Membership and internal democracy. Immigrant organisations in the city of Oslo

Immigrant organisations in the City of Oslo receive support from the government for their daily operation. In order to receive such support, each organisation must be membership-based and have internal democratic procedures. This paper raises the question of how we can understand this combination of support for ethnic based organisations and requirements of membership and internal democracy. It explores the usefulness of two partly overlapping ways of understanding this policy and discusses their interrelationship. Firstly, within the context of the crisis of multiculturalism, the paper discusses whether this combination is based on the aim of strengthening the organisations’ procedural commitment to liberal-democratic principles. Secondly, the paper analyses whether requirements of membership and internal democracy can mainly be understood within the framework of the Nordic model of voluntary organisation. By comparing the policy at three empirical levels, the paper concludes that this combination can mainly be understood within the framework of the traditional historical Nordic model, but that there is an ambiguity in this policy related to minority rights.

Federalism and democracy. The case of minority nations: a federalist deficit

In this chapter, after pointing out the different logics that lie behind the familiar ideas of democracy and federalism, I have dealt with the case of plurinational federal democracies. Having put forward a double criterion of an empirical nature with which to differentiate between the existence of minority nations within plurinational democracies (section 2), I suggest three theoretical criteria for the political accommodation of these democracies. In the following section, I show the agonistic nature of the normative discussion of the political accommodation of this kind of democracies, which bring monist and pluralist versions of the demos of the polity into conflict (section 3.1), as well as a number of conclusions which are the result of a comparative study of 19 federal and regional democracies using four analytical axes: the uninational/plurinational axis; the unitarianism-federalism axis; the centralisation-decentralisation axis; and the symmetry-asymmetry axis (section 3.2). This analysis reveals shortcomings in the constitutional recognition of national pluralism in federal and regional cases with a large number of federated units/regions with political autonomy; a lower degree of constitutional federalism and a greater asymmetry in the federated entities or regions of plurinational democracies. It also reveals difficulties to establish clear formulas in these democracies in order to encourage a “federalism of trust” based on the participation and protection of national minorities in the shared government of plurinational federations/regional states. Actually, there is a federal deficit in this kind polities according to normative liberal-democratic patterns and to what comparative analysis show. Finally, this chapter advocates the need for a greater normative and institutional refinement in plurinational federal democracies. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to introduce a deeper form of “ethical” pluralism -which displays normative agonistic trends, as well as a more “confederal/asymmetrical” perspective, congruent with the national pluralism of these kind of polities.

Policy Making in Divided Government. A Pivotal Actors Model with Party Discipline.

This article presents a formal model of policy decision-making in an institutional framework of separation of powers in which the main actors are pivotal political parties with voting discipline. The basic model previously developed from pivotal politics theory for the analysis of the United States lawmaking is here modified to account for policy outcomes and institutional performances in other presidential regimes, especially in Latin America. Legislators' party indiscipline at voting and multi-partism appear as favorable conditions to reduce the size of the equilibrium set containing collectively inefficient outcomes, while a two-party system with strong party discipline is most prone to produce 'gridlock', that is, stability of socially inefficient policies. The article provides a framework for analysis which can induce significant revisions of empirical data, especially regarding the effects of situations of (newly defined) unified and divided government, different decision rules, the number of parties and their discipline. These implications should be testable and may inspire future analytical and empirical work.

Policy making in divided government. A pivotal actors model with party discipline

This article presents a formal model of policy decision-making in an institutional framework of separation of powers in which the main actors are pivotal political parties with voting discipline. The basic model previously developed from pivotal politics theory for the analysis of the United States lawmaking is here modified to account for policy outcomes and institutional performances in other presidential regimes, especially in Latin America. Legislators' party indiscipline at voting and multi-partism appear as favorable conditions to reduce the size of the equilibrium set containing collectively inefficient outcomes, while a two-party system with strong party discipline is most prone to produce 'gridlock', that is, stability of socially inefficient policies. The article provides a framework for analysis which can induce significant revisions of empirical data, especially regarding the effects of situations of (newly defined) unified and divided government, different decision rules, the number of parties and their discipline. These implications should be testable and may inspire future analytical and empirical work.

Fiscal decentralization in Spain: An asymmetric transition to democracy

Asymmetric fiscal decentralization, by which we mean different fiscal arrangements between the central government and different groups of, or individual, lower-level governments, may be justified from an economic efficiency perspective. As argued by Tiebout (1956), Oates (1972) and others, a decentralized system of regional and local governments is better able to accommodate differences in tastes for public goods and services. This efficiency argument calls for decentralization of fiscal authority to regional and local governments, but not necessarily asymmetric decentralization. However, when the differences in tastes for public goods and services arise out of differences in history, culture and language across regions of a country, asymmetric treatment may be justified. History, culture and language may influence how a group of people (a region) views autonomy, independence and fiscal authority. Some regions may have had experience with autonomous government in the past, they may have a culture that is strongly reliant upon (or leery of) the central government, or they may be fearful of losing their separate languages if they do not have special arrangements. To accommodate differences in taste for independence, autonomy, and fiscal authority, it may be necessary to have different fiscal arrangements between the central government and the different regions comprising the country.

