Desenvolupament d'un sistema de transferència de software per una placa entrenadora

El departament d’electrònica i telecomunicacions de la Universitat de Vic ha dissenyat un conjunt de plaques entrenadores amb finalitat educativa. Perquè els alumnes puguin utilitzar aquestes plaques com a eina d’estudi, és necessari disposar d’un sistema de gravació econòmic i còmode. La major part dels programadors, en aquest cas, no compleixen amb aquests requeriments. L’objectiu d’aquest projecte és dissenyar un sistema de programació que utilitzi la comunicació sèrie i que no requereixi d'un hardware ni software específics. D’aquesta manera, obtenim una placa autònoma i un programador gratuït, de muntatge ràpid i simple d’utilitzar. El sistema de gravació dissenyat s’ha dividit en tres blocs. Per una banda, un programa que anomenem “programador” encarregat de transferir codi de programa des de l’ordinador al microcontrolador de la placa entrenadora. Per altra banda, un programa anomenat “bootloader”, situat al microcontrolador, permet rebre aquest codi de programa i emmagatzemar-lo a les direccions de memòria de programa corresponents. Com a tercer bloc, s’implementa un protocol de comunicació i un sistema de control d’errors per tal d’assegurar una correcta comunicació entre el “programador” i el “bootloader”. Els objectius d’aquest projecte s’han complert i per les proves realitzades, el sistema de programació ha funcionat correctament.

La Gestión del conocimiento en pequeñas empresas de tecnologías de la información: una investigación exploratoria

La habilidad de crear y replicar el conocimiento es especialmente crítico para empresas que compiten en entornos dinámicos, las cuales no solamente tienen recursos tecnológicos relevantes, sino que deben mostrar flexibilidad y capacidad administrativa para coordinar efectivamente sus competencias internas. Los procesos de generación y transferencia del conocimiento son analizados aquí a través de un estudio de casos de cuatro pequeñas empresas del sector de las tecnologías de la información en Barcelona. Como resultado del estudio, se diseña un modelo en el cual la generación del conocimiento es posible a través de la adquisición de conocimiento externo y de la creación interna de conocimiento, proceso este último facilitado por la motivación personal y la oportunidad de aprender de los miembros de la organización. La transferencia del conocimiento se realiza mediante la utilización de mecanismos formales e informales. Aún y cuando los mecanismos formales como los documentos y el Intranet proveen un apoyo a este proceso, los empleados prefieren transferir su conocimiento de una forma cara a cara.

Classical horizontal inequity and reranking: an integrated approach

The last 20 years have seen a significant evolution in the literature on horizontal inequity (HI) and have generated two major and "rival" methodological strands, namely, classical HI and reranking. We propose in this paper a class of ethically flexible tools that integrate these two strands. This is achieved using a measure of inequality that merges the well-known Gini coefficient and Atkinson indices, and that allows a decomposition of the total redistributive effect of taxes and transfers in a vertical equity effect and a loss of redistribution due to either classical HI or reranking. An inequality-change approach and a money-metric cost-of-inequality approach are developed. The latter approach makes aggregate classical HI decomposable across groups. As in recent work, equals are identified through a nonparametric estimation of the joint density of gross and net incomes. An illustration using Canadian data from 1981 to 1994 shows a substantial, and increasing, robust erosion of redistribution attributable both to classical HI and to reranking, but does not reveal which of reranking or classical HI is more important since this requires a judgement that is fundamentally normative in nature.

The Politics of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in Argentina

The search for political determinants of intergovernmental fiscal relations has shaped much of the recent literature on the economic viability of federalism. This study assesses the explanatory power of two competing views about intergovernmental transfers; one emphasizing the traditional neoclassical approach to federal-subnational fiscal relations and the other suggesting that transfers are contingent on the political fortunes and current political vulnerability of each level of government. The author tests these models using data from Argentina, a federation exhibiting one of the most decentralised fiscal systems in the world and severe imbalances in the territorial distribution of legislative and economic resources. It is shown that overrespresented provinces ruled by governors who belong to opposition parties can bring into play their political overrepresentation to attract shares of federal transfers beyond social welfare criteria and to shield themselves from unwanted reforms to increase fiscal co-responsibilty. This finding suggests that decision makers in federal countries must pay close heed to the need to synchronize institutional reforms and fiscal adjustment.

