The Rise of democracy in Europe and the fight against mass poverty in Latin America: the implications for marxist thought of some recent mainstream papers

Recently a number of mainstream papers have treated the rise of democracy in 19th century Europe and its instability in Latin America in an eminently Marxist fashion. This paper sets out their implications for Marxist thought. With respect to Europe, Marx's emphasis on political action backed by the threat of violence is vindicated but his justification for socialism is not. With respect to Latin America, the unequal distribution of wealth is the cause of political instability that is, in turn, the root cause of mass poverty. In addition it is possible to explain some of the paradoxical characteristics of neo-liberalism and to make a weak argument for socialism in spite of its rejection in Europe.

The Measurement of social polarization in a multi-group context

Polarization indices presented up to now have only focused their attention on the distribution of income/wealth. However, in many circumstances income is not the only relevant dimension that might be the cause of social conflict, so it is very important to have a social polarization index able to cope with alternative dimensions. In this paper we present an axiomatic characterization of one of such indices: it has been obtained as an extension of the (income) polarization measure introduced in Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) to a wider domain. It turns out that the axiomatic structure introduced in that paper alone is not appropriate to obtain a fully satisfactory characterization of our measure, so additional axioms are proposed. As a byproduct, we present an alternative axiomatization of the aforementioned income polarization measure.

Sistema de información SIGARQ: desarrollo de un aplicativo S.I.G. para la gestión de la secuencia estratigráfica de una intervención arqueológica

El Sistema de Información Geográfica Arqueológico (SIGARQ), pretende ser una herramienta que permita integrar, gestionar y analizar todos aquellos datos procedentes de cualquier tipo de intervención arqueológica independientemente de la naturaleza del elemento patrimonial a estudiar y de la técnica de trabajo empleada en la intervención. Al mismo tiempo ha de permitir contextualizar cada una de las intervenciones y sus resultados en un marco geográfico más extenso. De esta manera, el proyecto actual también supone un avance de las potencialidades del sistema de cara a la gestión patrimonial del territorio y los estudios de carácter paisajístico.

Marges i biodiversitat a Vandellòs i l'Hospitalet de l'Infant

Els marges de pedra seca són un dels ambients socioecològics més singulars del país i, al mateix temps, un dels hàbitats menys estudiats. La nostra recerca ha analitzat la biodiversitat de les margenades de Vandellòs i l’Hospitalet de l’Infant; mitjançant mostrejos de flora i de la fauna hem constatat l’elevada complexitat de la xarxa tròfica que s’estableix en aquest nínxol ecològic. En la vessant socioambiental, hem realitzat entrevistes a diferents entesos en la cultura de la pedra seca, les quals han permès determinar la importància dels marges per entendre una part de la història ambiental del país. Amb la recerca s’ha observat un clar retrocés del patrimoni de pedra seca a causa de la recessió del sector agrícola. L’aprofitament turístic de la cultura de la pedra seca i la implicació de les Administracions Públiques en la difusió d’aquest patrimoni, són claus per garantir-ne la pervivència en el futur.

Development and Democratization

Current studies, mainly focused on the postwar period, are split on the impact of development on democracy. Examining panel data that runs from early nineteenth century (a time where hardly any democracy was in place) to the end of the twentieth century, I show income matters positively for democratization – both after controlling for country and time effects and instrumenting for income. Since the effect of time partly varies over time, with some historical periods that are more favorable to democracy than others, I investigate the domestic variables (a decreasing marginal effect of growth in already developed economies) and international factors (the strategies of great powers toward small countries) generating that result. I finally probe the underlying processes through which income shapes political institutions, showing that development produces key changes in the distribution and nature of wealth that, in turn, make democracy a stable political outcome.

