Rational reasoning or adaptive behavior? Evidence from two-person beauty contest games

Many experiments have shown that human subjects do not necessarily behave in line with game theoretic assumptions and solution concepts. The reasons for this non-conformity are multiple. In this paper we study the argument whether a deviation from game theory is because subjects are rational, but doubt that others are rational as well, compared to the argument that subjects, in general, are boundedly rational themselves. To distinguish these two hypotheses, we study behavior in repeated 2-person and many-person Beauty-Contest-Games which are strategically different from one another. We analyze four different treatments and observe that convergence toward equilibrium is driven by learning through the information about the other player s choice and adaptation rather than self-initiated rational reasoning.

Constraints and non-existence of rational expectations equilibria

In this article we show that in the presence of trading constraints, such as short sale constraints, the standard definition of a Rational Expectations Equilibrium allows for equilibrium prices that reveal information unknown to any active trader in the market. We propose a new definition of the Rational Expectations Equilibrium that incorporates a stronger measurability condition than measurability with respect to the join of the information sets of the agents and give an example of non-existence of equilibrium. The example is robust to perturbations on the data of the economy and the introduction of new assets.

On the concept of optimality interval

The approximants to regular continued fractions constitute `best approximations' to the numbers they converge to in two ways known as of the first and the second kind.This property of continued fractions provides a solution to Gosper's problem of the batting average: if the batting average of a baseball player is 0.334, what is the minimum number of times he has been at bat? In this paper, we tackle somehow the inverse question: given a rational number P/Q, what is the set of all numbers for which P/Q is a `best approximation' of one or the other kind? We prove that inboth cases these `Optimality Sets' are intervals and we give aprecise description of their endpoints.

Monetary policy and rational asset price bubbles

I examine the impact of alternative monetary policy rules on arational asset price bubble, through the lens of an overlapping generations model with nominal rigidities. A systematic increase in interestrates in response to a growing bubble is shown to enhance the fluctuations in the latter, through its positive effect on bubble growth. Theoptimal monetary policy seeks to strike a balance between stabilization of the bubble and stabilization of aggregate demand. The paper'smain findings call into question the theoretical foundations of the casefor "leaning against the wind" monetary policies.

Buy-and-Hold Strategies and Comonotonic Approximations

[cat] En aquest article estudiem estratègies “comprar i mantenir” per a problemes d’optimitzar la riquesa final en un context multi-període. Com que la riquesa final és una suma de variables aleatòries dependents, on cadascuna d’aquestes correspon a una quantitat de capital que s’ha invertit en un actiu particular en una data determinada, en primer lloc considerem aproximacions que redueixen l’aleatorietat multivariant al cas univariant. A continuació, aquestes aproximacions es fan servir per determinar les estratègies “comprar i mantenir” que optimitzen, per a un nivell de probabilitat donat, el VaR i el CLTE de la funció de distribució de la riquesa final. Aquest article complementa el treball de Dhaene et al. (2005), on es van considerar estratègies de reequilibri constant.

Buy-and-Hold Strategies and Comonotonic Approximations

[cat] En aquest article estudiem estratègies “comprar i mantenir” per a problemes d’optimitzar la riquesa final en un context multi-període. Com que la riquesa final és una suma de variables aleatòries dependents, on cadascuna d’aquestes correspon a una quantitat de capital que s’ha invertit en un actiu particular en una data determinada, en primer lloc considerem aproximacions que redueixen l’aleatorietat multivariant al cas univariant. A continuació, aquestes aproximacions es fan servir per determinar les estratègies “comprar i mantenir” que optimitzen, per a un nivell de probabilitat donat, el VaR i el CLTE de la funció de distribució de la riquesa final. Aquest article complementa el treball de Dhaene et al. (2005), on es van considerar estratègies de reequilibri constant.

