The Strategic value of European renewable energy promotion policy

Encara falta per fer possible una transformació estratègica d'Europa del sistema d'energia, però el que és de la mateixa importància com a objectius a llarg termini de la FER i Reduccions de GEH són vinculants i forts objectius d'eficiència energètica, no només per 2020, però també per al 2030, 2040 i 2050, com aquesta força ajudaria a fixar l'augment de les energies renovables en el total d'energia consum i per reduir el total Emissions de GEH d'Europa en general, i les del sector de l'energia en particular, encara sent un dels majors emissors de gasos d'efecte hivernacle de tots els sectors. La refosa Directiva, prevista per 2011/12 ha de ser un bones finestres d'oportunitat per finalment establir objectius vinculants d'eficiència energètica, l'únic pilar que encara falta en la força energia interdependents i estratègia sobre el clima de la UE, basat en la reducció de gasos d'efecte hivernacle i i l'eficiència energètica.

Technological convergence: a strategic perspective

The information and communication technologies (ICT) sectors are in a process of technological convergence. Determinant factors in this process are the liberalisation of the telecommunications markets and technological change. Many firms are engaged in a process of mergers and alliances to position themselves in this new framework. Technological and demand uncertainties are very important. Our objective in this paper is to study the economic determinants of the strategies of the firms. With this aim, we review some key technological and demand aspects. We shed some light on the strategic motivations of the firms by establishing a parallel with the evolution of the retailing sector

Business Exits entail greater future levels of entrepreneurship? An empirical analysis at country level

Using Global Entrepreneurship Monitor data for 41 countries this study investigates the impact of business exit on entrepreneurial activity at the country level. The paper distinguishes between two types of entrepreneurial activity according with the motive to start a new business: entrepreneurs driven by opportunity and necessity motives. The findings indicate that exits have a positive impact on future levels of entrepreneurial activity in a country. For each exit in a given year, a larger proportion of entrepreneurial activity the following year. Moreover, this e ffect turns out to be higher for opportunity entrepreneurs. The findings indicate that both types of entrepreneurial activity rates are influenced by the same factors and in the same direction. However, for some factors we find a di fferential impact on the entrepreneurship. The results show some important implications given that business exit may be overcome when there is a necessity motivation. This has important implications for both researchers and policy makers. JEL codes: L26. Keywords: Entrepreneurship, business exit, social values

Strategic Delegations in Monetary Unions

In monetary unions, monetary policy is typically made by delegates of the member countries. This procedure raises the possibility of strategic delegation - that countries may choose the types of delegates to influence outcomes in their favor. We show that without commitment in monetary policy, strategic delegation arises if and only if three conditions are met: shocks affecting individual countries are not perfectly correlated, risk-sharing across countries is imperfect, and the Phillips Curve is nonlinear. Moreover, inflation rates are inefficiently high. We argue that ways of solving the commitment problem, including the emphasis on price stability in the agreements constituting the European Union are especially valuable when strategic delegation is a problem.

Cooperative games in strategic form

In this paper we view bargaining and cooperation as an interaction superimposed on a strategic form game. A multistage bargaining procedure for N players, the proposer commitment procedure, is presented. It is inspired by Nash s two-player variable-threat model; a key feature is the commitment to threats. We establish links to classical cooperative game theory solutions, such as the Shapley value in the transferable utility case. However, we show that even in standard pure exchange economies the traditional coalitional function may not be adequate when utilities are not transferable.

Entrepreneurship, organization and economic performance among Spanish firms, 1930-1975. The case of the motor industry

Before the Civil War (1936-1939), Spain had seen the emergence offirms of complex organizational forms. However, the conflict andthe postwar years changed this pattern. The argument put forwardin this paper is based on historical experience, the efforts willbe addressed to explain the development of Spanish entrepreneurshipduring the second half of the twentieth century. To illustrate thechange in entrepreneurship and organizational patterns among theSpanish firms during the Francoist regime we will turn to the caseof the motor vehicle industry.

A foundation for strategic agenda voting

We offer complete characterizations of the equilibrium outcomesof two prominent agenda voting institutions that are widely used in the democraticworld: the amendment, also known as the Anglo-American procedure,and the successive, or equivalently the Euro-Latin procedure. Our axiomaticapproach provides a proper understanding of these voting institutions, and allowscomparisons between them, and with other voting procedures.