Business-science research collaboration under moral hazard

I analyze, in the context of business and science research collaboration, how the characteristics of partnership agreements are the result of an optimal contract between partners. The final outcome depends on the structure governing the partnership, and on the informational problems towards the efforts involved. The positive effect that the effort of each party has on the success of the other party, makes collaboration a preferred solution. Divergence in research goals may, however, create conflicts between partners. This paper shows how two different structures of partnership governance (a centralized, and a decentralized ones) may optimally use the type of project to motivate the supply of non-contractible efforts. Decentralized structure, however, always choose a project closer to its own preferences. Incentives may also come from monetary transfers, either from partners sharing each other benefits, or from public funds. I derive conditions under which public interventio

Pareto-improving optimal capital and labor taxes

We show a standard model where the optimal tax reform is to cut labor taxes and leave capital taxes very high in the short and medium run. Only in the very long run would capital taxes be zero. Our model is a version of Chamley??s, with heterogeneous agents, without lump sum transfers, an upper bound on capital taxes, and a focus on Pareto improving plans. For our calibration labor taxes should be low for the first ten to twenty years, while capital taxes should be at their maximum. This policy ensures that all agents benefit from the tax reform and that capital grows quickly after when the reform begins. Therefore, the long run optimal tax mix is the opposite from the short and medium run tax mix. The initial labor tax cut is financed by deficits that lead to a positive long run level of government debt, reversing the standard prediction that government accumulates savings in models with optimal capital taxes. If labor supply is somewhat elastic benefits from tax reform are high and they can be shifted entirely to capitalists or workers by varying the length of the transition. With inelastic labor supply there is an increasing part of the equilibrium frontier, this means that the scope for benefitting the workers is limited and the total benefits from reforming taxes are much lower.

Addressing the net balances problem as a prerequisite for EU budget reform: a proposal

Conflict among member states regarding the distribution of net financial burdens has been allowed to contaminate the entire design of the EU budget with very negative consequences in terms of equity, efficiency and transparency. To get around this problem and pave the way for a substantive budget reform, we propose to decouple distributional negotiations from the rest of the budget process by linking member state net balances in a rigid manner to relative prosperity. This would be achieved through the introduction of a system of compensating horizontal transfers that would take to its logical conclusion the Commission's proposal for a generalized compensation mechanism. We discuss the impact of the proposed scheme on member states? incentives and illustrate its financial implications using revenue and expenditure projections for 2013 that are based on the current Financial Perspectives and Own Resources Decision.

Authoritarian Responses to Foreign Pressure: Spending, Repression, and Sanctions

This paper explores how international sanctions affect authoritarian rulers’ decisions concerning repression and public spending composition, and how different authoritarian rulers respond to foreign pressure. If sanctions are assumed to increase the price of loyalty to the regime, then rulers whose budgets are not severely constrained by sanctions will tend to increase spending in those categories that most benefit their core support groups. In contrast, when constraints are severe due to reduced aid and trade, dictators are expected to greatly increase their levels of repression. Using data on regime types, public expenditures and spending composition (1970–2000) as well as on repression levels (1976–2001), we show that the empirical patterns conform well to our theoretical expectations. Single-party regimes, when targeted by sanctions, increase spending on subsidies and transfers which largely benefit more substantial sectors of the population and especially the urban classes. Likewise, military regimes increase their expenditures on goods and services, which include military equipment and soldiers’ and officers’ wages. Conversely, personalist regimes reduce spending in all categories, especially capital expenditures, while increasing repression much more than other regime types when targeted by sanctions.

Devolution dynamics of Spanish local government

Over the last few years, ther has been a devolutionary tendency in many developed and developing countries. In this article we propose a methodology to decompose whether the benefits in terms of effciency derived from transfers of powers from higher to municipal levels of government "the "economic dividend" of devolution) might increase over time. This methodology is based on linear programming approaches for effciency measurement. We provide anapplication to Spanish municipalities, which have had to adapt to both the European Stability and Growth Pact as well as to domestic regulation seeking local governments balanced budget. Results indicate that efficiency gains from enhaced decentralization have increased over time. However, the way through which these gains accrue differs across municipalities -in some cases technical change is the main component, whereas in others catching up dominates.

Which firms want PhDs? The effect of the university-industry relationship on the PhD labour market

PhD graduates hold the highest education degree, are trained to conduct research and can be considered a key element in the creation, commercialization and diffusion of innovations. The impact of PhDs on innovation and economic development takes place through several channels such as the accumulation of scientific capital stock, the enhancement of technology transfers and the promotion of cooperation relationships in innovation processes. Although the placement of PhDs in industry provides a very important mechanism for transmitting knowledge from universities to firms, information about the characteristics of the firms that employ PhDs is very scarce. The goal of this paper is to improve understanding of the determinants of the demand for PhDs in the private sector. Three main potential determinants of the demand for PhDs are considered: cooperation between firms and universities, R&D activities of firms and several characteristics of firms, size, sector, productivity and age. The results from the econometric analysis show that cooperation between firms and universities encourages firms to recruit PhDs and point to the existence of accumulative effects in the hiring of PhD graduates.

