumptions about agentbehavior.

Auctions of licences and market structure

This paper studies sequential auctions of licences to operate in amarket where those firms that obtain at least one licence then engage ina symmetric market game. I employ a new refinement of Nash equilibrium,the concept of {\sl Markovian recursively undominated equilibrium}.The unique solution satisfies the following properties: (i) when severalfirms own licences before the auction (incumbents), new entrants buylicences in each stage, and (ii) when there is no more than one incumbent,either the single firm preempts entry altogether or entry occurs inevery stage, depending on the parameter configuration.

Addressing the natural resource curse: An illustration from Nigeria

Some natural resources oil and minerals in particular exert a negative andnonlinear impact on growth via their deleterious impact on institutionalquality. We show this result to be very robust. The Nigerian experienceprovides telling confirmation of this aspect of natural resources. Wasteand corruption from oil rather than Dutch disease has been responsible forits poor long run economic performance. We propose a solution for addressingthis resource curse which involves directly distributing the oil revenuesto the public. Even with all the difficulties of corruption and inefficiencythat will no doubt plague its actual implementation, our proposal will, atthe least, be vastly superior to the status quo. At best, however, it couldfundamentally improve the quality of public institutions and, as a result,transform economics and politics in Nigeria.

Internet e-ethics in confrontation with an activists' agenda: Yahoo! on trial

A prolonged confrontation between Yahoo! Inc. and French anti-racismactivists who ask for the removal of Nazi items from auction sitesas well as restricted access to neo-Nazis sites is analyzed. We presentthe case and its development up to the decision of Yahoo! Inc. to removethe items from yahoo.com following a French court s verdict against thefirm. Using a business ethics approach, we distinguish the legal,technical, philosophical and managerial issues involved in the case andtheir management by Yahoo! We conclude on the difficulty of governingrelations with society from corporate and legal affairs departments atthe headquarters level, and on the clash of two visions over theregulation of social freedom.