Contribution to Asterisk Open Source Project

With this final master thesis we are going to contribute to the Asterisk open source project. Asterisk is an open source project that started with the main objective of develop an IP telephony platform, completely based on Software (so not hardware dependent) and under an open license like GPL. This project was started on 1999 by the software engineer Mark Spencer at Digium. The main motivation of that open source project was that the telecommunications sector is lack of open solutions, and most of the available solutions are based on proprietary standards, which are close and not compatible between them. Behind the Asterisk project there is a company, Digum, which is the project leading since the project was originated in its laboratories. This company has some of its employees fully dedicated to contribute to the Asterisk project, and also provide the whole infrastructure required by the open source project. But the business of Digium isn't based on licensing of products due to the open source nature of Asterisk, but it's based on offering services around Asteriskand designing and selling some hardware components to be used with Asterisk. The Asterisk project has grown up a lot since its birth, offering in its latest versions advanced functionalities for managing calls and compatibility with some hardware that previously was exclusive of proprietary solutions. Due to that, Asterisk is becoming a serious alternative to all these proprietaries solutions because it has reached a level of maturity that makes it very stable. In addition, as it is open source, it can be fully customized to a givenrequirement, which could be impossible with the proprietaries solutions. Due to the bigness that is reaching the project, every day there are more companies which develop value added software for telephony platforms, that are seriously evaluating the option of make their software fully compatible withAsterisk platforms. All these factors make Asterisk being a consolidated project but in constant evolution, trying to offer all those functionalities offered by proprietaries solutions. This final master thesis will be divided mainly in two blocks totally complementaries. In the first block we will analyze Asterisk as an open source project and Asterisk as a telephony platform (PBX). As a result of this analysis we will generate a document, written in English because it is Asterisk project's official language, which could be used by future contributors as an starting point on joining Asterisk. On the second block we will proceed with a development contribution to the Asterisk project. We will have several options in the form that we do the contribution, such as solving bugs, developing new functionalities or start an Asterisk satellite project. The type of contribution will depend on the needs of the project on that moment.

Financing Constraints, Irreversibility, and Investment Dynamics

We develop a model of an industry with many heterogeneous firms that face both financing constraints and irreversibility constraints. The financing constraint implies that firms cannot borrow unless the debt is secured by collateral; the irreversibility constraint that they can only sell their fixed capital by selling their business. We use this model to examine the cyclical behavior of aggregate fixed investment, variable capital investment, and output in the presence of persistent idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. Our model yields three main results. First, the effect of the irreversibility constraint on fixed capital investment is reinforced by the financing constraint. Second, the effect of the financing constraint on variable capital investment is reinforced by the irreversibility constraint. Finally, the interaction between the two constraints is key for explaining why input inventories and material deliveries of US manufacturing firms are so volatile and procyclical, and also why they are highly asymmetrical over the business cycle.

Dynamic price competition with fixed capacities

Many revenue management (RM) industries are characterized by (a) fixed capacities in theshort term (e.g., hotel rooms, seats on an airline flight), (b) homogeneous products (e.g., twoairline flights between the same cities at similar times), and (c) customer purchasing decisionslargely influenced by price. Competition in these industries is also very high even with just twoor three direct competitors in a market. However, RM competition is not well understood andpractically all known implementations of RM software and most published models of RM donot explicitly model competition. For this reason, there has been considerable recent interestand research activity to understand RM competition. In this paper we study price competitionfor an oligopoly in a dynamic setting, where each of the sellers has a fixed number of unitsavailable for sale over a fixed number of periods. Demand is stochastic, and depending on howit evolves, sellers may change their prices at any time. This reflects the fact that firms constantly,and almost costlessly, change their prices (alternately, allocations at a price in quantity-basedRM), reacting either to updates in their estimates of market demand, competitor prices, orinventory levels. We first prove existence of a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium for a duopoly.In equilibrium, in each state sellers engage in Bertrand competition, so that the seller withthe lowest reservation value ends up selling a unit at a price that is equal to the equilibriumreservation value of the competitor. This structure hence extends the marginal-value conceptof bid-price control, used in many RM implementations, to a competitive model. In addition,we show that the seller with the lowest capacity sells all its units first. Furthermore, we extendthe results transparently to n firms and perform a number of numerical comparative staticsexploiting the uniqueness of the subgame-perfect equilibrium.

