Uniform-price assignment markets

Uniform-price assignment games are introduced as those assignment markets with the core reduced to a segment. In these games, for all active agents, competitive prices are uniform although products may be non-homogeneous. A characterization in terms of the assignment matrix is given. The only assignment markets where all submarkets are uniform are the Bohm-Bawerk horse markets. We prove that for uniform-price assignment games the kernel, or set of symmetrically-pairwise bargained allocations, either coincides with the core or reduces to the nucleolus

Uniform-price assignment markets

Uniform-price assignment games are introduced as those assignment markets with the core reduced to a segment. In these games, for all active agents, competitive prices are uniform although products may be non-homogeneous. A characterization in terms of the assignment matrix is given. The only assignment markets where all submarkets are uniform are the Bohm-Bawerk horse markets. We prove that for uniform-price assignment games the kernel, or set of symmetrically-pairwise bargained allocations, either coincides with the core or reduces to the nucleolus

Single-valued solutions for the Böhm-Bawerk horse market game

Single-valued solutions for the case of two-sided market games without product differentiation, also known as Böhm-Bawerk horse market games, are analyzed. The nucleolus is proved to coincide with the tau-value, and is thus the midpoint of the core. Moreover a characterization of this setof games in terms of the assignment matrix is provided.

Multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets: the nucleolus and the core-center

En aquest treball mostrem que, a diferència del cas bilateral, per als mercats multilaterals d'assignació coneguts amb el nom de Böhm-Bawerk assignment games, el nucleolus i el core-center, i. e. el centre de masses del core, no coincideixen en general. Per demostrar-ho provem que donant un m-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game les dues solucions anteriors poden obtenir-se respectivament del nucleolus i el core-center d'un joc convex definit en el conjunt format pels m sectors. Encara més, provem que per calcular el nucleolus d'aquest últim joc només les coalicions formades per un jugador o m-1 jugadors són importants. Aquests resultats simplifiquen el càlcul del nucleolus d'un multi-sided ¿¿ohm-Bawerk assignment market amb un número molt elevat d'agents.

The assignment game: core bounds for mixed-pair coalitions

In the assignment game framework, we try to identify those assignment matrices in which no entry can be increased without changing the coreof the game. These games will be called buyer¿seller exact games and satisfy the condition that each mixed¿pair coalition attains the corresponding matrix entry in the core of the game. For a given assignment game, a unique buyerseller exact assignment game with the same core is proved to exist. In order to identify this matrix and to provide a characterization of those assignment games which are buyer¿seller exact in terms of the assignment matrix, attainable upper and lower core bounds for the mixed¿pair coalitions are found. As a consequence, an open question posed in Quint (1991) regarding a canonical representation of a ¿45o¿lattice¿ by means of the core of an assignment game can now be answered

Outpatient Quick Diagnosis Units for the evaluation of suspected severe diseases: an observational, descriptive study

Background: Hospitals in countries with public health systems have recently adopted organizational changes to improve efficiency and resource allocation, and reducing inappropriate hospitalizations has been established as an important goal. AIMS: Our goal was to describe the functioning of a Quick Diagnosis Unit in a Spanish public university hospital after evaluating 1,000 consecutive patients. We also aimed to ascertain the degree of satisfaction among Quick Diagnosis Unit patients and the costs of the model compared to conventional hospitalization practices. DESIGN: Observational, descriptive study. METHODS: Our sample comprised 1,000 patients evaluated between November 2008 and January 2010 in the Quick Diagnosis Unit of a tertiary university public hospital in Barcelona. Included patients were those who had potentially severe diseases and would normally require hospital admission for diagnosis but whose general condition allowed outpatient treatment. We analyzed several variables, including time to diagnosis, final diagnoses and hospitalizations avoided, and we also investigated the mean cost (as compared to conventional hospitalization) and the patients' satisfaction. RESULTS: In 88% of cases, the reasons for consultation were anemia, anorexia-cachexia syndrome, febrile syndrome, adenopathies, abdominal pain, chronic diarrhea and lung abnormalities. The most frequent diagnoses were cancer (18.8%; mainly colon cancer and lymphoma) and Iron-deficiency anemia (18%). The mean time to diagnosis was 9.2 days (range 1 to 19 days). An estimated 12.5 admissions/day in a one-year period (in the internal medicine department) were avoided. In a subgroup analysis, the mean cost per process (admission-discharge) for a conventional hospitalization was 3,416.13 Euros, while it was 735.65 Euros in the Quick Diagnosis Unit. Patients expressed a high degree of satisfaction with Quick Diagnosis Unit care. CONCLUSIONS: Quick Diagnosis Units represent a useful and cost-saving model for the diagnostic study of patients with potentially severe diseases. Future randomized study designs involving comparisons between controls and intervention groups would help elucidate the usefulness of Quick Diagnosis Units as an alternative to conventional hospitalization.

A geometric chracterization of the nucleolus of the assignment game

Maschler et al. (1979) caracteritzen geomètricament la intersecció del kernel i del core en els jocs cooperatius, demostrant que les distribucions que pertanyen a ambdós conjunts es troben en el punt mig d’un cert rang de negociació entre parelles de jugadors. En el cas dels jocs d’assignació, aquesta caracterització vol dir que el kernel només conté aquells elements del core on el màxim que un jugador pot transferir a una parella òptima és igual al màxim que aquesta parella li pot transferir, sense sortir-se’n del core. En aquest treball demostrem que el nucleolus d’un joc d’assignació queda caracteritzat si requerim que aquesta propietat de bisecció es compleixi no només per parelles, sinó també per coalicions entre sectors aparellades òptimament.