On payoff heterogeneity in games with strategic complementarities

Payoff heterogeneity weakens positive feedback in binary choice models intwo ways. First, heterogeneity drives individuals to corners where theyare unaffected by strategic complementarities. Second, aggregate behaviouris smoother than individual behaviour when individuals are heterogeneous.However, this smoothing does not necessarily eliminate positive feedbackor guarantee a unique equilibrium. In games with an unbounded, continuouschoice space, heterogeneity may either weaken or strengthen positive feedback,depending on a simple convexity/concavity condition. We conclude that positivefeedback phenomena derived in representative agent models will often be robustto heterogeneity.

Measuring strategic uncertainty in coordination games

This paper explores three aspects of strategic uncertainty: its relation to risk, predictability of behavior and subjective beliefs of players. In a laboratory experiment we measure subjects certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Behavior in coordination games is related to risk aversion, experience seeking, and age.From the distribution of certainty equivalents we estimate probabilities for successful coordination in a wide range of games. For many games, success of coordination is predictable with a reasonable error rate. The best response to observed behavior is close to the global-game solution. Comparing choices in coordination games with revealed risk aversion, we estimate subjective probabilities for successful coordination. In games with a low coordination requirement, most subjects underestimate the probability of success. In games with a high coordination requirement, most subjects overestimate this probability. Estimating probabilistic decision models, we show that the quality of predictions can be improved when individual characteristics are taken into account. Subjects behavior is consistent with probabilistic beliefs about the aggregate outcome, but inconsistent with probabilistic beliefs about individual behavior.

Strategic behavior and price discovery

The paper analyzes the effects of strategic behavior by an insider in a price discovery process, akin to an information tatonnement, in the presence of a competitive informed sector. Such processes are used in the preopening period of continuous trading systems in several exchanges. It is found that the insider manipulates the market using a contrarian strategy in order to neutralize the effect of the trades of competitive informed agents. Furthermore, consistently with the empirical evidence available, we find that information revelation accelerates close to the opening, that the market price does not converge to the fundamental value no matter how many rounds the tatonnement has, and that the expected trading volume displays a U-shaped pattern. We also find that a market with a larger competitive sector (smaller insider) has an improved informational efficiency and an increased trading volume. The insider provides a public good (a lower informativeness of the price) for the competitive informed sector.

Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty

This paper introduces a new solution concept, a minimax regret equilibrium, which allows for the possibility that players are uncertain about the rationality and conjectures of their opponents. We provide several applications of our concept. In particular, we consider pricesetting environments and show that optimal pricing policy follows a non-degenerate distribution. The induced price dispersion is consistent with experimental and empirical observations (Baye and Morgan (2004)).

Does foreign direct investment crowd out domestic entrepreneurship?

In analyzing firm entry and exit across Belgian manufacturing industries,this paper presents evidence that import competition and foreign directinvestment discourage entry and stimulate exit of domestic entrepreneurs.These results are in line with theoretical occupational choice modelsthat predict foreign direct investment would crowd out domesticentrepreneurs through their selections in product and labor markets.However, the empirical results also suggest that this crowding out effectmay be moderated or even reversed in the long-run due to the long termpositive effects of FDI on domestic entrpreneurship as a result oflearning, demonstration, networking and linkage effects between foreignand domestic firms.

Strategic delegation in monetary unions

In monetary unions, monetary policy is typically made by delegates of the member countries. This procedure raises the possibility of strategic delegation - that countries may choose the types of delegates to influence outcomes in their favor. We show that without commitment in monetary policy, strategic delegation arises if and only if three conditions are met: shocks affecting individual countries are not perfectly correlated, risk-sharing across countries is imperfect, and the Phillips Curve is nonlinear. Moreover, inflation rates are inefficiently high. We argue that ways of solving the commitment problem, including the emphasis on price stability in the agreements constituting the European Union are especially valuable when strategic delegation is a problem.

Strategic ambiguity in electoral competition

Many have observed that political candidates running for election areoften purposefully expressing themselves in vague and ambiguous terms. In thispaper we provide a simple formal model of this phenomenon. We model theelectoral competition between two candidates as a two--stage game. In thefirst stage of the game two candidates simultaneously choose their ideologies,and in the second stage they simultaneously choose their level of ambiguity.Our results show that ambiguity, although disliked by voters, may be sustainedin equilibrium. The introduction of ambiguity as a strategic choice variablefor the candidates can also serve to explain why candidates with the sameelectoral objectives end up ``separating'', that is, assuming different ideological positions.