A theoretical and practical study on linear reforms of dual taxes

We extend the linear reforms introduced by Pf¨ahler (1984) to the case of dual taxes. We study the relative effect that linear dual tax cuts have on the inequality of income distribution -a symmetrical study can be made for dual linear tax hikes-. We also introduce measures of the degree of progressivity for dual taxes and show that they can be connected to the Lorenz dominance criterion. Additionally, we study the tax liability elasticity of each of the reforms proposed. Finally, by means of a microsimulation model and a considerably large data set of taxpayers drawn from 2004 Spanish Income Tax Return population, 1) we compare different yield-equivalent tax cuts applied to the Spanish dual income tax and 2) we investigate how much income redistribution the dual tax reform (Act ‘35/2006’) introduced with respect to the previous tax.

Are parties domocratizing themselves? the evolution of leardership selection in Spain (1977-2008)

The aim of this paper is to verify, for the Spanish case, whether between 1977 and 2008 has increased the internal democracy of the major political parties (PSOE, AP / PP, PCE / IU, PNV and CDC). To do this, we will focus on their leadership selection processes, one of the key elements associated with intra-party democracy. The paper is going to introduce data on four different dimensions of leadership selection: the certification process, the voting procedure, the inclusiveness of the selectorate and, finally, the degree of competitiveness. The results will show that have been few changes in the leadership selection processes of the Spanish political parties since 1977. However, the results of the Spanish case will also be used to suggest some preliminary links between the four dimensions.