Optimal negligence rule under limited liability

We study the standard economic model of unilateral accidents, in its simplest form, assumingthat the injurers have limited assets.We identify a second-best optimal rule that selects as duecare the minimum of first-best care, and a level of care that takes into account the wealth ofthe injurer. We show that such a rule in fact maximizes the precautionary effort by a potentialinjurer. The idea is counterintuitive: Being softer on an injurer, in terms of the required level ofcare, actually improves the incentives to take care when he is potentially insolvent. We extendthe basic result to an entire population of potentially insolvent injurers, and find that the optimalgeneral standards of care do depend on wealth, and distribution of income. We also show theconditions for the result that higher income levels in a given society call for higher levels of carefor accidents.

Promoting rule compliance in daily-life: Evidence from a randomized field experiment in the public libraries of Barcelona

We study how to promote compliance with rules in everyday situations. Having access to unique data on the universe of users of all public libraries inBarcelona, we test the effect of sending email messages with dierent contents.We find that users return their items earlier if asked to do so in a simple email.Emails reminding users of the penalties associated with late returns are more effective than emails with only a generic reminder. We find differential treatmenteffects by user types. The characteristics we analyze are previous compliance,gender, age, and nationality.

A simple access pricing rule to achieve the Ramsey outcome for interconnected networks

This paper considers a general and informationally efficient approach to determine the optimal access pricing rule for interconnected networks. It shows that there exists a simple rule that achieves the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium when networks compete in linear prices without network-based price discrimination. The approach is informationally efficient in the sense that the regulator is required to know only the marginal cost structure, i.e. the marginal cost of making and terminating a call. The approach is general in that access prices can depend not only on the marginal costs but also on the retail prices, which can be observed by consumers and therefore by the regulator as well. In particular, I consider the set of linear access pricing rules which includes any fixed access price, the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) and the Modified ECPR as special cases. I show that in this set, there is a unique rule that implements the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium independently of the underlying demand conditions.

IV Col·loqui Internacional Problemes i Mètodes de Literatura Catalana Antiga. Història i llegenda al Renaixement (Universitat de Girona, 8-11 de juliol del 2002)

Crònica IV Col·loqui Internacional Problemes i Mètodes de Literatura Catalana Antiga. Història i llegenda al Renaixement (Universitat de Girona, 8-11 de juliol del 2002)