The effect of intergroup competition on group coordination: An experimental study

We report an experiment on the effect of intergroup competition on group coordination in the minimal-effort game (Van Huyck et al., 1990). The competition was between two 7-person groups. Each player in each group independently chose an integer from 1 to 7. The group with the higher minimum won the competition and each of its members was paid according to the game s original payoff matrix. Members of the losing group were paid nothing. In case of a tie, each player was paid half the payoff in the original matrix. This treatment was contrasted with two control treatments where each of the two groups played an independent coordination game, either with or without information about the minimum chosen by the outgroup. Although the intergroup competition does not change the set of strict equilibria, we found that it improved collective rationality by moving group members in the direction of higher-payoff equilibria. Merely providing group members with information about the minimal-effort level in the other group was not sufficient to generate this effect.

Ex post bargaining, labor coordination and wage formation at the firm level

We lay out a model of wage bargaining with two leading features:bargaining is ex post to relevant investments and there isindividual bargaining in firms without a Union. We compareindividual ex post bargaining to coordinated ex post bargainingand we analyze the effects on wage formation. As opposed to exante bargaining models, the costs of destroying the employmentrelationship play a crucial role in determining wages. Highfiring costs in particular yield a rent for employees. Ourtheory points to a employer size-wage effect that is independentof the production function and market power. We derive a simpleleast squares specification from the theoretical model thatallow us to estimate components of the wage premium fromcoordination. We reject the hypothesis that labor coordinationdoes not alter the extensive form of the bargaining game. Laborcoordination substantially increases bargaining power butdecreases labor's ability to pose costly threats to the firm.

Communication, coordination and efficiency in evolutionary one-population models

We analyze the role of commitment in pre-play communication for ensuringefficient evolutionarily stable outcomes in coordination games. All players are a priori identical as they are drawn from the same population. In games where efficient outcomes can be reached by players coordinating on the same action we find commitment to be necessary to enforce efficiency. In games where efficienct outcomes only result from play of different actions, communication without commitment is most effective although efficiency can no longer be guaranteed. Only when there are many messages then inefficient outcomes are negligible as their basins of attraction become very small.

Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: An experimental study

We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertaintyabout the payoffs. Our game is closely related to models that have beenused in many macroeconomic and financial applications to solve problemsof equilibrium indeterminacy. In our experiment each subject receives anoisy signal about the true payoffs. This game has a unique strategyprofile that survives the iterative deletion of strictly dominatedstrategies (thus a unique Nash equilibrium). The equilibrium outcomecoincides, on average, with the risk-dominant equilibrium outcome ofthe underlying coordination game. The behavior of the subjects convergesto the theoretical prediction after enough experience has been gained. The data (and the comments) suggest that subjects do not apply through"a priori" reasoning the iterated deletion of dominated strategies.Instead, they adapt to the responses of other players. Thus, the lengthof the learning phase clearly varies for the different signals. We alsotest behavior in a game without uncertainty as a benchmark case. The gamewith uncertainty is inspired by the "global" games of Carlsson and VanDamme (1993).

On the role of non-equilibrium focal points as coordination devices

Considering a pure coordination game with a large number of equivalentequilibria, we argue, first, that a focal point that is itself not a Nash equilibriumand is Pareto dominated by all Nash equilibria, may attract the players'choices. Second, we argue that such a non-equilibrium focal point may act asan equilibrium selection device that the players use to coordinate on a closelyrelated small subset of Nash equilibria. We present theoretical as well asexperimental support for these two new roles of focal points as coordinationdevices.

Faculty and Student Perspectives Toward Open Courseware, and Open Access Publishing: Some Comparisons Between European and North American Populations

Instructor and student beliefs, attitudes and intentions toward contributing to local open courseware (OCW) sites have been investigated through campus-wide surveys at Universidad Politecnica de Valencia and the University of Michigan. In addition, at the University of Michigan, faculty have been queried about their participation in open access (OA) publishing. We compare the instructor and student data concerning OCW between the two institutions, and introduce the investigation of open access publishing in relation to open courseware publishing.

Scientific journals in Brazil and Spain: Alternative publishing models

This paper describes high-quality journals in Brazil and Spain, with an emphasis on the distribution models used. It presents the general characteristics (age, type of publisher, and theme) and analyzes the distribution model by studying the type of format (print or digital), the type of access (open access or subscription), and the technology platform used. The 549 journals analyzed (249 in Brazil and 300 in Spain) are included in the 2011 Web of Science (WoS) and Scopus databases. Data on each journal were collected directly from their websites between March and October 2012. Brazil has a fully open access distribution model (97%) in which few journals require payment by authors thanks to cultural, financial, operational, and technological support provided by public agencies. In Spain, open access journals account for 55% of the total and have also received support from public agencies, although to a lesser extent. These results show that there are systems support of open access in scientific journals other than the"author pays" model advocated by the Finch report for the United Kingdom.

Critical behavior of a water monolayer under hydrophobic confinement

The properties of water can have a strong dependence on the confinement. Here, we consider a water monolayer nanoconfined between hydrophobic parallel walls under conditions that prevent its crystallization. We investigate, by simulations of a many-body coarse-grained water model, how the properties of the liquid are affected by the confinement. We show, by studying the response functions and the correlation length and by performing finite-size scaling of the appropriate order parameter, that at low temperature the monolayer undergoes a liquid-liquid phase transition ending in a critical point in the universality class of the two-dimensional (2D) Ising model. Surprisingly, by reducing the linear size L of the walls, keeping the walls separation h constant, we find a 2D-3D crossover for the universality class of the liquid-liquid critical point for L/h=~50, i.e. for a monolayer thickness that is small compared to its extension. This result is drastically different from what is reported for simple liquids, where the crossover occurs for , and is consistent with experimental results and atomistic simulations. We shed light on these findings showing that they are a consequence of the strong cooperativity and the low coordination number of the hydrogen bond network that characterizes water.