The impact of the reference price system on the pharmaceutical market: A theoretical approach

This article analyses the impact of the reference pricesystem on the price-setting strategies of thepharmaceutical firms and on the level of generic usage.This model is the first to take explicitly into accountthe impact of the reference price mechanism on the levelof competition between brand-name and generic drugs andnational pharmaceutical spending. We consider aduopolistic model with one firm producing the brand-namedrug, whose patent has already expired, and the otherproducing the corresponding generic version. We work ina partial equilibrium framework where firms set pricessequentially and consumers face heterogeneous switchingcosts.We show that brand producers compensate thedecline of profits by selling greater quantities insteadof charging higher prices, thus fostering pricecompetition in the pharmaceutical market. This result isa consequence of both the assumption of a verticallydifferentiated model and the introduction of thereference price system.

Financing constraints, irreversibility and investment dynamics

We develop a model of an industry with many heterogeneous firms that face both financingconstraints and irreversibility constraints. The financing constraint implies that firmscannot borrow unless the debt is secured by collateral; the irreversibility constraint thatthey can only sell their fixed capital by selling their business. We use this model to examinethe cyclical behavior of aggregate fixed investment, variable capital investment, and outputin the presence of persistent idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. Our model yields threemain results. First, the effect of the irreversibility constraint on fixed capital investmentis reinforced by the financing constraint. Second, the effect of the financing constraint onvariable capital investment is reinforced by the irreversibility constraint. Finally, the interactionbetween the two constraints is key for explaining why input inventories and materialdeliveries of US manufacturing firms are so volatile and procyclical, and also why they arehighly asymmetrical over the business cycle.

Probabilistic maximal covering location-allocation models with constrained waiting time or queue length for congested systems

When dealing with the design of service networks, such as healthand EMS services, banking or distributed ticket selling services, thelocation of service centers has a strong influence on the congestion ateach of them, and consequently, on the quality of service. In this paper,several models are presented to consider service congestion. The firstmodel addresses the issue of the location of the least number of single--servercenters such that all the population is served within a standard distance,and nobody stands in line for a time longer than a given time--limit, or withmore than a predetermined number of other clients. We then formulateseveral maximal coverage models, with one or more servers per service center.A new heuristic is developed to solve the models and tested in a 30--nodesnetwork.

Dynamic adverse selection and debt

This paper argues that the strategic use of debt favours the revelationof information in dynamic adverse selection problems. Our argument is basedon the idea that debt is a credible commitment to end long term relationships.Consequently, debt encourages a privately informed party to disclose itsinformation at early stages of a relationship. We illustrate our pointwith the financing decision of a monopolist selling a good to a buyerwhose valuation is private information. A high level of (renegotiable)debt, by increasing the scope for liquidation, may induce the highvaluation buyer to buy early at a high price and thus increase themonopolist's expected payoff. By affecting the buyer's strategy, it mayreduce the probability of excessive liquidation. We investigate theconsequences of good durability and we examine the way debt mayalleviate the ratchet effect.

The growth and diffusion of knowlegde and the theory of the firm

We analyze the implications of a market imperfection related to the inability to establish intellectual property rights, that we label {\it unverifiable communication}. Employees are able to collude with external parties selling ``knowledge capital'' of the firm. The firm organizer engages in strategic interaction simultaneously with employees and competitors, as she introduces endogenous transaction costs in the market for information between those agents. Incentive schemes and communication costs are the key strategic variables used by the firm to induce frictions in collusive markets. Unverifiable communication introduces severe allocative distortions, both at internal product development and at intended sale of information (technology transfer). We derive implications of the model for observable decisions like characteristics of the employment relationship (full employment, incompatibility with other jobs), firms' preferences over cluster characteristics for location decisions, optimal size at entry, in--house development vs sale strategies for innovations and industry evolution.

