Disseny d'un doble pont trifàsic totalment controlat de tiristors controlat per un sistema microprocessat

El disseny d’un equip per controlar un doble pont trifàsic totalment controlat de tiristors,consta de diferents parts: disseny i programació de la lògica de control, el disseny del’etapa de potència per augmentar el senyal de la lògica de control i atacar els tiristors,el disseny del doble pont de tiristor per rectificar el senyal trifàsic i el disseny de lafont d’alimentació per alimentar tot l’equip.El projecte engloba només la mecanització de la lògica de control i de l’etapa depotència, el doble pont de tiristor i la font d’alimentació només hi ha documentacióteòrica. En ser un prototip es realitzen proves al laboratori per comprovar el correctefuncionament.La finalitat d’aquest projecte és el disseny d’una nou equip, principalment la renovacióde tota la lògica de control, per substituir l’aparell que s’ha utilitzat fins ara, ja que,aquest últim ha quedat obsolet.El nou equip servirà per la realització de pràctiques al laboratori d’electrotècnia perl’estudi del motor de corrent continua. Amb les novetats introduïdes es considera quel’alumne podrà observar, estudiar i entendre millor, la rectificació controlada i elfuncionament del motor de manera més directa, pràctica i segura

Dos cuestiones pendientes de la sintaxis de los pronombres átonos: enclisis como fenómeno asociado a las oraciones matrices y doble clítico en las construcciones perifrásticas = The Remainders of the Syntax of Clitics: Enclisis as a Root Phenomenon, and Clitic Doubling in Periphrastic Constructions

Conferència centrada en dos aspectes concrets de la sintaxi dels pronoms àtons: l' enclisis que es dona en algunes oracions subordinades de les variants iberromàniques modernes de l'oest peninsular i les configuracions de doble cíclic en les construccions perifràstiques

Pèrdua d’ energia de pedalada en una MTB de doble suspensió

L' objectiu d' aquest projecte és crear un sistema de càlcul per estudiar el desplaçament dels amortidors al llarg del cicle de pedalada, que són la causa de la dissipació d' energia. Tot el projecte s' ha desenvolupat de forma teòrica i l' estudi que s' ha dut a terme ha estat estàtic. Els resultats obtinguts són una aproximació del que seria de s' hagués estudiat dinàmicament

Utilidad de la densitometría de doble energía (DEXA) en la valoración de las alteraciones morfológicas y estructurales en el paciente VIH en relación con distintos regímenes de tratamiento antiretroviral (TAR)

Objetivo: Comparar la distribución de la grasa corporal mediante DEXA, en pacientes VIH+ monoinfectados y coinfectados VHC, que reciben tratamiento antirretroviral basado en inhibidores de proteasa o no nucléosidos. Materiales y Métodos: Estudio retrospectivo, observacional, unicéntrico. Resultados: 80 pacientes, 60 hombres, 20 mujeres. 41 monoinfectados, 39 coinfectados. Edad 48 años, peso 71 kg, IMC 24, 39 IP, 41 NN. Los coinfectados tenían triglicéridos, colesterol y LDL-c inferiores a los monoinfectados (p <0.05). La DEXA no mostró diferencias en la comparación de mono/coinfectados y grupos de tratamiento. Conclusiones: No se encontraron diferencias entre grupos. Los coinfectados muestran lípidos plasmáticos inferiores.

Sobre la facticitat de la consideració moral dels animals no humans

Aquest treball s'enquadra en l'àmbit del que s'anomena bioètica animal i es desenvolupa al voltant de la consideració moral dels animals no humans a partir d'un tractament interdisciplinari que implica l'encontre de disciplines tan diverses com filosofia, història, psicologia o estudis de gènere, entre d'altres.

¿Es posible reducir el gasto sanitario a través del subsidio a los seguros sanitarios privados? La doble cobertura sanitaria en Catalunya. Estimación de patrones de utilización de servicios sanitarios y simulación de costes asociados a la asistencia sanit

The objective of this study consists in quantifying in money terms the potential reduction in usage of public health care outlets associated to the tenure of double (public plus private) insurance. In order to address the problem, a probabilistic model for visits to physicians is specified and estimated using data from the Catalonian Health Survey. Also, a model for the marginal cost of a visit to a physician is estimated using data from a representative sample of fee-for-service payments from a major insurer. Combining the estimates from the two models it is possible to quantify in money terms the cost/savings of alternative policies which bear an impact on the adoption of double insurance by the population. The results suggest that the private sector absorbs an important volume of demand which would be re-directed to the public sector if consumers cease to hold double insurance.

Catholic Confession of Sins as Third-Party Moral Enforcement

Catholicism has built up a legalistic religion based on two pillars: salvation by works and 'auricular' confession of sins to a priest with judicial functions. Since the Reformation, many consider auricular confession inferior to less institutional and more individual conceptions of faith. This article analyzes how all these historical solutions trade off specialization advantages against exchange costs to produce moral enforcement. After showing the behavioral foundations of confession and the adaptiveness of its historical evolution, it tests hypotheses on its efficacy, exploitation and opportunity cost. Econometric evidence supports the efficacy but not the exploitative character of Catholic confession. It also explains its secular decline as a consequence of two factors. First, the rise in education, which makes moral self-enforcement less costly. Second, the productivity gap suffered by confession, given its necessarily interpersonal nature.

