103 resultados para Social safety net
Resumo:
The purpose of this article is to introduce a Cartesian product structure into the social choice theoretical framework and to examine if new possibility results to Gibbard's and Sen's paradoxes can be developed thanks to it. We believe that a Cartesian product structure is a pertinent way to describe individual rights in the social choice theory since it discriminates the personal features comprised in each social state. First we define some conceptual and formal tools related to the Cartesian product structure. We then apply these notions to Gibbard's paradox and to Sen's impossibility of a Paretian liberal. Finally we compare the advantages of our approach to other solutions proposed in the literature for both impossibility theorems.
Resumo:
Barriers to technological changes have recently been shown to be a key element in explaining differences in output per worker across countries. This study examines the role that labour market features and institutions have in explaining barriers to technology adoption. I build a model that includes labour market frictions, capital market imperfections and heterogeneity in workers' skills. I found that the unemployment rate together with the welfare losses that workers experiment after displacement are key factors in explaining the existence of barriers to technology adoption. Moreover, I found that none of these factors alone is sufficient to build these barriers. The theory also suggests that welfare policies like the unemployment insurance system may enhance these kinds of barriers while policies like a severance payment system financed by an income tax seem to be more effective in eliminating them.
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As a response to the rapidly growing empirical literature on social capital and the evidence of its correlation with government performance, we build a theoretical framework to study the interactions between social capital and government's action. This paper presents a model of homogeneous agents in an overlapping generations framework incorporating social capital as the values transmitted from parent to child. The government's role is to provide public goods. First, government expenditure is exogenously given. Then, it will be chosen at the preferred level of the representative agent. For both setups the equilibrium outcomes are characterized and the resulting dynamics studied. Briefly we include an analysis of the effect of productivity growth on the evolution of social capital. The results obtained caution caution against both the crowding out effect of the welfare state and the impact of sustained economic growth on social capital.
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We investigate the properties of a family of social evaluation functions and inequality indices which merge the features of the family of Atkinson (1970) and S-Gini (Donaldson and Weymark (1980, 1983), Yitzhaki (1983) and Kakwani (1980)) indices. Income inequality aversion is captured by decreasing marginal utilities, and aversion to rank inequality is captured by rank-dependent ethical weights, thus providing an ethically-flexible dual basis for the assessment of inequality and equity. These ocial evaluation functions can be interpreted as average utility corrected for the illfare of relative deprivation. They can alternatively be understood as averages of altruistic well-being in a population. They moreover have a simple graphical interpretation.
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In this paper we use micro data from the Spanish Family Expenditure Survey for 1990 to estimate, for the first time, the private and social rates of return of different university degrees in Spain. We compute internal rates of return and include investment on higher education financed by the public purse to estimate social rates of return. Our main finding is that, as presumed, there is large heterogeneity in rates of return amongst different university
Resumo:
The aim of this paper is to analyze the causes leading to social exclusion dynamics. In particular, we wish to understand why any individual experiencing social exclusion today is much more likely to experience it again. In fact, there are two distinct processes that may generate a persistence of social exclusion: heterogeneity (individuals are heterogeneous with respect to some observed and/or unobserved adverse characteristics that are relevant for the chance of experiencing social exclusion and persistence over time) and true state of dependence (experiencing social exclusion in a specific time period, in itself, increases the probability of undergoing social exclusion in subsequent periods). Distinguishing between the two processes is crucial since the policy implications are very different.
Resumo:
Social exclusion can be defined as a process leading to a state of multiple functioning deprivations. Cross-sectional headcount ratios of social exclusion may overstate the extent of the problem if most individuals do not remain in the same state in successive years. To address this issue, we need to focus on mobility. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to analyse changes in the individual levels of social exclusion focusing on the extent to which individuals change place in social exclusion distribution.
Resumo:
The decisions of many individuals and social groups, taking according to well-defined objectives, are causing serious social and environmental problems, in spite of following the dictates of economic rationality. There are many examples of serious problems for which there are not yet appropriate solutions, such as management of scarce natural resources including aquifer water or the distribution of space among incompatible uses. In order to solve these problems, the paper first characterizes the resources and goods involved from an economic perspective. Then, for each case, the paper notes that there is a serious divergence between individual and collective interests and, where possible, it designs the procedure for solving the conflict of interests. With this procedure, the real opportunities for the application of economic theory are shown, and especially the theory on collective goods and externalities. The limitations of conventional economic analysis are shown and the opportunity to correct the shortfalls is examined. Many environmental problems, such as climate change, have an impact on different generations that do not participate in present decisions. The paper shows that for these cases, the solutions suggested by economic theory are not valid. Furthermore, conventional methods of economic valuation (which usually help decision-makers) are unable to account for the existence of different generations and tend to obviate long-term impacts. The paper analyzes how economic valuation methods could account for the costs and benefits enjoyed by present and future generations. The paper studies an appropriate consideration of preferences for future consumption and the incorporation of sustainability as a requirement in social decisions, which implies not only more efficiency but also a fairer distribution between generations than the one implied by conventional economic analysis.