Towards a Network Government? A critical analysis of current assessment methods for e-Government

Contemporary public administrations have become increasingly more complex, having to cordinate actions with emerging actors in the public and the private spheres. In this scenario the modern ICTs have begun to be seen as an ideal vehicle to resolve some of the problems of public administration. We argue that there is a clear need to explore the extent to which public administrations are undergoing a process of transformation towards a netowork government linked to the systematic incorporation of ICTs in their basic activities. Through critically analysing a selection of e-government evaluation reports, we conclude that research should be carried out if we are to build a solid government assessment framework based on network-like organisation characteristics.

The First Privatization Policy in a Democracy: Selling State-Owned Enterprises in 1948-1950, Puerto Rico

In the 1940s, when the Governor of Puerto Rico was appointed by the US President and the Puerto Rican government was answerable only to the US Federal government, a large state-owned enterprise (SOE) sector was established on the island. Public services such as water, transportation and energy were nationalized, and several new manufacturing SOEs were created to produce cement, glass, shoes, paper and chalkboard, and clay products. These enterprises were created and managed by government-owned corporations. Later on, between 1948 and 1950, under the island’s first elected Governor, the government sold these SOEs to private groups. This paper documents both the creation and the privatization of the SOE sector in Puerto Rico, and analyzes the role played by ideology, political interests, and economic concerns in the decision to privatize them. Whereas ideological factors might have played a significant role in the building of the SOE sector, we find that privatization was driven basically by economic factors, such as the superior efficiency of private firms in the sectors where the SOEs operated, and by the desire to attract private industrial investment to the Puerto Rican economy.

Pork Barrel politics in semi-democracies: the Spanish 'Parlamentary roads', 1874-1915

This paper analyzes the effects of parliamentary representation on road infrastructure expenditure during the Spanish Restoration. Using a panel dataset of Spanish provinces in 1880-1914 we find that the allocation of administrative resources among provinces depended both on the delegation characteristics (such as the share of MPs with party leadership positions, and their degree of electoral independence), and the regime"s global search for stability. These results point to the importance of electoral dynamics within semi-democratic political systems, and offer an example of the influence of government tactics on infrastructure allocation.

Pork Barrel politics in semi-democracies: the Spanish 'Parlamentary roads', 1874-1915

This paper analyzes the effects of parliamentary representation on road infrastructure expenditure during the Spanish Restoration. Using a panel dataset of Spanish provinces in 1880-1914 we find that the allocation of administrative resources among provinces depended both on the delegation characteristics (such as the share of MPs with party leadership positions, and their degree of electoral independence), and the regime"s global search for stability. These results point to the importance of electoral dynamics within semi-democratic political systems, and offer an example of the influence of government tactics on infrastructure allocation.

Empowering local democracy in Catalonia: tools and policy domains to implement a top-down solution

This article is the result of an ongoing research into a variety of features of Spanish local government. It aims, in particular, at providing a profile of the tools implemented by local authorities to improve local democracy in Catalonia. The main hypothesis of the work is that, even though the Spanish local model is constrained by a shared and unique set of legal regulations, local institutions in Catalonia have developed their own model of local participation. And the range of instruments like these is still now increasing. More specifically, the scope of this research is twofold. On the one hand, different types of instruments for public deliberation in the Catalan local administration system are identified and presented, based on the place they take in the policy cycle. On the other hand, we focus on policy domains and the quality of the decision-making processes. Researching the stability of the participation tools or whether local democracy prefers more 'ad hoc' processes allows us to analyze the boundaries/limits of local democracy in Catalonia. The main idea underlying this paper is that, despite the existence of a single legal model regulating municipalities in Catalonia, local authorities tend to use their legally granted selfmanagement capacities to design their own instruments which end up presenting perceivable distinct features, stressing democracy in different policy domains, and in diverse policy cycles. Therefore, this paper is intended to identify such models and to provide factors (variables) so that an explanatory model can be built.

Regulatory framework of local citizen participation: Instruments of Direct and Participative Democracy in the Municipal Field

This article focuses on the analysis of the regulatory framework of citizen participation in the local government, which organises direct and participatory democracy at the local level, and identifies the laws and mechanisms through which the constitutional requirements for participation are accomplished. Mu nicipalities, the authority closest to citizens, are the best level of government since they directly involve civil society in the decision-making process experiencing the scope and appropriateness of the instruments by which it is channeled.

Efficiency and quality in local government management: the case of Spanish local authorities

This study analyses efficiency levels in Spanish local governments and their determining factors through the application of DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) methodology. It aims to find out to what extent inefficiency arises from external factors beyond the control of the entity, or on the other hand, how much it is due to inadequate management of productive resources. The results show that on the whole, there is still a wide margin within which managers could increase local government efficiency levels, although it is revealed that a great deal of inefficiency is due to exogenous factors. It is specifically found that the size of the entity, per capita tax revenue, the per capita grants or the amount of commercial activity are some of the factors determining local government inefficiency.