Patent policy, patent pools, and the accumulation of claims in sequential innovation

We present a dynamic model where the accumulation of patents generates an increasing number of claims on sequential innovation. We compare innovation activity under three regimes -patents, no-patents, and patent pools- and find that none of them can reach the first best. We find that the first best can be reached through a decentralized tax-subsidy mechanism, by which innovators receive a subsidy when they innovate, and are taxed with subsequent innovations. This finding implies that optimal transfers work in the exact opposite way as traditional patents. Finally, we consider patents of finite duration and determine the optimal patent length.

Simulating the Impact of Sectorial Productivity Gains on Two Regional Economies: Key Sectors from a Supply Side Perspective

In this paper we simulate and analyse the economic impact that sectorial productivity gains have on two regional Spanish economies (Catalonia and Extremadura). In particular we study the quantitative effect that each sector’s productivity gain has on household welfare (real disposable income and equivalent variation), on the consumption price indices and factor relative prices, on real production (GDP) and on the government’s net income (net taxation revenues of social transfers to households). The analytical approach consists of a computable general equilibrium model, in which we assume perfect competition and cleared markets, including factor markets. All the parameters and exogenous variables of the model are calibrated by means of two social accounting matrices, one for each region under study. The results allow us to identify those sectors with the greatest impact on consumer welfare as the key sectors in the regional economies. Keywords: Productivity gains, key sectors, computable general equilibrium

Information Mobility: Information Dissemination in Mobile Networks

En el nostre projecte, considerem un escenari urbà o interurbà on persones amb dispositius mòbils (smartphones) o vehicles equipats amb interfícies de comunicació, estan interessats en compartir fitxers entre ells o descarregar-los al creuar Punts d’Accés (APs) propers a la carretera. Estudiem la possibilitat d’utilizar la cooperació en les trobades casuals entre nodes per augmentar la velocitat de descàrrega global. Amb aquest objectiu, plantejem algoritmes per a la selecció de quins paquets, per a quins destins i quins transportistes s’escullen en cada moment. Mitjançant extenses simulacions, mostrem com les cooperacions carry&forward dels nodes augmenten significativament la velocitat de descàrrega dels usuaris, i com aquest resultat es manté per a diversos patrons de mobilitat, col•locacions d'AP i càrregues de la xarxa. Per altra banda, aparells com els smartphones, on la targeta de WiFi està encesa contínuament, consumeixen l'energia de la bateria en poques hores. En molts escenaris, una targeta WiFi sempre activa és poc útil, perque sovint no hi ha necessitat de transmissió o recepció. Aquest fet es veu agreujat en les Delay Tolerant Networks (DTN), on els nodes intercanvien dades quan es creuen i en tenen l’oportunitat. Les tècniques de gestió de l’estalvi d’energia permeten extendre la duració de les bateries. El nostre projecte analitza els avantatges i inconvenients que apareixen quan els nodes apaguen períodicament la seva targeta wireless per a estalviar energia en escenaris DTN. Els nostres resultats mostren les condicions en que un node pot desconnectar la bateria sense afectar la probabilitat de contacte amb altres nodes, i les condicions en que aquesta disminueix. Per exemple, es demostra que la vida del node pot ser duplicada mantenint la probabilitat de contacte a 1. I que aquesta disminueix ràpidament en intentar augmentar més la vida útil.

Discrimination in Bankruptcy Situations

In a bankruptcy situation, not all claimants are affected in the same way. In particular, some depositors may enter into a situation of personal bankruptcy if they lose part of their investments. Events of this kind may lead to a social catastrophe. We propose discrimination among the claimants as a possible solution. A fact considered in the American bankruptcy law (among others) that establishes some discrimination on the claimants, or the Santander Bank that in the Madoff’s case reimbursed only the deposits to its particular customers. Moreover, the necessity of discriminating has already been mentioned in different contexts by Young (1988), Bossert (1995), Thomson (2003) and Pulido et al. (2002, 2007), for instance. In this paper, we take a bankruptcy solution as the reference point. Given this initial allocation, we make transfers from richer to poorer with the purpose of distributing not only the personal incurred losses as evenly as possible but also the transfers in a progressive way. The agents are divided into two groups depending on their personal monetary value (wealth, net-income, GDP or any other characteristic). Then, we impose a set of Axioms that bound the maximal transfer that each net-contributor can make and each net-receiver can obtain. Finally, we define a value discriminant solution, and we characterize it by means of the Lorenz criterion. Endogenous convex combinations between solutions are also considered. Keywords: Bankruptcy, Discrimination, Compensation, Rules JEL classification: C71, D63, D71.