Market institutions and judicial rulemaking

Assuming that the degree of discretion granted to judges was the main distinguishing feature between common and civil law until the 19th century, we argue that constraining judicial discretion was instrumental in protecting freedom of contract and developing the market order in civil law. We test this hypothesis by analyzing the history of Western law. In England, a unique institutional balance between the Crown and the Parliament guaranteed private property and prompted the gradual evolution towards a legal framework that facilitated market relationships, a process that was supported by the English judiciary. On the Continent, however, legal constraints on the market were suppressed in a top-down fashion by the founders of the liberal state, often against the will of the incumbent judiciary. Constraining judicial discretion there was essential for enforcing freedom of contract and establishing the legal order of the market economy. In line with this evidence, our selection hypothesis casts doubts on the normative interpretation of empirical results that proclaim the superiority of one legal system over another, disregarding the local conditions and institutional interdependencies on which each legal system was grounded.

The Law of Impersonal Transactions: Meaning and Difficulties

Most economic interactions happen in a context of sequential exchange in which innocent third parties suffer information asymmetry with respect to previous "originative" contracts. The law reduces transaction costs by protecting these third parties but preserves some element of consent by property right holders to avoid damaging property enforcement-e.g., it is they as principals who authorize agents in originative contracts. Judicial verifiability of these originative contracts is obtained either as an automatic byproduct of transactions or, when these would have remained private, by requiring them to be made public. Protecting third parties produces a sort of legal commodity which is easy to trade impersonally, improving the allocation and specialization of resources. Historical delay in generalizing this legal commoditization paradigm is attributed to path dependency-the law first developed for personal trade-and an unbalance in vested interests, as luddite legal professionals face weak public bureaucracies.

Common law and civil law as pro-market adaptations

We argue that in the development of the Western legal system, cognitive departures are themain determinant of the optimal degree of judicial rule-making. Judicial discretion, seen here as the main distinguishing feature between both legal systems, is introduced in civil law jurisdictions to protect, rather than to limit, freedom of contract against potential judicial backlash. Such protection was unnecessary in common law countries, where free-market relations enjoyed safer judicial ground mainly due to their relatively gradual evolution, their reliance on practitioners as judges, and the earlier development of institutional checks and balances that supported private property rights. In our framework, differences in costs and benefits associated with self-interest and lack of information require a cognitive failure to be active.

Standardized enforcement: Access to justice vs contractual innovation

We model the different ways in which precedents and contract standardization shapethe development of markets and the law. In a setup where more resourceful parties candistort contract enforcement to their advantage, we find that the introduction of astandard contract reduces enforcement distortions relative to precedents, exerting twoeffects: i) it statically expands the volume of trade, but ii) it crowds out the use ofinnovative contracts, hindering contractual innovation. We shed light on the largescale commercial codification occurred in the 19th century in many countries (evenCommon Law ones) during a period of booming commerce and long distance trade.

Standardized enforcement: Access to justice vs. contractual innovation

We model the effect of contract standardization on the development of markets andthe law. In a setting in which biased judges can distort contract enforcement, we findthat the introduction of a standard contract reduces enforcement distortions relative toreliance on precedents, exerting two effects: i) it statically expands the volume of trade,but ii) it crowds out the use of open-ended contracts, hindering legal evolution. We shedlight on the large-scale commercial codification undertaken in the nineteenth centuryin many countries (even common-law ones) during a period of booming commerce andlong-distance trade.

The law of impersonal transactions

Most economic interactions happen in a context of sequential exchangein which innocent third parties suffer information asymmetry with respect toprevious "originative" contracts. The law reduces transaction costs byprotecting these third parties but preserves some element of consent byproperty rightholders to avoid damaging property enforcement?e.g., it isthey, as principals, who authorize agents in originative contracts. Judicialverifiability of these originative contracts is obtained either as an automaticbyproduct of transactions or, when these would have remained private, byrequiring them to be made public. Protecting third parties produces a legalcommodity which is easy to trade impersonally, improving the allocationand specialization of resources. Historical delay in generalizing this legalcommoditization paradigm is attributed to path dependency?the law firstdeveloped for personal trade?and an unbalance in vested interests, asluddite legal professionals face weak public bureaucracies.

Are traffic violators criminals? Searching for answers in experiences of European countries

The connection between road traffic safety and criminal behavior has recently become a topic of interest in the literature, although little emphasis placed on the relationship with road accidents. Evidence worldwide shows that people who commit other offences characteristic of antisocial attitudes, are more prone to suffer road traffic accidents and infringe traffic laws. Here we examine the records of the 28 current member states of the European Union over the period 1999 - 2010. Our aim is to test the hypothesis that crime rates (and specifically, motor vehicle-related crimes) may be considered as predictors of fatal road traffic accidents. If they may, this could justify, at least prima facie, the tendency in several countries to consider traffic offences as crimes in their penal codes and to toughen the punishment imposed on those who commit them. We also analyze the effect of the severity of the legal system applied to traffic offences. Our results reveal that road traffic fatality rates are higher in countries whose inhabitants have more aggressive behavior, while the rates are lower in countries with more severe penal systems.

Are traffic violators criminals? Searching for answers in experiences of European countries

The connection between road traffic safety and criminal behavior has recently become a topic of interest in the literature, although little emphasis placed on the relationship with road accidents. Evidence worldwide shows that people who commit other offences characteristic of antisocial attitudes, are more prone to suffer road traffic accidents and infringe traffic laws. Here we examine the records of the 28 current member states of the European Union over the period 1999 - 2010. Our aim is to test the hypothesis that crime rates (and specifically, motor vehicle-related crimes) may be considered as predictors of fatal road traffic accidents. If they may, this could justify, at least prima facie, the tendency in several countries to consider traffic offences as crimes in their penal codes and to toughen the punishment imposed on those who commit them. We also analyze the effect of the severity of the legal system applied to traffic offences. Our results reveal that road traffic fatality rates are higher in countries whose inhabitants have more aggressive behavior, while the rates are lower in countries with more severe penal systems.