Rational periodic sequences for the Lyness recurrence

Consider the celebrated Lyness recurrence $x_{n+2}=(a+x_{n+1})/x_{n}$ with $a\in\Q$. First we prove that there exist initial conditions and values of $a$ for which it generates periodic sequences of rational numbers with prime periods $1,2,3,5,6,7,8,9,10$ or $12$ and that these are the only periods that rational sequences $\{x_n\}_n$ can have. It is known that if we restrict our attention to positive rational values of $a$ and positive rational initial conditions the only possible periods are $1,5$ and $9$. Moreover 1-periodic and 5-periodic sequences are easily obtained. We prove that for infinitely many positive values of $a,$ positive 9-period rational sequences occur. This last result is our main contribution and answers an open question left in previous works of Bastien \& Rogalski and Zeeman. We also prove that the level sets of the invariant associated to the Lyness map is a two-parameter family of elliptic curves that is a universal family of the elliptic curves with a point of order $n, n\ge5,$ including $n$ infinity. This fact implies that the Lyness map is a universal normal form for most birrational maps on elliptic curves.

Sierpinski curve Julia sets for quadratic rational maps

We investigate under which dynamical conditions the Julia set of a quadratic rational map is a Sierpiński curve.

Sierpinski curve Julia sets for quadratic rational maps

We investigate under which dynamical conditions the Julia set of a quadratic rational map is a Sierpiński curve.

Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods

We consider exchange markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods. We are interested in exchange rules that are efficient and immune to manipulations via endowments (either with respect to hiding or destroying part of the endowment or transferring part of the endowment to another trader). We consider three manipulability axioms: hiding-proofness, destruction-proofness, and transfer-proofness. We prove that no rule satisfying efficiency and hiding-proofness (which implies individual rationality) exists. For two-agent exchange markets with separable and responsive preferences, we show that efficient, individually rational, and destruction-proof rules exist. However, for separable preferences, no rule satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, and destruction-proofness. In the case of transfer-proofness the compatibility with efficiency and individual rationality for the two-agent case extends to the unrestricted domain. For exchange markets with separable preferences and more than two agents no rule satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, and transfer-proofness.

Does bounded rationality lead to individual heterogeneity? The impact of the experimentation process and of memory constraints

In this paper we explore the effect of bounded rationality on the convergence of individual behavior toward equilibrium. In the context of a Cournot game with a unique and symmetric Nash equilibrium, firms are modeled as adaptive economic agents through a genetic algorithm. Computational experiments show that (1) there is remarkable heterogeneity across identical but boundedly rational agents; (2) such individual heterogeneity is not simply a consequence of the random elements contained in the genetic algorithm; (3) the more rational agents are in terms of memory abilities and pre-play evaluation of strategies, the less heterogeneous they are in their actions. At the limit case of full rationality, the outcome converges to the standard result of uniform individual behavior.

Can genetic algorithms explain experimental anomalies? An application to common property resources

It is common to find in experimental data persistent oscillations in the aggregate outcomes and high levels of heterogeneity in individual behavior. Furthermore, it is not unusual to find significant deviations from aggregate Nash equilibrium predictions. In this paper, we employ an evolutionary model with boundedly rational agents to explain these findings. We use data from common property resource experiments (Casari and Plott, 2003). Instead of positing individual-specific utility functions, we model decision makers as selfish and identical. Agent interaction is simulated using an individual learning genetic algorithm, where agents have constraints in their working memory, a limited ability to maximize, and experiment with new strategies. We show that the model replicates most of the patterns that can be found in common property resource experiments.

Allocative and productive efficiency in REE with asymetric information

We characterize the divergence between informational and economic efficiency in a rational expectations competitive market with asymmetric information about the costs of production. We find that prices may contain too much or too little information with respect to incentive efficient allocations depending on whether the main role of the price is, respectively, the traditional as index of scarcity or informational. Only when REE degenerate to Cournot equilibria the market solution does not show llocative inefficiency. With multidimensional uncertainty we find that the REE price does not have in general the incentive efficient information mix: It pays to sacrifice allocative efficiency at the REE to improve productive efficiency.

Asymmetries in the capacity-inflation trade-off

This paper analyzes the joint dynamics of two key macroeconomic variables for the conduct of monetary policy: inflation and the aggregate capacity utilization rate. An econometric procedure useful for estimating dynamic rational expectation models with unobserved components is developed and applied in this context. The method combines the flexibility of the unobserved components approach, based on the Kalman recursion, with the power of the general method of moments estimation procedure. A 'hyb id' Phillips curve relating inflation to the capacity utilization gap and incorporating forward and backward looking components is estimated. The results show that such a relationship in non-linear: the slope of the Phillips curve depends significantly on the magnitude of the capacity gap. These findings provide support for studying the implications of asymmetricmonetary policy rules.