Disseny i implementació d'una pàgina web de subhastes

Amb la situació econòmica actual pot ser interessant poder vendre objectes que ja no s’utilitzen i també poder-ne comprar de segona mà. Amb aquesta idea sorgeix el projecte de crear una pàgina de subhastes online on la gent pugui comerciar amb les coses que ja no necessita. Tenint en compte el concepte inicial, el propietari de la pàgina no rebrà cap retribució ni percentatge de cada subhasta, tot l’import serà pel venedor. L’objectiu principal és el de poder oferir un lloc on després de registrar-se, els usuaris puguin veure i pujar per els articles que altres persones estan subhastant i també la possibilitat de crear les seves pròpies subhastes. Cada usuari disposarà d’un espai personal on veure les subhastes amb les que ha interactuat i així no perdre-les de vista i també on poder veure en cada moment l’estat de les subhastes que ha creat. La vista d’una subhasta s’actualitzarà automàticament sense haver de recarregar la pàgina i si algú puja durant l’últim minut la subhasta s’allargarà un minut més per evitar puges a l’últim moment i així maximitzar el preu final. Hi haurà un administrador que serà l’encarregat de gestionar el bon funcionament de la pàgina amb permís per afegir, editar, consultar i eliminar tota la informació disponible. Per portar a terme el projecte s’ha utilitzat PHP per la part de programació i MySQL com a sistema gestor de bases de dades.

Aplicatiu per gestionar la informació administrativa, tècnica i comptable per una empresa constructora

Les tendencies del mercat actual i futur obliguen a les empreses a ser cada vegada més competitives. Tota empresa que desitgi competir en el mercat actual ha de considerar la informació com un dels seus principals actius. Per aquesta raó, és necessari que l’empresa disposi dels sistemes d’informació adequats per ser gestionada. En les pimes ( petites i mitjanes empreses ), i en la majoria dels casos, la seva informació es troba repartida en diversos aplicatius informàtifcs. Això comporta principalment una duplicitat de dades, costos de manteniment i possibles errades en la informació. Dins del sector de les pimes, es troben empreses contructores d’un volum petit o mig, les quals enmagatzemen molta informació tècnica i de planificació per desemvolupar els seus projectes. Aquesta necessitat els hi suposa, tenir un aplicatiu eficient per la gestió i seguiment de la producció de les seves tasques i per altra banda l’aplicatiu necessari com qualsevol pime a nivell administratiu i comptable. L’objectiu principal d’aquest treball és generar un aplicatiu que integri la informació administrativa, comptable i tècnica per una empresa constructora. Amb l’assoliment d’aquest objectiu l’empresa constructora guanya temps en l’entrada i accés a les dades, evita la seva duplicitat i redueix el seu manteniment. En resum, redueix els costos de l’empresa i augmenta la seva seguretat en la informació. Un el mercat, existeixen aplicatius anomenats ERP ( Enterprise resource planning o sistemes de planificació de recursos ) els quals la seva gran virtud es la integració de les dades. Aprofitant aquests aplicatius i seleccionant-ne el més adequat, s’ha generat la part de gestió i planificació necessària per l’empresa constructora integrant-la i personalitzant-la en els processos existents de l’aplicació ( comptabilitat, ventes, compres, recursos humans, magatzems, etc… ) Entre les conclusions més rellevants obtingudes en aquest treball, voldriem destacar la millora i reducció d’entrada, accés i manteniment de la informació, l’històric que proporciona l’eina i per tan la millora de la gestío i planificació de l’empresa.

Deciding the sale of a life policy in the viatical market: Implications on individual welfare

[cat] En aquest article, es presenta un model econòmic que permet determinar la venda o no d'una pòlissa de vida (total o en part) per part d'un assegurat malalt terminal en el mercat dels viatical settlements. Aquest mercat va aparèixer a finals de la dècada dels 80 a conseqüència de l'epidèmia de la SIDA. Actualment, representa una part del mercat dels life settlements. Les pòlisses que es comercialitzen en el mercat dels viaticals són aquelles on l'assegurat és malalt terminal amb una esperança de vida de dos anys o menys. El model és discret i considera només dos períodes (anys), ja que aquesta és la vida residual màxima que contempla el mercat. L'agent posseix una riquesa inicial que ha de repartir entre consum i herència. S'introdueix en primer lloc la funció d'utilitat esperada del decisor i, utilitzant programació dinàmica, es dedueix l'estratègia que reporta una utilitat més gran (no vendre/vendre (en part) la pòlissa en el moment zero/vendre (en part) la pòlissa en el moment ú). L'òptim depèn del preu de la pòlissa venuda i de paràmetres personals de l'individu. Es troba una expressió analítica per l'estratègia òptima i es realitza un anàlisi de sensibilitat.

