21 resultados para Warsaw Bank
Resumo:
The financial revolution improved the British government s ability to borrow, andthus its ability to wage war. North andWeingast argued that it also permitted privateparties to borrow more cheaply and widely.We test these inferences with evidencefrom a London bank.We confirm that private bank credit was cheap in the earlyeighteenth century, but we argue that it was not available widely. Importantly, thegovernment reduced the usury rate in 1714, sharply reducing the circle of privateclients that could be served profitably.
Resumo:
The current crisis has swept aside not only the whole of the US investment banking industry butalso the consensual perception of banking risks, contagion and their implication for bankingregulation. As everyone agrees now, risks where mispriced, they accumulated in neuralgic pointsof the financial system, and where amplified by procyclical regulation as well as by the instabilityand fragility of financial institutions.The use of ratings as carved in stone and lack of adequate procedure to swiftly deal withsystemic institutions bankruptcy (whether too-big-to-fail, too complex to fail or too-many to fail).The current paper will not deal with the description and analysis of the crisis, already covered inother contributions to this issue will address the critical choice regulatory authorities will face. Inthe future regulation has to change, but it is not clear that it will change in the right direction. Thismay occur if regulatory authorities, possibly influenced by public opinion and political pressure,adopt an incorrect view of financial crisis prevention and management. Indeed, there are twoapproaches to post-crisis regulation. One is the rare event approach, whereby financial crises willoccur infrequently, but are inescapable.
Resumo:
A major lesson of the recent financial crisis is that the interbank lending marketis crucial for banks facing large uncertainty regarding their liquidity needs. Thispaper studies the efficiency of the interbank lending market in allocating funds. Weconsider two different types of liquidity shocks leading to different implications foroptimal policy by the central bank. We show that, when confronted with a distributional liquidity-shock crisis that causes a large disparity in the liquidity held amongbanks, the central bank should lower the interbank rate. This view implies that thetraditional tenet prescribing the separation between prudential regulation and monetary policy should be abandoned. In addition, we show that, during an aggregateliquidity crisis, central banks should manage the aggregate volume of liquidity. Twodifferent instruments, interest rates and liquidity injection, are therefore required tocope with the two different types of liquidity shocks. Finally, we show that failureto cut interest rates during a crisis erodes financial stability by increasing the riskof bank runs.
Resumo:
We combine existing balance sheet and stock market data with two new datasets to studywhether, how much, and why bank lending to firms matters for the transmission of monetarypolicy. The first new dataset enables us to quantify the bank dependence of firms precisely,as the ratio of bank debt to total assets. We show that a two standard deviation increase inthe bank dependence of a firm makes its stock price about 25% more responsive to monetarypolicy shocks. We explore the channels through which this effect occurs, and find that thestock prices of bank-dependent firms that borrow from financially weaker banks display astronger sensitivity to monetary policy shocks. This finding is consistent with the banklending channel, a theory according to which the strength of bank balance sheets mattersfor monetary policy transmission. We construct a new database of hedging activities andshow that the stock prices of bank-dependent firms that hedge against interest rate riskdisplay a lower sensitivity to monetary policy shocks. This finding is consistent with aninterest rate pass-through channel that operates via the direct transmission of policy ratesto lending rates associated with the widespread use of floating-rates in bank loans and creditline agreements.
Resumo:
We propose an extension of Alesina and Tabellini 's model (1987) to include corruption, which is understood as the presence of weak institutions collecting revenue through formal tax channels. This paper analyses how conservative should an independent central bank be when the institutional quality is poor. When there are no political distortions, we show that the central bank has to be more conservative than the government, except with complete corruption. In this particular case, the central bank should be as conservative as the government. Further, we obtain that the relationship between the optimal relative degree of conservativeness of the central bank and the degree of corruption is affected by supply shocks. Concretely, when these shocks are not important, the central bank should be less conservative if the degree of corruption increases. However, this result may not hold when the shocks are relevant. JEL classi fication: D6, D73, E52, E58, E62, E63. Keywords: Central Bank Conservativeness; Corruption; Fiscal Policy; Monetary Policy; Seigniorage.
Resumo:
This paper proposes a managerial control tool that integrates risk in efficiency scores. Building on existing efficiency specifications, our proposal reflects the real banking technology and accurately models the relationship between desirable and undesirable outputs. Specifically, the undesirable output is defined as non-performing loans to capture credit risk, and is linked only to the relevant dimension of the output set. We empirically illustrate how our efficiency measure functions for managerial control purposes. The application considers a unique dataset of Costa Rican banks during 1998-2012. Efficiency scores? implications are mostly discussed at bank-level, and their interpretations are enhanced by using accounting ratios. We also show the usefulness of our tool for corporate governance by examining performance changes around executive turnover. Results confirm that appointing CEOs from outside the bank significantly improves performance, thus suggesting the potential benefits of new organisational practices.