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Moral values infuence individual behavior and social interactions. A specially signif- cant instance is the case of moral values concerning work e¤ort. Individuals determine what they take to be proper behaviour and judge the others, and themselves, accordingly. They increase their esteem -and self-esteem- for those who perform in excess of the standard and decrease their esteem for those who work less. These changes in self-esteem result from the self-regulatory emotions of guilt or pride extensively studied in Social Psychology. We examine the interactions between sentiments, individual behaviour and the social contract in a model of rational voting over redistribution where individual self-esteem and relative es-teem for others are endogenously determined. Individuals di¤er in their productivities. The desired extent of redistribution depends both on individual income and on individual attitudes toward others. We characterize the politico-economic equilibria in which sentiments, labor supply and redistribution are simultaneously determined. The model has two types of equilibria. In "cohesive" equilibria, all individuals conform to the standard of proper behav- iour, income inequality is low and social esteem is not biased toward any particular type. Under these conditions equilibrium redistribution increases in response to larger inequality. In a "clustered" equilibrium skilled workers work above the mean while unskilled workers work below. In such an equilibrium, income inequality is large and sentiments are biased in favor of the industrious. As inequality increases, this bias may eventually overtake the egoistic demand for greater taxation and equilibrium redistribution decreases. The type of equilibrium that emerges crucially depends on inequality. We contrast the predictions of the model with data on inequality, redistribution, work values and attitudes toward work and toward the poor for a set of OECD countries.
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A partir de les fonts documentals de la “Casa Misericòrdia” i de “Casa Caritat” de Vic i també del testimoni de persones que hi havien viscut o hi havien treballat o les coneixien de prop, s’ha volgut explicar el naixement, evolució i decadència de les dues institucions centenàries que van realitzar, gairebé sempre amb pocs mitjans però amb notable dedicació, una tasca ingent en favor dels més desfavorits i que van deixar d’existir a principis dels anys setanta. Casa Caritat atenia persones necessitades d’ambdós sexes, encara que en dues instal•lacions diferents, com l’antic convent dels Trinitaris per al sexe femení i l’antic convent de Sant Domènec, per al masculí. La Misericòrdia va acollir durant poc més de dos-cents cinquanta anys nenes, noies, dones i velles pobres i desemparades. La raresa d’aquesta institució estava en el règim d’autogestió, sense la intervenció de cap ordre religiosa, com era costum en aquells temps. El tancament de les dues institucions va donar lloc a un nou model assistencial i educatiu per als menors, promogut pel bisbe de Vic Ramon Masnou i per Joan Riera, els impulsors de la Llar Juvenil. Es tractava d’un recurs modern i d’inspiració cristiana, ubicat en una casa de nova construcció i sota un reglament molt més humanitzat i amb menys pes de les pràctiques religioses. La conflictivitat dels nens i nenes, a mesura que creixien, i amb les necessitats d’uns altres temps, a més d’assumpció de les competències de menors per part de la Generalitat el 1981, van propiciar la creació per part de la Generalitat i de l’Ajuntament de Vic de Casa Moreta, amb un projecte totalment laic i portat per professionals que després es convertiria en el Centre Residencial Osona i també va suposar el naixement d’una altra entitat, la Llar Terricabras. La recerca, doncs, pretén posar les bases per a futures anàlisis aprofundides sobre l’atenció als menors a la ciutat de Vic, al llarg del temps.
Resumo:
El trabajo que aquí presentamos se planteó precisamente para cuantificar la repercusión económica y social de la accesibilidad en las viviendas, con una perspectiva de mercado orientada hacia la cuantificación de la demanda y la valoración de los beneficios monetarios que de ella se derivan. El objetivo de esta cuantificación es triple: social, económico y político. Social, porque permite dar a conocer la importancia que está adquiriendo el deseo de eliminación de barreras, tanto para el colectivo de personas con movilidad reducida como para las demás. Económico, porque ofrece a las administraciones responsables y al sector de construcción y promoción de viviendas una cuantificación del incremento de coste en la edificación que el mercado estaría dispuesto a asumir a cambio de la incorporación de soluciones accesibles y adaptables en el diseño y adaptación de espacios. Político, porque puede orientar a la Administración e instituciones en general, sobre el grado de exigencia en la supresión de barreras que el conjunto de ciudadanos demanda, especialmente aquellos afectados por problemas de movilidad, así como estimar el cambio de bienestar asociado con el cumplimiento de la legislación o justificar la adopción de políticas de difusión y promoción.
Resumo:
We study a model where agents, located in a social network, decide whether to exert effort or not in experimenting with a new technology (or acquiring a new skill, innovating, etc.). We assume that agents have strong incentives to free ride on their neighbors' effort decisions. In the static version of the model efforts are chosen simultaneously. In equilibrium, agents exerting effort are never connected with each other and all other agents are connected with at least one agent exerting effort. We propose a mean-field dynamics in which agents choose in each period the best response to the last period's decisions of their neighbors. We characterize the equilibrium of such a dynamics and show how the pattern of free riders in the network depends on properties of the connectivity distribution.