Can You Home Again? Desertion and Control of Hometowns in Civil Wars

What allows an armed group in a civil war to prevent desertion? This paper addresses this question with a focus on control in the rearguard. Most past studies focus on motivations for desertion. They explain desertion in terms of where soldiers stand in relation to the macro themes of the war, or in terms of an inability to provide positive incentives to overcome the collective action problem. However, since individuals decide whether and how to participate in civil wars for multiple reasons, responding to a variety of local conditions in an environment of threat and violence, a focus only on macro-level motivations is incomplete. The opportunities side of the ledger deserves more attention. I therefore turn my attention to how control by an armed group eliminates soldiers’ opportunities to desert. In particular, I consider the control that an armed group maintains over soldiers’ hometowns, treating geographic terrain as an important exogenous indicator of the ease of control. Rough terrain at home affords soldiers and their families and friends advantages in ease of hiding, the difficulty of using force, and local knowledge. Based on an original dataset of soldiers from Santander Province in the Spanish Civil War, gathered from archival sources, I find statistical evidence that the rougher the terrain in a soldier’s home municipality, the more likely he is to desert. I find complementary qualitative evidence indicating that soldiers from rough-terrain communities took active advantage of their greater opportunities for evasion. This finding has important implications for the way observers interpret different soldiers’ decisions to desert or remain fighting, for the prospect that structural factors may shape the cohesion of armed groups, and for the possibility that local knowledge may be a double-edged sword, making soldiers simultaneously good at fighting and good at deserting.

La evaluación de la reducción de amenazas en el Parque Natural de la Zona Volcánica de la Garrotxa (Girona)

En este artículo se presenta la metodología y los resultados derivados de la aplicación de una adaptación del denominado modelo de evaluación de reducción de amenazas (Threat Reduction Assesment) en el Parque Natural de la Zona Volcánica de la Garrotxa (PNZVG). Endefinitiva, se pretende valorar la efectividad de la gestión a partir del grado de reducción de amenazas en el PNZVG. El estudio se realizó a partir de la elaboración de una evaluación externa e independiente, que ha contado a la vez con una estrecha colaboración de los órganos gestores y rectores del Parque, así como con una activa participación de distintos agentes sociales clave. Se concluye que, después de veinticinco años de existencia del Parque, muchas de las amenazas iniciales sólo se han reducido de forma modesta e incluso a partir del índice adaptado, considerado un enfoque más realista; con lo cual se llega a la preocupante conclusión de que algunas de las amenazas más importantes se han incrementado

Prevención de los comportamientos sexuales de riesgo en los adolescentes: SIDA, otras enfermedades de transmisión sexual y embarazos no deseados

En la actualidad, los adolescentes son uno de los grupos que por sus características conductuales, cognitivas y sociales, se encuentran en mayor riesgo frente al posible contagio con el VIH. Esta amenaza para la salud y el bienestar de los adolescentes, se ha venido a sumar a otros problemas ya existentes en este colectivo: los embarazos no deseados y las enfermedades de transmisión sexual (ETS), que también se derivan de la no utilización de precauciones en las relaciones sexuales. En este trabajo se exponen diversos factores biológicos, psicológicos (conductuales y cognitivos) y sociales que pueden facilitar, dificultar o impedir los comportamientos sexuales de prevención de los adolescentes, y se revisan y valoran algunas de las intervenciones preventivas realizadas. A partir de esta revisión se argumenta sobre la conveniencia de unificar los programas para la prevención simultánea de los tres trastornos, maximizando de esta forma los recursos disponibles

Ecologia del tram final del riu Ebre: la comunitat de macròfits i macroinvertebrats associats