The size of the underground economy in Germany: A correction of the record and new evidence from the Modified-Cash-deposit-Ratio approach

Based on the Ahumada et al. (2007, Review of Income and Wealth) critique we revise existing estimates of the size of the German underground economy. Among other things, it turns out that most of these estimates are untenable and that the tax pressure induced size of the German underground economy may be much lower than previously thought. To this extent, German policy and law makers have been misguided during the last three decades. Therefore, we introduce the Modified-Cash-Deposit-Ratio (MCDR) approach, which is not subject to the recent critique and apply it to Germany for the period 1960 to 2008. JEL: O17, Q41, C22, Keywords: underground economy, shadow economy, cash-depositratio, currency demand approach, MIMIC approach

Discrimination in Bankruptcy Situations

In a bankruptcy situation, not all claimants are affected in the same way. In particular, some depositors may enter into a situation of personal bankruptcy if they lose part of their investments. Events of this kind may lead to a social catastrophe. We propose discrimination among the claimants as a possible solution. A fact considered in the American bankruptcy law (among others) that establishes some discrimination on the claimants, or the Santander Bank that in the Madoff’s case reimbursed only the deposits to its particular customers. Moreover, the necessity of discriminating has already been mentioned in different contexts by Young (1988), Bossert (1995), Thomson (2003) and Pulido et al. (2002, 2007), for instance. In this paper, we take a bankruptcy solution as the reference point. Given this initial allocation, we make transfers from richer to poorer with the purpose of distributing not only the personal incurred losses as evenly as possible but also the transfers in a progressive way. The agents are divided into two groups depending on their personal monetary value (wealth, net-income, GDP or any other characteristic). Then, we impose a set of Axioms that bound the maximal transfer that each net-contributor can make and each net-receiver can obtain. Finally, we define a value discriminant solution, and we characterize it by means of the Lorenz criterion. Endogenous convex combinations between solutions are also considered. Keywords: Bankruptcy, Discrimination, Compensation, Rules JEL classification: C71, D63, D71.

La ramaderia extensiva a la Vall d'Alinyà. Un retrat de la ramaderia de muntanya del segle XXI

El projecte se centra en el la vall d’Alinyà, en els terrenys de la Fundació Territori i Paisatge que abasten des dels cims del Port del Comte, a més de 2.000 m d’altitud fins més avall del nucli de Perles en els 500 m, en un ambient de muntanya a la comarca de l’Alt Urgell, Catalunya. L’objectiu principal ha estat diagnosticar la situació de la ramaderia extensiva de la vall, tot predient la seva viabilitat socioeconòmica com a estratègia de futur, tant pel que fa la seva població, com per les característiques d’un paisatge en mosaic molt ben afaiçonat per la mà humana en el passat. Aquesta diversitat paisatgística assegurada per l’existència de la ramaderia extensiva, provoca una riquesa en biodiversitat ecològica, en front del creixement continu de la massa forestal causat per l’abandonament de les activitats a la muntanya. Un dels aspectes estudiats de la ramaderia de la vall, ha estat la gestió dels cinc ramats existents en l’actualitat, dos de vaques, un de cabres, un d’ovelles i un de cavalls. Des de la identificació dels moviments de transtermitància durant les diferents estacions de l’any, a la de l’obtenció dels diferents recursos alimentaris pel bestiar provinents directament de la natura. Les entrevistes personals als ramaders han estat una important font d’informació i de tractament de dades per poder diagnosticar la situació actual del sector i de la figura del pastor com a figura professional clau en la vessant socioeconòmica i paisatgística local. Es van poder identificar clarament els problemes amb els quals es troba la ramaderia extensiva i quins reptes presenta per poder arribar a ser un sector de futur per a la població de la vall. En aquest context es proposen mesures de millora de l’activitat i de difusió dels productes agroramaders de qualitat.

La evaluación entre iguales en la educación social: entre lo profesional y lo académico

El siguiente artículo describe la experiencia de la metodología de aprendizaje basada en la evaluación entre iguales aplicada a la profesionalización de los educadores/as sociales.Tanto a nivel escolar como universitario, hay numerosas experiencias publicadas en relación con la metodología de evaluación entre iguales. Además, existen numerosos apartados de los “Documentos profesionalizadores” donde se justifica el hecho de que se entrenen algunas habilidades que deberían darse en la práctica profesional (como porejemplo en la definición, en el código ético y en el catálogo de funciones y competencias del educador/a social). En estas páginas pretendemos dar a conocer la experiencia de entrenamiento de futuros educadores/as en aspectos que tienen una relación directa con la evaluación entre educadores/as sociales.