Deciding the sale of a life policy in the viatical market: Implications on individual welfare

[cat] En aquest article, es presenta un model econòmic que permet determinar la venda o no d'una pòlissa de vida (total o en part) per part d'un assegurat malalt terminal en el mercat dels viatical settlements. Aquest mercat va aparèixer a finals de la dècada dels 80 a conseqüència de l'epidèmia de la SIDA. Actualment, representa una part del mercat dels life settlements. Les pòlisses que es comercialitzen en el mercat dels viaticals són aquelles on l'assegurat és malalt terminal amb una esperança de vida de dos anys o menys. El model és discret i considera només dos períodes (anys), ja que aquesta és la vida residual màxima que contempla el mercat. L'agent posseix una riquesa inicial que ha de repartir entre consum i herència. S'introdueix en primer lloc la funció d'utilitat esperada del decisor i, utilitzant programació dinàmica, es dedueix l'estratègia que reporta una utilitat més gran (no vendre/vendre (en part) la pòlissa en el moment zero/vendre (en part) la pòlissa en el moment ú). L'òptim depèn del preu de la pòlissa venuda i de paràmetres personals de l'individu. Es troba una expressió analítica per l'estratègia òptima i es realitza un anàlisi de sensibilitat.

Una reflexión sobre la impronta romana del 'beneficio de separación de patrimonios' en el Código Civil catalán

The roman institution of the separatio bonorum is a pretorian remedy that relies on the principle of equity, created as to protect the deceased creditors and/or legatees. It provides them a"benefit" in the case of selling the goods of the heir-deubtor, enabling them to separate and reserve for themselves that whole patrimonium, as to avoid that by the act of selling, the heirs creditors could go to it; and like this they maintain intact their guarantee, which relies on the whole goods and assets left by the deceased. The separation of patrimonies implied the existence of 2 different groups of goods: that of the heirs" and that one of the deceased, which are not the same in legal terms, in spite of having a common owner at this point, the heir. This institution was regulated in the 6th title of the 42nd book of the Digesto, and in the 72th title, 7th book of the Justinean Code, and its interest is really high due to its material complexity and its procedure. The aim of this work is to analyze the institution of the separatio bonorum in Roman Law, and its importance in the same figure, actually regulated in the 4th book of the Catalan civil code.

S.I. de taxacions de béns immobles

El Sistema d'Informació de Taxacions de béns immobles és una solució adaptada a les necessitats d'una empresa que vol sortir al mercat venent els seus productes a través d'internet. L'activitat econòmica de l'empresa es basa en la venda d'informació de subhastes i taxacions de béns immobles. El sistema implementat proporciona una eina per gestionar els productes i un canal de venda per internet.

Firms, destinations, and aggregate fluctuations

This paper uses a database covering the universe of French firms for the period 1990-2007 to provide a forensic account of the role of individual firms in generating aggregatefluctuations. We set up a simple multi-sector model of heterogeneous firms selling tomultiple markets to motivate a theoretically-founded decomposition of firms' annualsales growth rate into different components. We find that the firm-specific componentcontributes substantially to aggregate sales volatility, mattering about as much as thecomponents capturing shocks that are common across firms within a sector or country.We then decompose the firm-specific component to provide evidence on two mechanismsthat generate aggregate fluctuations from microeconomic shocks highlighted in the recentliterature: (i) when the firm size distribution is fat-tailed, idiosyncratic shocks tolarge firms directly contribute to aggregate fluctuations; and (ii) aggregate fluctuationscan arise from idiosyncratic shocks due to input-output linkages across the economy.Firm linkages are approximately three times as important as the direct effect of firmshocks in driving aggregate fluctuations.