Durant els últims anys al tram final del riu Ebre s’han produit canvis molt importants a l’ecosistema fluvial: l’augment de la transparència de l’aigua ha comportat una proliferació massiva de macròfits que ha provocat canvis en l’estructura tròfica i en la composició de les comunitats biològiques, representant un greu perill per espècies amenaçades com Margaritifera auricularia. A més del problema ecològic, els macròfits estan provocant molts problemes socio-econòmics perjudicant les captacions d’aigua (centrals nuclears, hidroelèctriques i regadius), creant problemes per a la navegació fluvial, i afavorint la proliferació d’espècies molestes com la mosca negra (Simulium erythrocephalum). Entre les diferents causes que podrien explicar aquests canvis en l’ecosistema hi ha: la disminució del fòsfor dissolt, la regularització i la disminució de cabals, i l’aparició d’espècies introduides com el musclo zebra. Segurament es tractarà d’un efecte combinat de les diferents causes però és necessari analitzar-les per tal de conèixer quines tenen més incidència i així, poder proposar mesures de gestió per als problemes ecològics que pateix el tram final de l’Ebre. Al present projecte de tesi (inclós en el projecte d’I+D: efectes de la millora de la qualitat de l'aigua i de l'alteració del règim de cabals sobre les comunitats biològiques del tram final del riu Ebre) s’estudiarà la comunitat de macròfits i macroinvertebrats associats per tal de determinar el paper que tenen en el canvis que s’han produit al riu durant els últims anys.

Context switching accounting mechanism

How many times a given process p preempts, either voluntarily or involuntarily, is an important threat to computer's processes throughput. Whenever running cpu-bound processes on a multi-core system without an actual system grid engine as commonly found on Grid Clusters, their performance and stability are directly related to their accurate implementation and the system reliability which is, to an extend, an important caveat most of the times so difficult to detect. Context Switching is time-consuming. Thus, if we could develop a tool capable of detecting it and gather data from every single performed Context Switch, we would beable to study this data and present some results that should pin-point at whatever their main cause could be.

Europe’s experience in countering radicalization: approaches and challenges

For the last decade Europe has perceived itself to be under a constant threat from jihadistinspired terrorism. Terrorist organizations motivated by other ideologies are still active throughout the European Union, but the 2010 Europol annual report clearly states that “Islamist terrorism is still perceived as the biggest threat to most Member States,” and statements from the highest-ranking officials in most European countries confirm this observation (EUROPOL, 2010, p. 6). Authorities base their assessment on the extensive intelligence and investigative activities directed against jihadist networks taking place in virtually every European country. On average, in fact, European authorities arrest some 200 individuals and thwart a handful of plots of jihadist inspiration every year (EUROPOL, 2009). Keeping the global scenario in mind, European authorities deem this dynamic likely to continue in the foreseeable future.

Reconciling context and contact with immigrants effects: an examination of the Catalan case

Contact theory and threat group theory offer contradictory hypotheses regarding the effect of contact with immigrants. Despite recent efforts to test the validity of both approaches, we still lack a definitive conclusion. This article integrates both approaches and tests the effect of contact towards immigrants and how this changes when different contexts are considered. Mainly, we investigate the effect of the economic environment and the immigrant group size on modifying attitudes toward immigration. The hypotheses, which are tested in Catalonia, show that contact with immigrants reduce negative attitudes towards immigration, especially friendship and family contact. However, mixed results are reported regarding the effect of economic environment and immigrant group size. Whereas the former modifies positively the effect of workplace contact, the latter has no effect. Findings have implications for the impact of context when dealing with the impact of contact on attitudes towards immigration.

Interbank Competition with Costly Screening

We analyse credit market equilibrium when banks screen loan applicants. When banks have a convex cost function of screening, a pure strategy equilibrium exists where banks optimally set interest rates at the same level as their competitors. This result complements Broecker s (1990) analysis, where he demonstrates that no pure strategy equilibrium exists when banks have zero screening costs. In our set up we show that interest rate on loans are largely independent of marginal costs, a feature consistent with the extant empirical evidence. In equilibrium, banks make positive profits in our model in spite of the threat of entry by inactive banks. Moreover, an increase in the number of active banks increases credit risk and so does not improve credit market effciency: this point has important regulatory implications. Finally, we extend our analysis to the case where banks have differing screening abilities.