A geometric chracterization of the nucleolus of the assignment game

Maschler et al. (1979) caracteritzen geomètricament la intersecció del kernel i del core en els jocs cooperatius, demostrant que les distribucions que pertanyen a ambdós conjunts es troben en el punt mig d’un cert rang de negociació entre parelles de jugadors. En el cas dels jocs d’assignació, aquesta caracterització vol dir que el kernel només conté aquells elements del core on el màxim que un jugador pot transferir a una parella òptima és igual al màxim que aquesta parella li pot transferir, sense sortir-se’n del core. En aquest treball demostrem que el nucleolus d’un joc d’assignació queda caracteritzat si requerim que aquesta propietat de bisecció es compleixi no només per parelles, sinó també per coalicions entre sectors aparellades òptimament.

Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems

We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency and resource-monotonicity. The characterized rules assign the objects in a sequence of steps such that at each step there is either a dictator or two agents "trade" objects from their hierarchically specified "endowments."

Resource dimensioning aspect of heterogeneous traffic with different service requirements: Integration versus segregation

In this paper, we consider the ATM networks in which the virtual path concept is implemented. The question of how to multiplex two or more diverse traffic classes while providing different quality of service requirements is a very complicated open problem. Two distinct options are available: integration and segregation. In an integration approach all the traffic from different connections are multiplexed onto one VP. This implies that the most restrictive QOS requirements must be applied to all services. Therefore, link utilization will be decreased because unnecessarily stringent QOS is provided to all connections. With the segregation approach the problem can be much simplified if different types of traffic are separated by assigning a VP with dedicated resources (buffers and links). Therefore, resources may not be efficiently utilized because no sharing of bandwidth can take place across the VP. The probability that the bandwidth required by the accepted connections exceeds the capacity of the link is evaluated with the probability of congestion (PC). Since the PC can be expressed as the CLP, we shall simply carry out bandwidth allocation using the PC. We first focus on the influence of some parameters (CLP, bit rate and burstiness) on the capacity required by a VP supporting a single traffic class using the new convolution approach. Numerical results are presented both to compare the required capacity and to observe which conditions under each approach are preferred

Rhizodeposition of organic carbon by plants with contrasting traits for resource acquisition: responses to different fertility regimes

Background and aims Rhizodeposition plays an important role in mediating soil nutrient availability in ecosystems. However, owing to methodological difficulties (i.e., narrow zone of soil around roots, rapid assimilation by soil microbes) fertility-induced changes in rhizodeposition remain mostly unknown. Methods We developed a novel long-term continuous 13C labelling method to address the effects of two levels of nitrogen (N) fertilization on rhizodeposited carbon (C) by species with different nutrient acquisition strategies. Results Fertility-induced changes in rhizodeposition were modulated by root responses to N availability rather than by changes in soil microbial biomass. Differences among species were mostly related to plant biomass: species with higher total leaf and root biomass also had higher total rhizodeposited C, whereas species with lower root biomass had higher specific rhizodeposited C (per gram root mass). Experimental controls demonstrated that most of the biases commonly associated with this type of experiment (i.e., long-term steady-state labelling) were avoided using our methodological approach. Conclusions These results suggest that the amount of rhizodeposited C from plants grown under different levels of N were driven mainly by plant biomass and root morphology rather than microbial biomass. They also underline the importance of plant characteristics (i.e., biomass allocation) as opposed to traits associated with plant resource acquisition strategies in predicting total C rhizodeposition.

Access as a motivational device: implications for human resource management

This paper analyzes the employment relationship on the basis of the notion of access. We argue that the degree of access provided by a job is an incentive to activate the employee’s self-actualization needs. We investigate the effect of access on the workers’ performance through an agency model and provide a number of propositions with practical implications for personnel policies. Our results are consistent with the intuition emerged from the real business practice as well as with many of the arguments on the substitutive role between monetary and non-monetary incentives frequently reported in the literature.

A cooperative appproach to queue allocation of indivisible objects

We consider the allocation of a finite number of indivisible objects to the same number of agents according to an exogenously given queue. We assume that the agents collaborate in order to achieve an efficient outcome for society. We allow for side-payments and provide a method for obtaining stable outcomes.

Personal redistribution and the regional allocation of public investment

How should an equity-motivated policy-marker allocate public capital (infrastructure) across regions. Should it aim at reducing interregional differences in per capita output, or at maximizing total output? Such a normative question is examined in a model where the policy-marker is exclusively concerned about personal inequality and has access to two policy instruments. (i) a personal tax-transfer system (taxation is distortionary), and (ii) the regional allocation of public investment. I show that the case for public investment as a significant instrument for interpersonal redistribution is rather weak. In the most favorable case, when the tax code is constrained to be uniform across regions, it is optimal to distort the allocation of public investment in favor of the poor regions, but only to a limited extent. The reason is that poor individuals are relatively more sensitive to public trans fers, which are maximized by allocating public investment efficiently. If! the tax code can vary across regions then the optimal policy may involve an allocation of public investment distorted in favor of the rich regions.

Explaining Variation in Organizational Change: The Reform of Human Resource Management in the European Commission and the OECD

In this article we investigate the reforms of human resource management in the European Commission and the OECD by analyzing comparatively to what extent both organizations have adjusted their respective structures towards the ideal type of the so-called New Public Management (NPM). The empirical findings show that reforms towards NPM are more pronounced in the Commission than in the OECD. These findings are surprising for two reasons: First, it seems rather paradoxical that the OECD as central promoter of NPM at the international level lags behind the global trend when it comes to reforming its own structures. Second, this result is in contradiction with theoretical expectations, as they can be derived from theories of institutional isomorphism. To nevertheless account for the surprising results, it is necessary to modify and complement existing theories especially with regard to the scope conditions of their causal mechanisms.