The role of moral values in the economic analysis of crime: A general equilibrium approach

In this paper, we develop a general equilibrium model of crime and show thatlaw enforcement has different roles depending on the equilibrium characterization and the value of social norms. When an economy has a unique stable equilibrium where a fraction of the population is productive and the remaining predates, the government can choose an optimal law enforcement policy to maximize a welfare function evaluated at the steady state. If such steady state is not unique, law enforcement is still relevant but in a completely different way because the steady state that prevails depends on the initial proportions of productive and predator individuals in the economy. The relative importance of these proportions can be changed through law enforcement policy.

¿Es posible reducir el gasto sanitario a través del subsidio a los seguros sanitarios privados? La doble cobertura sanitaria en Catalunya. Estimación de patrones de utilización de servicios sanitarios y simulación de costes asociados a la asistencia

The objective of this study consists in quantifying in money terms thepotential reduction in usage of public health care outlets associatedto the tenure of double (public plus private) insurance. In order to address the problem, a probabilistic model for visits to physicians is specified and estimated using data from the Catalonian Health Survey. Also, a model for the marginal cost of a visit to a physician is estimated using data from a representative sample of fee-for-service payments from a major insurer. Combining the estimates from the two models it is possible to quantify in money terms the cost/savings of alternative policies which bear an impact on the adoption of double insurance by the population. The results suggest that the private sector absorbs an important volumeof demand which would be re-directed to the public sector if consumerscease to hold double insurance.

Rules or consequences? The role of ethical mindsets in moral dynamics

Recent research on the dynamics of moral behavior has documented two contrastingphenomena - moral consistency and moral balancing. Moral balancing refers to thephenomenon whereby behaving (un)ethically decreases the likelihood of doing so againat a later time. Moral consistency describes the opposite pattern - engaging in(un)ethical behavior increases the likelihood of doing so later on. Three studies supportthe hypothesis that individuals' ethical mindset (i.e., outcome-based versus rule-based)moderates the impact of an initial (un)ethical act on the likelihood of behaving ethicallyin a subsequent occasion. More specifically, an outcome-based mindset facilitates moralbalancing and a rule-based mindset facilitates moral consistency.

Specialization and rent-seeking in moral enforcement: The case of confession

Moral codes are produced and enforced by more or less specialized means and are subject to standard economic forces. This paper argues that the intermediary role played by the Catholic Church between God and Christians, a key difference from Protestantism, faces the standard trade-off of specialization benefits and agency costs. It applies this trade-off hypothesis to confession of sins to priests, an institution that epitomizes such intermediation, showing that this hypothesis fits cognitive, historical and econometric evidence better than a simpler rent-seeking story. In particular, Catholics who confess more often are observed to comply more with the moral code; however, no relationship is observed between mass attendance and moral compliance. The data also links the current decline in confession to the rise in education, which makes moral self-enforcement less costly, and to the productivity gap suffered by confession services, given its necessarily interpersonal nature.

A note on the convergence to competitive equilibria in economies with moral hazard

We examine the conditions under which competitive equilibria can beobtained as the limit, when the number of strategic traders getslarge, of Nash equilibria in economies with asymmetric informationon agents' effort and possibly imperfect observability of agents'trades. Convergence always occur when either effort is publiclyobserved (no matter what is the information available tointermediaries on agents' trades); or effort is private informationbut agents' trades are perfectly observed; or no information at allis available on agents' trades. On the other hand, when eachintermediary can observe its trades with an agent, but not theagent's trades with other intermediaries, the (Nash) equilibriawith strategic intermediaries do not converge to any of thecompetitive equilibria, for an open set of economies. The source ofthe difficulties for convergence is the combination of asymmetricinformation and the restrictions on the observability of tradeswhich prevent the formation of exclusive contractual relationshipsand generate barriers to entry in the markets for contracts.

Moral hazard and non-exclusive contracts

This paper studies equilibria for economies characterized by moral hazard(hidden action), in which the set of contracts marketed in equilibrium isdetermined by the interaction of financial intermediaries.The crucial aspect of the environment that we study is thatintermediaries are restricted to trade non-exclusive contracts: theagents' contractual relationships with competing intermediaries cannot bemonitored (or are not contractible upon). We fully characterize equilibrium allocations and contracts. In thisset-up equilibrium allocations are clearly incentive constrainedinefficient. A robust property of equilibria with non-exclusivity isthat the contracts issued in equilibrium do not implement the optimalaction. Moreover we prove that, whenever equilibrium contracts doimplement the optimal action, intermediaries make positive profits andequilibrium allocations are third best inefficient (where the definitionof third best efficiency accounts for constraints which capture thenon-exclusivity of contracts).

Social value orientation as a moral intuition: Decision-making in the dictator game

We studied the decision making process in the Dictator Game and showed that decisions are the result of a two-step process. In a first step, decision makers generate an automatic, intuitive proposal. Given sufficient motivation and cognitive resources, they adjust this in a second, more deliberated phase. In line with the social intuitionist model, we show that one s Social Value Orientation determines intuitive choice tendencies in the first step, and that this effect is mediated by the dictator s perceived interpersonal closeness with the receiver. Self-interested concerns subsequently leadto a reduction of donation size in step 2. Finally, we show that increasing interpersonal closeness can promote pro-social decision-making.

Moral hazard and dynamics of insider ownership stakes

In this paper, I analyze the ownership dynamics of N strategic risk-averse corporate insiders facing a moral hazard problem. A solution for the equilibrium share price and the dynamics of the aggregate insider stake is obtained in two cases: when agents can crediblycommit to an optimal ownership policy and when they cannot commit (time-consistent case). Inthe latter case, the aggregate stake gradually adjusts towards the competitive allocation. The speed of adjustment increases with N when outside investors are risk-averse, and does not depend on it when investors are risk-neutral. Predictions of the model are consistent with recent empirical findings.