46 resultados para Theory of Relativity,
Resumo:
This paper makes several contributions to the growing literatureon the economics of religion. First, we explicitly introduce spatial-location models into the economics of religion. Second, we offer a newexplanation for the observed tendency of state (monopoly) churches tolocate toward the "low-tension" end of the "strictness continuum" (ina one-dimensional product space): This result is obtained through theconjunction of "benevolent preferences" (denominations care about theaggregate utility of members) and asymmetric costs of going to a moreor less strict church than one prefers.We also derive implications regarding the relationship between religiousstrictness and membership. The driving forces of our analysis, religiousmarket interactions and asymmetric costs of membership, high-light newexplanations for some well-established stylized facts. The analysis opensthe way to new empirical tests, aimed at confronting the implications ofour model against more traditional explanations.
Resumo:
In this paper we analyze sanctioning policies in international law. We develop a model of international military conflict where the conflicting countries can be a target of international sanctions. These sanctions constitute an equilibrium outcome of an international political market for sanctions, where different countries trade political influence. We show that the level of sanctions in equilibrium is strictly positive but limited, in the sense that higher sanctions would exacerbate the military conflict, not reduce it. We then propose an alternative interpretation to the perceived lack of effectiveness of international sanctions, by showing that the problem might not be one of undersanctioning but of oversanctioning.
Resumo:
The objective of this note is to analyze some implications of the model of commodity money described in Banerjee and Maskin (1996) which may seem paradoxical. In order to do this, we incorporate a general production cost structure into the model. We focus on two different results. First, the existence of technologies that make counterfeiting a commodity more difficult may exclude it from being used as medium of exchange. Second, allocative distortions due to problems of asymmetric information may become larger in the presence of such technologies.
Resumo:
Registering originative business contracts allows entrepreneurs and creditors to choose, andcourts to enforce market-friendly contract rules that protect innocent third parties whenadjudicating disputes on subsequent contracts. This reduces information asymmetry for thirdparties, which enhances impersonal trade. It does so without seriously weakening property rights,because it is rightholders who choose or activate the legal rules and can, therefore, minimize thecost of any possible weakening. Registries are essential not only to make the chosen rules publicbut to ensure rightholders commitment and avoid rule-gaming, because independent registriesmake rightholders choices verifiable by courts. The theory is supported by comparative andhistorical analyses.
Resumo:
We present a leverage theory of reputation building with co-branding. We showthat under certain conditions, co-branding that links unknown firms in a new sectorwith established firms in a mature sector allows the unknown firms to signal a highproduct quality and establish their own reputation. We compare this situationwith a benchmark in which both sectors are new and firms signal their qualityonly with prices. We investigate how this comparison is affected by the nature ofthe technology linking the two sectors and a cross-sector inference problem thatconsumers might face in identifying the true cause of product failure. We find thatco-branding facilitates the process in which a Þrm in the new sector to signal itsproduct quality only if the co-branding sectors produce complementary inputs andconsumers face a cross-sector inference problem. We apply our insight to economicsof superstars, multinational firms and co-authorship.
Resumo:
Extensive field and experimental evidence in a variety of environments show that behavior depends on a reference point. This paper provides an axiomatic characterization of this dependence. We proceed by imposing gradually more structure on both choice correspondences and preference relations, requiring increasingly higher levels of rationality, and freeing the decision-maker from certain types of inconsistencies. The appropriate degree of behavioral structure will depend on the phenomenon that is to be modeled. Lastly, we provide two applications of our work: one to model the status-quo bias, and another to model addictive behavior.
Resumo:
We analyze the implications of a market imperfection related to the inability to establish intellectual property rights, that we label {\it unverifiable communication}. Employees are able to collude with external parties selling ``knowledge capital'' of the firm. The firm organizer engages in strategic interaction simultaneously with employees and competitors, as she introduces endogenous transaction costs in the market for information between those agents. Incentive schemes and communication costs are the key strategic variables used by the firm to induce frictions in collusive markets. Unverifiable communication introduces severe allocative distortions, both at internal product development and at intended sale of information (technology transfer). We derive implications of the model for observable decisions like characteristics of the employment relationship (full employment, incompatibility with other jobs), firms' preferences over cluster characteristics for location decisions, optimal size at entry, in--house development vs sale strategies for innovations and industry evolution.
Resumo:
This paper advances a highly tractable model with search theoretic foundations for money and neoclassical growth. In the model, manufacturingand commerce are distinct and separate activities. In manufacturing,goods are efficiently produced combining capital and labor. In commerce,goods are exchanged in bilateral meetings. The model is applied to studythe effects of inßation on capital accumulation and welfare. With realisticparameters, inflation has large negative effects on welfare even though itraises capital and output. In contrast, with cash-in-advance, a deviceinformally motivated with bilateral trading, inflation depresses capitaland output and has a negligible effect on welfare.
Resumo:
This paper presents a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model thatcan explain cross-country empirical regularities in geographical mobility,unemployment and labor market institutions. Rational agents vote overunemployment insurance (UI), taking the dynamic distortionary effects ofinsurance on the performance of the labor market into consideration.Agents with higher cost of moving, i.e., more attached to their currentlocation, prefer more generous UI. The key assumption is that an agent'sattachment to a location increases the longer she has resided there. UIreduces the incentive for labor mobility and increases, therefore, thefraction of attached agents and the political support for UI. The mainresult is that this self-reinforcing mechanism can give rise to multiplesteady-states-one 'European' steady-state featuring high unemployment,low geographical mobility and high unemployment insurance, and one'American' steady-state featuring low unemployment, high mobility andlow unemployment insurance.