How does ownership structure invfluence bank risk? Analyzing the role of managerial incentives

This paper analyzes how ownership concentration and managerial incentives influences bank risk for a large sample of US banks over the period 1997-2007. Using 2SLS simultaneous equations models, we show that ownership concentration has a positive total effect on bank risk. This is the result of a positive direct effect, which reflects monitoring and opportunistic behavior, and a negative indirect effect, which works through the design of managerial incentive contracts and reflects shareholder preferences toward risk. Large shareholders reduce bank risk by reducing the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility (Vega) and by increasing the CEO pay-performance sensitivity (Delta). In addition, we show that the direct and indirect effect of ownership concentration on bank risk depends on the type of the largest shareholder (a family, a bank, a corporation or an institutional investor), as well as, on the total shareholding held by each type as a group. Our results suggest that the positive relation between ownership concentration and risk is not the result of preferences towards more risk. Rather, they point at opportunistic behavior of large shareholders.

Topological comparison of methods for predicting transcriptional cooperativity in yeast

Background: The cooperative interaction between transcription factors has a decisive role in the control of the fate of the eukaryotic cell. Computational approaches for characterizing cooperative transcription factors in yeast, however, are based on different rationales and provide a low overlap between their results. Because the wealth of information contained in protein interaction networks and regulatory networks has proven highly effective in elucidating functional relationships between proteins, we compared different sets of cooperative transcription factor pairs (predicted by four different computational methods) within the frame of those networks. Results: Our results show that the overlap between the sets of cooperative transcription factors predicted by the different methods is low yet significant. Cooperative transcription factors predicted by all methods are closer and more clustered in the protein interaction network than expected by chance. On the other hand, members of a cooperative transcription factor pair neither seemed to regulate each other nor shared similar regulatory inputs, although they do regulate similar groups of target genes. Conclusion: Despite the different definitions of transcriptional cooperativity and the different computational approaches used to characterize cooperativity between transcription factors, the analysis of their roles in the framework of the protein interaction network and the regulatory network indicates a common denominator for the predictions under study. The knowledge of the shared topological properties of cooperative transcription factor pairs in both networks can be useful not only for designing better prediction methods but also for better understanding the complexities of transcriptional control in eukaryotes.

Personal and household care giving for adult children to parents and social stratification

Using SHARE database the paper explores the factors conditioning personalcare giving from adult children to their parents. Frequency and intensity ofpersonal care is contrasted with the reciprocal expectations that children haveabout wealth inheritance from their parents and with the opportunity costs of helping, as well as with the capacity of parents of getting help from othersources of personal care. The results may help to understand how inequalitiesin accessing to formal services relate with intergenerational solidarity.

Optimal Contracts, Adverse Selection, and Social Preferences: An Experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

Do the Wealthy Risk More Money? An Experimental Comparison

Are poor people more or less likely to take money risks than wealthy folks? We find that risk attraction is more prevalent among the wealthy when the amounts of money at risk are small (not surprising, since ten dollars is a smaller amount for a wealthy person than for a poor one), but, interestingly, for the larger amounts of money at risk the fraction of the nonwealthy displaying risk attraction exceeds that of the wealthy. We also replicate our previous finding that many people display risk attraction for small money amounts, but risk aversion for large ones. We argue that preferences yielding risk attraction for small money amounts, together with risk aversion for larger amounts, at all levels of wealth, while contradicting the expected utility hypothesis, may be well-defined, independently of reference points, on the choice space.

A Model of Collateral, Investment, and Adverse Selection

This paper characterizes the relationship between entrepreneurial wealth and aggregate investment under adverse selection. Its main finding is that such a relationship need not be monotonic. In particular, three results emerge from the analysis: (i) pooling equilibria, in which investment is independent of entrepreneurial wealth, are more likely to arise when entrepreneurial wealth is relatively low; (ii) separating equilibria, in which investment is increasing in entrepreneurial wealth, are most likely to arise when entrepreneurial wealth is relatively high and; (iii) for a given interest rate, an increase in entrepreneurial wealth may generate a discontinuous fall in investment.