Proposing a 'Consent Commons' in open education - balancing the desire for openness with the rights of people to refuse or withdraw from participation

A new 'Consent Commons' licensing framework is proposed, complementing Creative Commons, to clarify the permissions given for using and reusing clinical and non-clinical digital recordings of people (patients and non-patients) for educational purposes. Consent Commons is a sophisticated expression of ethically based 'digital professionalism', which recognises the rights of patients, carers, their families, teachers, clinicians, students and members of the public to have some say in how their digital recordings are used (including refusing or withdrawing their consent), and is necessary in order to ensure the long term sustainability of teaching materials, including Open Educational Resources (OER). Consent Commons can ameliorate uncertainty about the status of educational resources depicting people, and protect institutions from legal risk by developing robust and sophisticated policies and promoting best practice in managing their information.

Electronic voting system for computer supported collaborative learning

The EVS4CSCL project starts in the context of a Computer Supported Collaborative Learning environment (CSCL). Previous UOC projects created a CSCL generic platform (CLPL) to facilitate the development of CSCL applications. A discussion forum (DF) was the first application developed over the framework. This discussion forum was different from other products on the marketplace because of its focus on the learning process. The DF carried out the specification and elaboration phases from the discussion learning process but there was a lack in the consensus phase. The consensus phase in a learning environment is not something to be achieved but tested. Common tests are done by Electronic Voting System (EVS) tools, but consensus test is not an assessment test. We are not evaluating our students by their answers but by their discussion activity. Our educational EVS would be used as a discussion catalyst proposing a discussion about the results after an initial query or it would be used after a discussion period in order to manifest how the discussion changed the students mind (consensus). It should be also used by the teacher as a quick way to know where the student needs some reinforcement. That is important in a distance-learning environment where there is no direct contact between the teacher and the student and it is difficult to detect the learning lacks. In an educational environment, assessment it is a must and the EVS will provide direct assessment by peer usefulness evaluation, teacher marks on every query created and indirect assessment from statistics regarding the user activity.

More than cheap talk? Euro-Mediterranean cooperation on human rights and democracy

Malgrat els esforços de la UE en la promoció de la democràcia i un compromís comú per la democràcia i els drets humans al EMP, no hi ha signes de convergència cap al model liberal democràtic propugnat per la UE. No obstant això, l'abast i la intensitat de la cooperació multilateral, transnacional i bilateral han augmentat constantment en tota la regió des de mitjans de 1990. La cooperació en el camp de la promoció de la democràcia es caracteritza per la forta dinàmica de normativa sectorial, i la diferenciació geogràfica, però està clarament situada en un marc regional i altament estandarditzat. Si bé la convergència política o la política sembla poc probable en el curt o mitjà termini, democràcia i drets humans estan fermament establerts en una agenda regional comú

The Voting Practice of the Fifteen in the UN General Assembly: Convergence and Divergence

The EU has, since the early days of the Community, had the ambition to speak with ‘a single voice’ in international fora, in particular in the United Nations’ General Assembly. This aspiration, which has become more pronounced since the inauguration of the CFSP, has not always been easy to achieve due to domestic or international level factors affecting the EU member states. However, in the last decade there has been a dramatic increase in convergence in the Fifteen’s voting record. This paper contemplates the underlying reasons for such a convergence

An electronic voting platform with elliptic curve cryptography

The future of elections seems to be electronic voting systems du to its advantatges over the traditional voting. Nowadays, there are some different paradigms to ensure the security and reliability of e-voting. This document is part of a wider project which presents an e-Voting platform based on elliptic curve cryptography. It uses an hybrid combination of two of the main e-Voting paradigms to guarantee privacy and security in the counting phase, these are precisely, the mixnets and the homomorphic protocols. This document is focused in the description of the system and the maths and programming needed to solve the homomorphic part of it. In later chapters, there is a comparison between a simple mixing system and our system proposal.

A note on Luttens’ Minimal rights based solidarity

Following the approach developed by Luttens (2010), we consider a model where individuals with di fferent levels of skills exert di fferent levels of e ffor. Speci fically, we propose a redistribution mechanism based on a lower bound on what every individual deserves: the so-called minimal rights (O'Neill (1982)). Our re finement of Luttens' mechanism ensures at the same time minimal rights based solidarity, participation (non-negativity) and claims feasibility. Keywords: Redistribution mechanism, Minimal rights, Solidarity, Participation, Claims feasibility. JEL classi fication: C71, D63, D71.

Between pluralism and majoritarianism: the European Court of Human Rights on religious symbols and education

How is it possible to square the development of a consistent Europeanapproach to religious diversity with the recognition of the sometimes-conflictiveplurality of state-religion models? The Court´s support of the liberalprinciples of separation and neutrality have either been deplored by Christianconservatives as the result of European Christophobia, or celebratedby secularists as contributing to the formation of a Europe free of religion.In contrast, the present chapter argues for a differentiated approach toEuropean jurisprudence, outlining how the Court has been oscillating betweenan appealing liberal-pluralist perspective or framework, and a questionablemajoritarian one. Both perspectives are illustrated by focusing onrepresentative decisions in the area of religious education and symbols.