Resumo:
This article designs what it calls a Credit-Risk Balance Sheet (the risk being that of default by customers), a tool which, in principle, can contribute to revealing, controlling and managing the bad debt risk arising from a company¿s commercial credit, whose amount can represent a significant proportion of both its current and total assets.To construct it, we start from the duality observed in any credit transaction of this nature, whose basic identity can be summed up as Credit = Risk. ¿Credit¿ is granted by a company to its customer, and can be ranked by quality (we suggest the credit scoring system) and ¿risk¿ can either be assumed (interiorised) by the company itself or transferred to third parties (exteriorised).What provides the approach that leads to us being able to talk with confidence of a real Credit-Risk Balance Sheet with its methodological robustness is that the dual vision of the credit transaction is not, as we demonstrate, merely a classificatory duality (a double risk-credit classification of reality) but rather a true causal relationship, that is, a risk-credit causal duality.Once said Credit-Risk Balance Sheet (which bears a certain structural similarity with the classic net asset balance sheet) has been built, and its methodological coherence demonstrated, its properties ¿static and dynamic¿ are studied.Analysis of the temporal evolution of the Credit-Risk Balance Sheet and of its applications will be the object of subsequent works.
Resumo:
This article has an immediate predecessor, upon which it is based and with which readers must necessarily be familiar: Towards a Theory of the Credit-Risk Balance Sheet (Vallverdú, Somoza and Moya, 2006). The Balance Sheet is conceptualised on the basis of the duality of a credit-based transaction; it deals with its theoretical foundations, providing evidence of a causal credit-risk duality, that is, a true causal relationship; its characteristics, properties and its static and dynamic characteristics are analyzed. This article, which provides a logical continuation to the previous one, studies the evolution of the structure of the Credit-Risk Balance Sheet as a consequence of a business¿s dynamics in the credit area. Given the Credit-Risk Balance Sheet of a company at any given time, it attempts to estimate, by means of sequential analysis, its structural evolution, showing its usefulness in the management and control of credit and risk. To do this, it bases itself, with the necessary adaptations, on the by-now classic works of Palomba and Cutolo. The establishment of the corresponding transformation matrices allows one to move from an initial balance sheet structure to a final, future one, to understand its credit-risk situation trends, as well as to make possible its monitoring and control, basic elements in providing support for risk management.
Resumo:
We work out a semiclassical theory of shot noise in ballistic n+-i-n+ semiconductor structures aiming at studying two fundamental physical correlations coming from Pauli exclusion principle and long-range Coulomb interaction. The theory provides a unifying scheme which, in addition to the current-voltage characteristics, describes the suppression of shot noise due to Pauli and Coulomb correlations in the whole range of system parameters and applied bias. The whole scenario is summarized by a phase diagram in the plane of two dimensionless variables related to the sample length and contact chemical potential. Here different regions of physical interest can be identified where only Coulomb or only Pauli correlations are active, or where both are present with different relevance. The predictions of the theory are proven to be fully corroborated by Monte Carlo simulations.
Resumo:
This article designs what it calls a Credit-Risk Balance Sheet (the risk being that of default by customers), a tool which, in principle, can contribute to revealing, controlling and managing the bad debt risk arising from a company¿s commercial credit, whose amount can represent a significant proportion of both its current and total assets.To construct it, we start from the duality observed in any credit transaction of this nature, whose basic identity can be summed up as Credit = Risk. ¿Credit¿ is granted by a company to its customer, and can be ranked by quality (we suggest the credit scoring system) and ¿risk¿ can either be assumed (interiorised) by the company itself or transferred to third parties (exteriorised).What provides the approach that leads to us being able to talk with confidence of a real Credit-Risk Balance Sheet with its methodological robustness is that the dual vision of the credit transaction is not, as we demonstrate, merely a classificatory duality (a double risk-credit classification of reality) but rather a true causal relationship, that is, a risk-credit causal duality.Once said Credit-Risk Balance Sheet (which bears a certain structural similarity with the classic net asset balance sheet) has been built, and its methodological coherence demonstrated, its properties ¿static and dynamic¿ are studied.Analysis of the temporal evolution of the Credit-Risk Balance Sheet and of its applications will be the object of subsequent works.
Resumo:
This article has an immediate predecessor, upon which it is based and with which readers must necessarily be familiar: Towards a Theory of the Credit-Risk Balance Sheet (Vallverdú, Somoza and Moya, 2006). The Balance Sheet is conceptualised on the basis of the duality of a credit-based transaction; it deals with its theoretical foundations, providing evidence of a causal credit-risk duality, that is, a true causal relationship; its characteristics, properties and its static and dynamic characteristics are analyzed. This article, which provides a logical continuation to the previous one, studies the evolution of the structure of the Credit-Risk Balance Sheet as a consequence of a business¿s dynamics in the credit area. Given the Credit-Risk Balance Sheet of a company at any given time, it attempts to estimate, by means of sequential analysis, its structural evolution, showing its usefulness in the management and control of credit and risk. To do this, it bases itself, with the necessary adaptations, on the by-now classic works of Palomba and Cutolo. The establishment of the corresponding transformation matrices allows one to move from an initial balance sheet structure to a final, future one, to understand its credit-risk situation trends, as well as to make possible its monitoring and control, basic elements in providing support for risk management.