Inter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game

We study how conflict in a contest game is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our main motivation stems from the analysis of socio-political conflict. The relevant theoretical prediction in our setting is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and independent of whether punishment is available or not. We find, first, that our results contradict the independence of group-size prediction: conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are substantially above equilibrium. Towards the end of the experiment material losses in groups are 257% of the predicted level. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity in the investment behaviour of individual group members. Second, allowing group members to punish each other after individual contributions to the contest effort are revealed leads to even larger conflict expenditures. Now material losses are 869% of the equilibrium level and there is much less heterogeneity in individual group members' investments. These results contrast strongly with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency and leads to higher material payoffs.

The Measurement of social polarization in a multi-group context

Polarization indices presented up to now have only focused their attention on the distribution of income/wealth. However, in many circumstances income is not the only relevant dimension that might be the cause of social conflict, so it is very important to have a social polarization index able to cope with alternative dimensions. In this paper we present an axiomatic characterization of one of such indices: it has been obtained as an extension of the (income) polarization measure introduced in Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) to a wider domain. It turns out that the axiomatic structure introduced in that paper alone is not appropriate to obtain a fully satisfactory characterization of our measure, so additional axioms are proposed. As a byproduct, we present an alternative axiomatization of the aforementioned income polarization measure.

Metric properties of the braided Thompson's groups

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."

Individual versus group strategy-proofness: when do they coincide?

A social choice function is group strategy-proof on a domain if no group of agents can manipulate its final outcome to their own benefit by declaring false preferences on that domain. Group strategy-proofness is a very attractive requirement of incentive compatibility. But in many cases it is hard or impossible to find nontrivial social choice functions satisfying even the weakest condition of individual strategy-proofness. However, there are a number of economically significant domains where interesting rules satisfying individual strategy-proofness can be defined, and for some of them, all these rules turn out to also satisfy the stronger requirement of group strategy-proofness. This is the case, for example, when preferences are single-peaked or single-dipped. In other cases, this equivalence does not hold. We provide sufficient conditions defining domains of preferences guaranteeing that individual and group strategy-proofness are equivalent for all rules defined on the

Conjugacy in Thompson's groups

We give a unified solution the conjugacy problem in Thompson’s groups F, V , and T using strand diagrams, and we analyze the complexity of the resulting algorithms.

The simultaneous conjugacy problem in groups of piecewise linear functions

Guba and Sapir asked, in their joint paper [8], if the simultaneous conjugacy problem was solvable in Diagram Groups or, at least, for Thompson's group F. We give an elementary proof for the solution of the latter question. This relies purely on the description of F as the group of piecewise linear orientation-preserving homeomorphisms of the unit. The techniques we develop allow us also to solve the ordinary conjugacy problem as well, and we can compute roots and centralizers. Moreover, these techniques can be generalized to solve the same questions in larger groups of piecewise-linear homeomorphisms.

The loop group and the cobar construction

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."

Singular integrals on Ahlfors-David regular subsets of the Heisenberg group

"Vegeu el resum a l'inici del document del fitxer adjunt."

An irreducibility criterion for group representations, with arithmetic applications

We prove a criterion for the irreducibility of an integral group representation p over the fraction field of a noetherian domain R in terms of suitably defined reductions of p at prime ideals of R. As applications, we give irreducibility results for universal deformations of residual representations, with a special attention to universal deformations of residual Galois representations associated with modular forms of weight at least 2.

Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results

We define different concepts of group strategy-proofness for social choice functions. We discuss the connections between the defined concepts under different assumptions on their domains of definition. We characterize the social choice functions that satisfy each one of them and whose ranges consist of two alternatives, in terms of two types of basic properties.

Sistema de votació electrònica sobre corbes el·líptques amb mescla de vots mitjançant Random Group Full Checking

L'objectiu del treball és dissenyar i implementar un sistema de simulació de votació electrònica, emprant una adaptació sobre corbes el·líptiques del criptosistema ElGamal, per tal d'estudiar-ne la viabilitat, centrant l'atenció en temes de seguretat, especialment en el procés de mescla de vots per tal de desvincular un vot de la persona que l'ha emès.

Internal test sets studies in a group of antimalarials

Topological indices have been applied to build QSAR models for a set of 20 antimalarial cyclic peroxy cetals. In order to evaluate the reliability of the proposed linear models leave-n-out and Internal Test Sets (ITS) approaches have been considered. The proposed procedure resulted in a robust and consensued prediction equation and here it is shown why it is superior to the employed standard cross-validation algorithms involving multilinear regression models