Cosmopolitan justice and minority rights: the case of minority nations (or Kant again, but different)

Global Justice has usually been understood to mean institutional and social justice (political and redistributive issues on a global scale). In contrast, issues involving different national and cultural identities, are usually marginal in reflections on global justice. This occurs despite the fact that human rights include political social and cultural rights. This paper links a conception of global justice, moral cosmopolitanism, with plurinational democracies. After giving a brief description of moral cosmopolitanism I go on to analyse notions of cosmopolitanism and patriotism in Kant's work and the political significance that the notion of "unsocial sociability" and the "Ideas of Pure Reason" of Kant's first Critique have for cosmopolitanism. Finally, I analyse the relationship between cosmopolitanism and minority nations based on the preceding sections. I postulate the need for a moral and institutional refinement of democracies and international society that is better able to accommodate national pluralism than has so far been achieved by traditional liberal constitutionalism and cosmopolitanism

Intellectual property rights and efficient firm organization

I show that intellectual property rights yield static efficiency gains, irrespective oftheir dynamic role in fostering innovation. I develop a property-rights model of firmorganization with two dimensions of non-contractible investment. In equilibrium, thefirst best is attained if and only if ownership of tangible and intangible assets is equallyprotected. If IP rights are weaker, firm structure is distorted and efficiency declines:the entrepreneur must either integrate her suppliers, which prompts a decline in theirinvestment; or else risk their defection, which entails a waste of her human capital. Mymodel predicts greater prevalence of vertical integration where IP rights are weaker,and a switch from integration to outsourcing over the product cycle. Both empiricalpredictions are consistent with evidence on multinational companies. As a normativeimplication, I find that IP rights should be strong but narrowly defined, to protect abusiness without holding up its potential spin-offs.

Property as an economic concept: Reconciling legal and economic conceptions of property rights in a Coasean framework

Adopting a simplistic view of Coase (1960), most economic analyses of property rightsdisregard both the key advantage that legal property rights (that is, in rem rights) provide torightholders in terms of enhanced enforcement, and the difficulties they pose to acquirers interms of information asymmetry about legal title. Consequently, these analyses tend to overstatethe role of "private ordering" and disregard the two key elements of property law: first, theessential conflict between property (that is, in rem) enforcement and transaction costs; and,second, the institutional solutions created to overcome it, mainly contractual registries capable ofmaking truly impersonal (that is, asset-based) trade viable when previous relevant transactionson the same assets are not verifiable by judges. This paper fills this gap by reinterpreting bothelements within the Coasean framework and thus redrawing the institutional foundations of bothproperty and corporate contracting.

A foundation for strategic agenda voting

We offer complete characterizations of the equilibrium outcomesof two prominent agenda voting institutions that are widely used in the democraticworld: the amendment, also known as the Anglo-American procedure,and the successive, or equivalently the Euro-Latin procedure. Our axiomaticapproach provides a proper understanding of these voting institutions, and allowscomparisons between them, and with other voting procedures.

Voting after the bombing: Can terrorist attacks change the outcome of democratic elections?

Economists have recently turned their attention to the effects of terrorism. One much debated effect of terrorist attacks is its impact on the results of democratic elections. We use the electoral consequences of the terrorist attacks of the 11-M in Madrid to analyze this issue. We consider this particular experiment since the attack took place only three days before the 2004 Congressional Election, which allows the use of credible identification criteria. In particular, we use the advance voting by Spanish residents abroad, who cast their vote before the terrorist attack, to identify the effect of the bombing. We exploit this macabre natural experiment to run a difference-in-differences estimation using data on three consecutive Congressional elections. Our empirical results indicate that a terrorist attack can have a large impact on the outcome of democratic elections.

Voting with preferences over margins of victory

This paper analyzes a two-alternative voting model with the distinctive feature that voters have preferences over margins of victory. We study voting contests with a finite as well as an infinite number of voters, and with and without mandatory voting. The main result of the paper is the existence and characterization of a unique equilibrium outcome in all those situations. At equilibrium, voters who prefer a larger support for one of the alternatives vote for such alternative.The model also provides a formal argument for the conditional sincerity voting condition in Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) and the benefit of voting function in Llavador (2006). Finally, we offer new insights on explaining why some citizens may vote strategically for an alternative different from the one declared as the most preferred.

Contractual allocation of decision rights and incentives: The case of automobile distribution

We analyze empirically the allocation of rights and monetary incentives in automobile franchise contracts. These contracts substantially restrict the decision rights of dealers and grant manufacturers extensive contractual completion and enforcement powers, converting the manufacturers, de facto, in a sort of quasi-judiciary instance. Variation in the allocation of decision rights andincentive intensity is explained by the incidence of moral hazard in the relation. In particular, when the cost of dealer moral hazard is higher and the risk of manufactureropportunism is lower, manufacturers enjoy more discretion in determining the performance required from their dealers and in using mechanisms such as monitoring, termination and monetary incentives to ensure such performance is provided. We also explore the existence of interdependencies between the different elements of the system. and find some complementarities between completion and termination rights, and between monitoring rights and the intensity of incentives.

How enforcement institutions affect markets

In an experiment we study market outcomes under alternative incentive structures for third-party enforcers. Our transactions resemble an anonymous credit market where lenders can give loans and borrowers can repay them. When borrowers default, judges are free to enforce repayment but are themselves paid differently in each of three treatments. First, paying judges according to lenders votes maximizes surplus and the equality of earnings. In contrast, paying judges according to borrowers votes triggers insufficient enforcement, destroying the market and producing the lowest surplus and the most unequal distribution of earnings. Lastly, judges paid the average earnings of borrowers and lenders achieve results close to those based on lender voting. We employ a steps-of-reasoning argument to interpret the performances of different institutions. When voting and enforcement rights are allocated to different classes of actors, the difficulty of their task changes, and arguably as a consequence they focus on high or low surplus equilibria.