Stakeholder Activism, Managerial Entrenchment, and the Congruence of Interests between Shareholders and Stakeholders

We argue that when stakeholder protection is left to the voluntary initiative of managers, concessions to social activists and pressure groups can turn into a self-entrenchment strategy for incumbent CEOs. Stakeholders other than shareholders thus benefit from corporate governance rules putting managers under a tough replacement threat. We show that a minimal amount of formal stakeholder protection, or the introduction of explicit covenants protecting stakeholder rights in the firm charter, may deprive CEOs of the alliance with powerful social activists, thus increasing managerial turnover and shareholder value. These results rationalize a recent trend whereby well-known social activists like Friends of the Earth and active shareholders like CalPERS are showing a growing support for each other s agendas.

Cooperative games in strategic form

In this paper we view bargaining and cooperation as an interaction superimposed on a strategic form game. A multistage bargaining procedure for N players, the proposer commitment procedure, is presented. It is inspired by Nash s two-player variable-threat model; a key feature is the commitment to threats. We establish links to classical cooperative game theory solutions, such as the Shapley value in the transferable utility case. However, we show that even in standard pure exchange economies the traditional coalitional function may not be adequate when utilities are not transferable.

Campaign rhetoric: A model of reputation

We analyze conditions under which a candidate's campaignrhetoric may affect the beliefs of the voters over whatpolicy the candidate will implement in case he wins theelection. We develop a model of repeated elections withcomplete information in which candidates are purely ideological. Voter's strategies involve a credible threat to punish candidates that renege of their campaignpromises, and in equilibrium all campaign promises arebelieved by voters, and honored by candidates. We obtainthat the degree to which promises are credible in equilibriumis an increasing function of the value of a candidate'sreputation.

How binding are legal limits? Transitions from temporary to permanent work in Spain

This paper studies the duration pattern of xed-term contracts and the determinantsof their conversion into permanent ones in Spain, where the share of xed-termemployment is the highest in Europe. We estimate a duration model for temporaryemployment, with competing risks of terminating into permanent employment versusalternative states, and exible duration dependence. We nd that conversion rates aregenerally below 10%. Our estimated conversion rates roughly increase with tenure,with a pronounced spike at the legal limit, when there is no legal way to retain theworker on a temporary contract. We argue that estimated di¤erences in conversionrates across categories of workers can stem from di¤erences in worker outside optionsand thus the power to credibly threat to quit temporary jobs.

Sovereign risk and secondary markets

Conventional wisdom views the problem of sovereign risk as one of insufficient penalties.Foreign creditors can only be repaid if the government enforces foreign debts. And this will onlyhappen if foreign creditors can effectively use the threat of imposing penalties to the country.Guided by this assessment of the problem, policy prescriptions to reduce sovereign risk havefocused on providing incentives for governments to enforce foreign debts. For instance, countriesmight want to favor increased trade ties and other forms of foreign dependence that make themvulnerable to foreign retaliation thereby increasing the costs of default penalties.

Interbank comptetition with costly screening

We analyse credit market equilibrium when banks screen loan applicants. When banks have a convex cost function of screening, a pure strategy equilibrium exists where banks optimally set interest rates at the same level as their competitors. This result complements Broecker s (1990) analysis, where he demonstrates that no pure strategy equilibrium exists when banks have zero screening costs. In our set up we show that interest rate on loansare largely independent of marginal costs, a feature consistent with the extant empirical evidence. In equilibrium, banks make positive profits in our model in spite of the threat of entry by inactive banks. Moreover, an increase in the number of active banks increases credit risk and so does not improve credit market effciency: this point has important regulatory implications. Finally, we extend our analysis to the case where banks havediffering screening abilities.

Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization

In this paper, we take an organizational view of organized crime. In particular, we study the organizational consequences of product illegality attending at the following characteristics: (i) contracts are not enforceable in court, (ii) all participants are subject to the risk of being punished, (iii) employees present a major threat to the entrepreneur having the most detailed knowledge concerning participation, (iv) separation between ownership and management is difficult because record-keeping and auditing augments criminal evidence.